Toward a Less-Check Society by Cousins, James A. et al.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 5 Article 3
6-1-1972
Toward a Less-Check Society
James A. Cousins
William A. Imparato
Bruce D. Kelley
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
James A. Cousins, William A. Imparato & Bruce D. Kelley, Toward a Less-Check Society, 47 Notre Dame L. Rev. 853 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol47/iss5/3
SURVEY
TOWARD A LESS-CHECK SOCIETY
CONTENTS
I. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1165
A. The Less-Check Model ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1165
B. Developments Conducive to Modification of the
Payments System ---.-.---------- ........................------------------------------------- 1166
1. Preauthorized Bill Paying --------------------------- .......... ---- - ---------- 1167
2. Overdraft Banking ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1167
3. Increased Use of Automation ---------------------------------------------- 1167
4. Technological Developments -----------.........................------------- 1168
5. Central Information Files ....................................................... 1168
C. Historical Perspective ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1170
1. In General ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1170
2. Why an EFTS? ------------------------------- ..................---- ------------------ 1171
D. The Problem: A Mounting Paper Load ---------------------------------- 1172
E. MICR-A Short Term Solution .................................................... 1175
1. In General -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1175
2. Legal and Operational Problems ---------------------------------------- 1176
II. Developing of the Credit Card Industry ------------------------------------------ 1178
A. Early Credit Card Operations ---------------------------------------------------- 1178
B. Bank Credit Card Operations ---------------------------------------------------- 1180
C. Interbank Credit Card Operations ------------------------------------- 1182
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Credit Cards --------------- .. -- - -  1184
III. Legal Effect of Credit Cards on Consumers .......................................... 1187
A. Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1187
B. Legal Relationships ---------------------- ........................--------------------------- 1187
1. Issuer-Merchant ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1188
2. Cardholder-Merchant ------------------------------------------------------------ 1190
3. Issuer-Cardholder ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1190
C. Case Law -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1192
1. No Written Agreement -------------------------------- ...----------------- 1192
2. Strict Contract ------------------------------- ...........- -  - -- - -- - ----- . 1195
3. Economic Policy -------------------------------------------------------------- - - - . 1197
4. Balancing of Consumer v. Business Interests ---.......------------- 1200
D. Legislation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1204
1. Unsolicited Credit Cards ------------------------------------------------------ 1204
2. Loss or Theft of Credit Cards ---------------------------------------------- 1205
3. Consumer Billing Practices-A Proposal ............................... 1208
a. The Shrinking Billing Period .---...........................--------- 1208
b. Computer Billing Errors -------.-.--- ... ......................------------ 1208
c. Adverse Credit Rating -----------............................-------------- 1209
d. Preservation of Cardholder Defenses .......................... 1209
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
e. Billing Reforms ---------------------------------------------------------------
f. Administrative Reforms ......................................................
4. Consumer Liability- A Suggestion ------------------------------------------
IV. Toward a Less-Check Society ..............................................................
A . In trodu ction --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Changes Required to Accommodate an EFTS .....................
2. C onsum er O pinion --------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Elements of an EFTS Present Today .................................
B. Preauthorized Paym ent Plans ----------------------------------------------------------
1. In General ..............................................................................
2. Current Problems ..................................................................
3. California's SCOPE Project ..............................................
a. An Experiment With "Paperless" Preauthorized
Payments --------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Participating Entities ---------------------------------------------......-
c. Processing of "Paperless" Entries .................................
d. Advantages to SCOPE Participants ----------------------------------
e. Legal Framework ............................................................
C. Hempstead Bank Experiment (ITS) .-----..........................--------
D. Other Groups Studying the Payments System ...........................
1. American Banker's Association ............................................
2. Federal Reserve System ............................................................
V. Legal Problems and Solutions for the EFTS ....................................
A. Application of the Uniform Commercial Code ............................
1. In General ..............................................................................
2. Collection of Items: Depositary and
Collecting Banks ....................................................................
3. Remittance ..............................................................................
4. Collection of Items: Payor Banks ------------------------------------------
5. Relationship Between Payor Bank and
Its Custom er ............................................................................
B . Is C ontract the A nsw er? ------------------------------------------------------------------
C. The Federal Reserve System ..........................................................
D. Bank Mergers and Their Antitrust Implication .......................
E . O ther A ntitrust Problem s ----------------------------------------------------------------
1. M onopolization ......................................................................
2. Concerted R efusals to D eal ------------------------------------------------------
3. Tying Agreements ..................................................................
F. Admission of Computer Print-Outs as
Business Records ............................................................................
1. In General ..............................................................................
2. Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule ...............
a. The Common Law Shop-Book Rule ...........................
b. Codifications of the Shop-Book Rule ------------------------------
c. Case Law ........................................................................
d. Unresolved Issues and a Suggested Approach ............
3. B est E vidence R ule --------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Right to Privacy --------------------------------------------------------------------------
VI. Conclusion
1210
1211
1211
1214
1214
1215
1216
1219
1220
1220
1221
1222
1222
1222
1223
1224
1225
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1233
1238
1241
1242
1243
1247
1250
1253
1254
1254
1258
1262
1265
1265
1267
1267
1269
1276
1281
1282
1284
1289
fjune, 1972]1164
[Vol. 47:1163]
TOWARD A LESS-CHECK SOCIETY
I. Introduction
A. The Less-Check Model
The time: 1984; the place: Midtown, USA; the setting: a typical day in
the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Jim Jones using an electronic funds transfer system
(EFTS)1 in place of our present paper-based system.
Mr. and Mrs. Jones arise at their usual time. Mrs. Jones prepares breakfast
as her husband gets ready for work. After breakfast, Mrs. Jones drives her hus-
band to work and then decides to go into the city to do some shopping. At the
supermarket, the clerk rings up her bill: $1.31, $1.92, $.57 .... "Will that be
cash or electronic transfer?" "Make it electronic transfer please, and have it
charged." Mrs. Jones then takes out her plastic identification card and hands
it to the clerk who inserts it in an apparatus located behind the counter. Mrs.
Jones proceeds to push a number of buttons-her confidential code-in a small,
inexpensive input terminal which in turn is connected through the supermarket's
telephone to a computer system located miles away. Instantaneously, her record
on the computer is interrogated, her credit rating computed and a rating deter-
mined and the clerk informed as to the results by means of a voice answerback
system or signal device at the counter. Had Mrs. Jones decided to make a "cash
purchase," she would have presented the card to the clerk who would have in-
serted the card in an electronic input apparatus which would have read the card
and established immediately and automatically an electronic communication
with her bank. If there was money in her account sufficient to cover the trans-
action, an indicator on the card-reading apparatus would have instructed the
clerk to complete the sale. The clerk would then have activated the device caus-
ing the amount of purchase to be automatically deducted from Mrs. Jones' ac-
count and added to the supermarket's account.
When Mrs. Jones arrives at home, she discovers that the mailman has left
a couple of bills which she decides to pay. She uses her touch tone telephone,
first to contact the bank's computer, and next to transfer funds from her account
to those of her creditors. If Mrs. Jones decides that she is "tired" of paying her
monthly bills in this fashion, she may make arrangements with her bank whereby
the bank's computer will automatically pay all bills for purchases or services
rendered by and for the Joneses. In this way, those payments that occur periodi-
cally, such as rent, mortgage, insurance, utility bills, etc., will be made auto-
1 "Electronic funds transfer system" means transferring information about fund transfers
over communication networks, starting with input from a terminal at the point of
sale and culminating in a computerized bookkeeping transaction at some central fund
transfer computer station, which in most cases, we assume, will be at a banking
institution.
"Fund transfer" means the movement of funds from the account of the consumer to
the account of the merchant, or from the buyer to the seller, or from the employer
to the employee.
Address by Dale L. Reistad, Deputy Manager and Director of Automation, The American
Bankers Association, before the Management- Operations- Trust Conference of the Mary-
land Bankers Association, in Baltimore, Maryland, November 9, 1967.
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matically. As for nonperiodic expenditures, the amount of purchases which were
charged during the month will all be recorded on tape. On the the first day of
every month, each store's computer where the Joneses had charged certain pur-
chases will order Jones' bank's computer to switch the amount of the charges to
the store's account. Additionally, if the Jones' bank account runs short, the com-
puter will automatically lend them what is needed, up to a predetermined limit,
deducting the repayments and interest charges when due. This phenomenon is
known as overdraft banking.
Meanwhile, Mr. Jones' salary from his employer, minus the regular deduc-
tions, will be electronically written on a tape. The tape will run through a com-
puter in the employer's office which is connected to a computer at Mr. Jones'
bank. Every day the computer at the employer's office will instruct the bank's
computer to deposit Mr. Jones' pay for that day in his bank. No longer will Mr.
Jones have to deposit his check in person or by mail. In addition, Mr. Jones'
employer benefits since he has cut costs by dispensing with the clerical work of
making out checks and keeping payroll records. On the other hand, another
intangible which Mr. Jones gains is that he no longer will lend his employer
money. Previously, he was paid once a month which meant, in effect, that he
was lending his employer approximately 30 days' pay every month without in-
terest.
The bank's computer will also be an investment advisor. Suppose Mr.
Jones instructs the computer that his living expenses never exceed $500 per
month. The computer could then transfer anything above that amount to his
savings account. Or Mr. Jones may instruct the computer to invest everything
above $3000 in debentures or mutual funds. The computer could even deter-
mine the advisability of Mr. Jones taking a discount for prompt payment of a
bill rather than paying later.
Mrs. Jones enjoys the EFTS with one exception-no longer is she able to
write a check on Friday in order to purchase a new dress and then over the
weekend talk her husband into putting money in their account Monday morning
in order to "cover" the check. The reason for this is the elimination of "float,"
i.e., the time in which a check is in the process of collection.2
B. Developments Conducive to Modification
of the Payments System
Although the above example may seem unrealistic at the present time, the
fact is that we are now experiencing part of this process. In addition to the
expanding use of credit cards in our society, some of the other major develop-
ments present today which will carry over into the future are:
(1) Preauthorized bill paying by banks;
(2) Overdraft banking;
(3) Increased use of automation by commercial banks;
(4) Increasing development of new technology; and
(5) Central information files.
2 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (4th ed. 1968).
[june, 1972]
1. Preauthorized Bill Paying
Briefly, preauthorized bill paying by banks works in this way. A depositor
will give his or her bank written authorization to pay specific recurring bills such
as utilities, insurance, rent, mortgage payments, etc. up to a certain amount.
The bank will then merely deduct from the person's account the amount of the
bill paid and credit it to the proper corresponding account. "[It] is simply an
automatic method of paying from or depositing funds to an individual bank
account, under authority granted to the bank by the account holder."' More
will be said later concerning this device.
2. Overdraft Banking
The revolving overdraft loan is also very important. The overdraft is "a
written order, directed to a bank, to pay a stated sum which is in excess of the
funds available in the account from which the order is to be paid."' Clearly,
"[w]ithout this feature the whole operation of automatic value exchange may
very well grind to a halt amid a welter of irritations at its inadequacy in meeting
the day to day needs of the consumer."'
A common example is the insurance company, which instead of billing
the customer each month sends the bill for the premium to the customer's bank
which pays the bill by simply transferring the specified amount from the cus-
tomer's account to the insurance company's account. Such preauthorization ac-
complishes three significant things:
Since the customer received no bill, he did not have to write a check and
mail it to the insurance company; since the insurance company maintained
a checking account at the customer's bank, the transaction could be com-
pleted as a book entry-no check was required; since no check was required,
the transaction could be completed almost instantly, once the -bill had been
presented to the bank. The customer's bill was paid, the insurance com-
pany had access to the funds practically as soon as payment was due, and
no checks entered the payments mechanism. 6
3. Increased Use of Automation
The increased use of automation by commercial banks permits us to think
constructively about an electronic funds transfer system (EFTS). Automated
devices currently in operation include computers with high processing speed,
multiprocessing capability, and high speed mass memory, on-line terminal sys-
tems, voice recognition devices and sophisticated computer languages, and
management systems. Recently,
3 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, REPORT ON ELECTRONIC MONEY . . . AND THE
PAYMENTS MECHANISM 9 (1968).
4 Id. at 10.
5 Address by Richard E. Sprague, Director, Advanced Business Systems, Touche, Ross,
Bailey & Smart of New York, in Chicago, before the National Installment Credit Conference,
April 4, 1966.
6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, supra note 3, at 11.
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[T]echnology has given bankers a big hand in shoveling through the per-
petual blizzard of paper: computers that read checks, confirm signatures,
tally accounts and render statements are the reason why bank personnel do
not work hundred-hour weeks.7
4. Technological Developments
Third generation computers8 employing sophisticated multiple use tech-
niques are sufficiently adaptable and capable of vast memory storage to permit
instantaneous access from a large number of terminals, rapid response, and use
from remote areas. In addition, touch tone telephones9 exist which transmit
number codes for both identification and transaction. The consumer can iden-
tify himself in a variety of ways, e.g., voice prints or numerical codes. Many of
these devices are in operation today. Illustrative of this fact is the current
experiment being conducted in Upper Arlington, Ohio, organized by City Na-
tional Bank and Trust Company in conjunction with IBM and National Bank
Americard, Inc.i" IBM designed a minicomputer terminal which a number of
Upper Arlington merchants have installed next to cash registers. The units
validate the credit card purchases and, through a computer in the City National
Bank, instantly credit the sale to the merchant's account. The customer is billed
and has 25 days to pay. The merchant receives his money immediately, since
his account is credited without a trip to the bank. A similar more ambitious
project has been under way for a number of years in Wilmington, Delaware,
under the auspices of the Bank of Delaware. Mr. Donald R. Schnee and Mr.
Walter B. Trabbold, both bank vice presidents, are two of the key men in the
Bank of Delaware plan. Their views on the importance of the computer in
commercial banking places technology's role in proper perspective. They believe
that:
Properly used, the computer can hold down operating costs in the face of
a steadily and rapidly increasing operational workload. It can provide a
foundation for an array of entirely new customer services. And, through
these services, it can enable banks to take the initiative in the highly profit-
able consumer-credit area and immensely increase the scope of the financial
services they can offer business. This combined potential makes the com-
puter just about the single most important profit factor in commercial bank-
ing today.11
5. Central Information Files
Many banks that participate in the credit card arena are amassing central
7 NEWS FRONT, May 1968, at 31.
8 Third generation computers are characterized by modularity and compatibility. These
computers are sufficiently adaptable so that new equipment may be added to them when needed
rather than having to build an entirely new system.
9 Tied in with touch tone telephones is an ARU, or audio response unit, a product of
IBM. A customer may present a check to a teller to be cashed. The teller can check the cus-
tomer's balance in his account and direct the computer to establish a hold thereon by using
the touch tone instrument which is on line with the computer. Almost immediately, the teller
receives an oral response from the computer which informs him that the customer's account is
good for a certain amount of money.
10 The Plain Dealer, Nov. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
11 D. SCHNEE & W. TRABBOLD, PROGRESS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS '(5th ed. 1970).
[June, 1972]
information files on their customers which contain financial information, per-
tinent data and a "basic description of every customer, including his relationship
with the bank and cross-references to where detailed account information can be
found."1 2 These central information fies form the nucleus of a central informa-
tion system, "a system that organizes all the information about accounts in a
way that makes it quickly and easily accessible to the people and machines con-
cerned with performing the various operational functions."" The importance of
these central information files is obvious. Any retailer or bank possessing an on-
line terminal could obtain an up-to-date report on the status of a particular cus-
tomer's account almost instantaneously. Such a file would facilitate faster ser-
vice while at the same time preventing fraud by the customer, in addition to
providing other information.'4
For the electronic funds transfer system to become operative on a national
basis, we must think in terms of a unified central information system. The neces-
sity for such a system is apparent in the following example:
A man buys a car in Los Angeles, and falls behind in his payments. To keep
the car from being repossessed he takes out a loan in Denver. Instantly,
the computers will spot the ploy and his Bank Americard will be cancelled
before he can run up a debt which the odds are he won't be able to repay.' 5
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that a Less-Check Society'"
will not come about through revolutionary means but through a gradual evolu-
tionary process in the payments system-a process which this country has experi-
enced many times before. The check, long considered to represent "about as
sophisticated a payments mechanism as modem commerce and technology
might devise,"' 7 is now giving way to a computerized payments mechanism.'
The form of money is changing:
The world has seen some pretty ridiculous kinds of money-from shells and
little stones with holes cut in them, to scraps of paper of assorted colors and
designs. But in their respective times and places, each has done a very
important job; each has served as a more-or-less workable means of making
payment for goods and services.' 9
Next, we will examine the most important aspect of money, i.e., what it
does.
12 Id. at 15.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 24.
15 Foans, Sept. 15, 1966, at 39.
16 The "Less-Check" Society is one in which we will use a proportionately smaller
number of checks in the fund transfer process because of the development of new,
more convenient and economical forms which will replace many if not all of the
checks that flow through the banking system.
Address by Dale Reistad, supra note 1.
17 FFDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BoSTON, supra note 3, at 3.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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C. Historical Perspective
1. In General
"Money is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously what would be
done, though less quickly and commodiously without it."
John Stuart Mill
In an exchange society, money acts as an intermediary that performs four
primary functions. It acts as (1) a measure of value, (2) a medium of exchange,
(3) a store of value, and (4) as a standard of deferred payment. 0 We will focus
our attention on the second and fourth of these capacities.2
As a medium of exchange, money has served to ease the burden of increased
economic activity. To bring about the smooth and effective exchange of goods as
new economic systems evolved, innovations in the basic money form have ad-
justed to the demands of technology. In each step of the evolutionary process,
the volume of transactions has increased, thereby warranting further innovation.
A look at the five previous stages of development of the payments system illus-
trates this. First, the Age of Commodity Money, or the barter system, evolved.
This was followed by the Age of Metal Coinage. Then, during the Middle Ages,
came the Age of Receipts, whereby written receipts were the medium of owner-
ship. A few hundred years later the Age of Paper Money developed. Most re-
cently, in 1861, the Age of Checks was introduced into the United States. 22
The more modem function of money as a standard of deferred credit has
been institutionalized in the banking and savings and loan industries. For some
time, banks have participated in retail credit financing by lending money to con-
sumers. In 1951, banks followed the lead of oil companies, department stores,
and travel and entertainment credit card programs and offered their own credit
card plans. Their entry has made consumer financing more profitable, but the
mass of paperwork that has accumulated calls for an evaluation of the basic
money form. The introduction of computers and high-speed MICR 2' reader-
sorters are only temporary measures in stemming the tide of paper volume.
20 R. THOMAS, OUR MODERN BANKING AND MONETARY SYSTEM 6 (4th ed. 1964).
21 At one time money had its value as a commodity. George W. Mitchell has stated that
thru history "money which was inferior in its commodity value had the capacity to force
out of circulation money that was superior in that respect. Eventually the phrase 'bad money
drives out good' became a monetary aphorism." Mr. Mitchell hopes that since money no longer
has worth as a commodity, the relative advantages of alternative forms of money, i.e., avail-
ability, convenience, safety and economy, will be exploited. As a result, he foresees an elec-
tronic transfer system (credit transfers) displacing at least half of the present-day volume of
checks without the concomitant problems of float, check kiting, inflated deposit totals and
other effects adding to the cost of the payment system. He proposes that this new form of
money transaction will make it possible for " 'good' (better) money to drive out 'bad' - some-
thing that has not happened up to now." Address by George W. Mitchell, Member, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at the American Management Association, New
York, Mar. 24, 1971.
22 See Duffy, Automation and Checkbook Money Outlook, BANKING, May 1966, at 30;
Soon You'll Never See Money at All, CHANGING TMES, Oct. 1967, at 7, 8.
23 Magnetic Ink Character Recognition.
1170 [June, 1972]
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Whether transfer of money is accomplished through a telephone or a computer
terminal, and whether it is activated by an electronic sensitized "money card"
or a personal identification card, the underlying purpose is the same-"to harness
the lightning-fast calculating speed and massive information storage capabilities
of modem electronic computers in a new and important way."24 The end result
sought is the reduction in the use of checks and speeding up of the process of
fund transfers. A change in the basic money form to an EFTS is drastically
needed. This change will not be a novelty; rather it will be the sixth stage in
the development of the payments system-The Age of Less-Check.
2. Why An EFTS?
The number of checks processed in the United States each year has been
growing rapidly. In another ten years, truly staggering amounts of paper will
require processing by the banking system. Even with the help of Magnetic Ink
Character Recognition (MICR) encoding and processing, many banks are ex-
periencing difficulties handling the growing number of checks. It seems obvious
that these difficulties will mount as check volume continues to increase. 5
This survey discusses the problem of handling this increasing paperload, and
looks at the development of what many feel will be the ultimate solution: the
Electronic Funds Transfer System. The focus is on (1) the historic development
of the credit card which will become an integral part of the EFTS, (2) basic
problems which must be met if such a system is to evolve, (3) some of the devel-
opments which are currently under way, and (4) selected legal problems of the
EFTS.
What is the present and future status of our payments system? Is our check-
based payments system undergoing a revolutionary change which will result in
the disappearance of the check, or are we simply continuing an evolutionary
change which will introduce a new payments alternative into our present struc-
ture? A study of today's problems, available alternatives, and areas of resistance
which will have to be surmounted to achieve a basic change in our payments
system, should shed light on where we may be going, what needs to be done to
get there, and what changes are likely to occur along the way.
An investigation conducted by the Bank Administration Institute developed
estimates of the volume and dollar amounts of money transfers in our present
payments system. These estimates appear below. 6
24 Kramer and Livingston, Cashing in on the Checkless Society, IR&Rv. Bus. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1967, at 141, 142.
25 Clark, The Payments System: Problems, Fantasies, and Realities, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YoRK MONTHLY REVIEW, May 1970, at 109.
26 BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTrrUTE, THE CHECK COLLECTION SYsTEM-A QUANTITA-
TIvE DESCRiPTION 1 (1969).
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1967 Estimated Distribution of Money Transfers
by Volume and Dollar Values
Average Daily Average Daily
Types of Number of % Dollar Value of
Money Transfers Money Transfers Money Transfers
1. Checks 74,900,000 99.6% $29.2 billion 52.8%
2. Wire 34,500 0.1% $25.5 billion 46.1%
3. Miscellaneous* 265,500 0.3% $ 0.6 billion 1.1%
*Miscellaneous money transfers includes bank credit card sales slips, debit and credit advises
from correspondent and Federal Reserve Banks to smaller banks, coin and currency transfers,
etc.
The major role played by the check in our present payments system is well
illustrated by this table. The popularity of the check as a medium of exchange
is further illustrated by an inspection of annual check volume. In 1945, annual
check volume was 5.3 billion; in 1955, 8.9 billion; in 1966, 18.0 billion;"r and
in 1970, 22.0 billion. As might be expected, this rapid growth has placed con-
siderable pressure upon the banking industry's ability to process these payments
transactions.
Because of these pressures, dire future predictions and numerous suggested
revisions in our payments system became commonplace in both bank trade and
general business publications. Concern, both within and without the banking
industry, developed regarding the banking industry's future ability to cope with
this growing paper mountain. It was recognized that "[d]istribution systems
which must process and transport paper items have maximum volume limita-
tions, and they begin to falter when these limits are reached. The postal system
and brokerage houses, currently struggling to maintain effective service, already
may have reached this point."2"
During this period of substantial growth in check volume, the introduction
of the computer and continued refinement in both hardware0 and software3'
offered new alternatives which would not require the passage of paper. As a
result of these concurrent developments, trade literature began proclaiming the
birth of an entirely new payment system-the Less-Check Society.
D. The Problem: A Mounting Paper Load
As has been indicated, the volume of checks processed in the United States
has experienced startling growth, increasing at about a seven percent annual
rate" during the past 15 years. Moreover, the average check is processed
through 2.6 institutions before it is paid, and each check is often handled more
than once in a single bank." The 18.65 billion checks written and paid in 1967
27 Id. at 3.
28 A Cashless Society Isn't Here, BUSINESS WEEK, June 5, 1971, 21, 22.
29 Banks: Left at the Line?, THE MAoAZINE O1z BANK ADMINISTRATION, Mar. 1969. at 1.
30 A colloquialism applied to the mechanical, electrical, and electronic features of a data
processing system.
31 The programs and routines used to extend the capabilities of computers.
32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, supra; note 3, at 1.
33 BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 26, at 17.
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required about 48.68 billion individual bank handlings."' It has been estimated
that this processing represents an annual cost of over $3 billion. 5
The check collection system is illustrated in the diagram below.8
S Statement I
Check
0ipi Deposit U
Recipient____
Interbank Collection Mechanism
Paying Bank
Check
Settlement
T/ IBank
LRipientank_
The entities involved in the check collection process and
are illustrated by the following diagram.
Entities Involved With the Check Collection System
the paper flow
34 Id. at 18.
35 FEDERAL RESERvE BANK OF BOSTON, supra note 3, at 4.
36 BANE: ADmINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 26, at 13.
37 Id. at 12.
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As can be seen, this collection mechanism consists of a network of processing
points which are tied together by transportation and communication systems.
The processing points are the nation's 13,693 commercial banks with their 17,690
branches, 248 city clearinghouses, and the 12 Federal Reserve Banks with their
24 branches." Federal Reserve Banks and about 400 larger commercial banks
are the major distribution centers. 9 Through these processing points flow more
than half of all the checks written.40
The use of the check, with all its advantages, is an inherently inefficient
payment instrument. As indicated in Figure 1, at its routine best, a check makes
a double trip going from drawer to payee and back again. At its dishonored
worst, it travels only part of the original route, perhaps once, perhaps several
times.41 The obvious disadvantage of the stop-shuffle-and-go-paper-merry-go-
round in an age of direct long-distance dialing and other communication marvels
strongly suggests that it is only a matter of time until the collection-payment
mechanism undergoes a reform which will produce the speed, directness and
certainty which, on one hand, technology makes available and, on the other,
modem financial conditions demand.42
The effect of any attempt to stabilize or reduce the number of checks pro-
cessed through the bank collection system must take into account who initiated
the payment order, who received the payment, and what its purpose was. An
understanding of the source and destination of check flow is necessary to evaluate
the effect that any alternative will have on reducing the volume of checks. The
table below gives the results of a survey conducted by the Bank Administration
Institute regarding the source and destination of checks.43
As can be seen, individuals are the major check writers and businesses the- major
Percentage of
Check Writers Checks Written
Individuals 51.7%
Business 46.6%
Government 1.7 %
Percentage of
Check Receivers Checks Written
Individuals 42.8%
Business 55.0%
Government 2.2%
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Dunne, Variation on A Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code & the Checkless Society, 75 YALB L.J. 788, 790 (1966).
42 Id. at 792.
43 BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 26, at 7.
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check receivers. Such programs as the one-check payroll4 and preauthorized
payment of bills4 can play a substantial role in the reduction of check volume.
Each of these programs could reduce the number of checks written by individuals
and businesses.
The banking industry has been so successful in marketing its checking ac-
count services that it is questionable how long they will be able to continue to
efficiently process checks. It has been estimated that if all checks written in 1967
were processed by hand, as they once were, it would take every woman in the
United States between the ages of 18 and 60 to accomplish it.4" However, the
increasing pressure has been relieved somewhat through the introduction of
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR). The use of MICR has enabled
the system to process an ever-increasing load, and thereby buy time for future
change to be implemented in an orderly fashion.
E. MICR-A Short-term Solution
1. In General
The banking industry found a short run solution to its paper load problem
through the use of MICR which now appears on all checks. This inscription in
magnetic ink enables machines to read the identifying number of the drawee
bank, the dollar amount involved, and the account number of the account to
be charged. Electronic data processing equipment can digest this information,
sorting and tabulating at speeds up to 1,500 checks per minute.4 ' Thus far, the
use of the computer's skills at reading and writing has been generally limited
to facilitating check sorting and bookkeeping jobs within points along the check
clearing route, although there is no technical reason why, having once read the
information on a check, the equipment could not then transmit the data electroni-
cally to the payor bank.4" Consequently, while each institution through which a
check passes may have done its bookkeeping chores electronically, each, in turn,
has duplicated a number of steps in the bookkeeping process, just as it had before
the electronic mechanisms joined the office staff.4"
This improvement in check processing primarily affected only those who
participated in the bank collection process. Since the use of MICR had very
little effect upon users of checks - the housewife or businessman - adoption of
this system required only that banks and clearinghouses acquire the necessary
equipment, and pre-encode checks before distribution to banking customers.
Since the objective was to solve an internal problem of check volume, the con-
44 The employer, rather than issuing a check to each employee, draws one check for the
entire payroll and deposits it in his payroll account. He then furnishes the bank with payroll
records indicating the amount of pay each employee is to receive. The bank then credits each
employee's account with the amount of his earnings.
45 The bank customer authorizes his bank to debit certain monthly bills directly to his
checking account. The vendor then sends the bill directly to the customer's bank. Upon receipt
of a bill for which the bank has received a preauthorization, the bank debits the customer's
account and credits the vendor's account.
46 Reynolds, The Checkless Society, DuNs Rav., May 1968, at 13.
47 FEDERAL R sERvE BANK OF BoSTON, supra note 3, at 6.
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id.
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version to automated data processing was accomplished without significant op-
position. However, such ease of transition is not likely to accompany a change
which affects the user of the payments system.
As indicated above, the essential data the check carries is pre-encoded in
magnetic ink on the check prior to customer receipt. The amount of the check
is encoded once the check enters the collection process. Errors in this encoding
process may give rise to both operational and potential legal problems.
2. Legal and Operational Problems
If the encoding in the amount field differs from the amount for which the
drawer issued the check and this error goes undetected, it will result in over-
payment or underpayment of the check. An example of such a processing error
and its possible consequences was related by John Fink, Vice President, First
National Bank of Southwestern Michigan."0 A check had been received through
the collection system, processed; paid, and returned to the drawer in his monthly
statement. This check had been drawn for $65,000; but, due to an undetected
encoding error by the depository bank, the check had passed through the clearing
process and was ultimately paid according to the amount encoded, $6,500. As
a result of this error the payor bank could have missed a stop payment order."'
On the other hand, had the check been over-encoded rather than under-encoded,
it could have resulted in a debit to the drawer's account for the over-encoded
amount which may have resulted in the return of other checks for insufficient
funds. Or, had the under-encoded check gone undetected for a sufficient period
of time, the payee's account, not having been credited with the proper amount,
could have been overdrawn, resulting in his checks being returned for insufficient
funds (NSF). In either case the bank may be accountable for damages proxi-
mately caused by dishonor of these subsequent checks.5 2
Although there are no judicial decisions allocating loss resulting from errone-
ously encoded items," such errors do occur.54 The reason for this lack of re-
ported decisions is probably the ease with which the source of the error can be
determined, which allows banks to settle their disputes based upon the source of
the improper encoding.
Section 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code establishes the liability
for wrongful dishonor and sets the measures of damages as those proximately
50 Interview with John E. Fink, Vice President, First National Bank of Southwestern
Michigan, in Niles, Michigan, Oct. 27, 1971.
51 Upon receipt of a stop payment order, banks which use a computer processing system
instruct the computer to reject all checks drawn for the amount of the stopped check on the
account against which the stop order was placed. Since the check number is not magnetically
encoded the only method by which the computer can identify a stopped check is the amount
field. Any checks rejected by the computer are inspected by a clerk to determine if they are
the check against which the stop order was placed. An under-encoded or over-encoded check will
not be rejected. Unless the error is discovered by the clerk who files the checks the stop order
is likely to be missed.
52 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COD- § 4-402.
53 Address by John J. Clarke, Vice President & Special Legal Advisor of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, School for Bank Administration, Aug. 7-8, 1968 [hereinafter cited
as Address by John J. Clarke].
54 Interview with John E. Fink, supra note 50.
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caused by the wrongful dishonor. This would seem to establish the payor bank's
liability to the drawer for wrongful dishonor of an over-encoded check. However,
the encoding error may well have occurred at an intermediary bank or at the
depository bank. The problem may often become, therefore, one of allocation of
liability between the collecting bank-which erroneously encoded an item and the
payor bank.5 Such allocation of liability may turn upon an assessment of the
degrees of fault attributable to the encoding bank that made the initial error and
the payor bank that paid too much or too little as a consequence of that error.56
Presumably, the party regarded as most at fault would be called to bear the full
brunt of the risk of loss." This suggested method of allocating the liability
between banks is compatible with other generally accepted legal principles.58
Another potential problem can arise from encoding errors in either the
customer's account number or the bank's routing-symbol-transit number. These
identifying symbols are pre-encoded on the check when delivered to the account
holder. Check stock is usually purchased by the bank from a supplier who
encodes these symbols. An encoding error in the customer's account number may
cause his check to be debited to another account within the bank, with the
resulting problems mentioned when an over-encoded check is debited to the
drawer's account. Here again it would seem reasonable that the liability would
turn upon an assessment of fault between the payor bank and the supplier who
encoded the check.
An incorrectly encoded routing-symbol-transit number, which can be a
product of either error or fraud, may result in the so-called "ricocheting check."59
An example of this phenomenon is as follows:
What happens is that the routing-symbol-transit number MICR encoded
along the bottom of the check contains an error in that the indicated Fed-
eral Reserve District does not have a Bank in its district that has that
transit number. Therefore when the check, after having entered banking
channels is sent to the indicated Federal Reserve Bank, it is rejected by
the Bank's high speed sorting equipment and becomes an "out" item subject
to manual processing. The problem is compounded, however, when the
check is subsequently examined by a clerk. The printed symbol in the
upper right-hand comer of the check (which the clerk customarily examines)
indicates that the check is drawn on a bank in another Federal Reserve
District. When it is sent there and is introduced into the high speed equip-
ment of the Federal Reserve Bank, it is sorted back to the first district
because that is what the MIOR encoding calls for. The process is there
repeated, and continues so long as the check is a machinable item. Whether
this kind of check is the result of an innocent error or is an instrument of
fraud, a bank of deposit would no doubt pay out against such a check once
the normal time for presentment and return had elapsed, and long before
the check would itself be spotted in the normal way.60
55 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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The fact that these varied instances of potential legal problems exist as a
result of the adoption of MICR encoding gives some indication of the com-
plexities which arise when the payments system is altered. However, this rela-
tively minor operational change in the processing of checks apparently has not
been a source of litigation. In practice the system works well and allows the
banking industry to handle an ever-increasing volume of checks.
II. Development of the Credit Card Industry
A. Early Credit Card Operations
The decade of the 1960's has been correctly called the age of the consumer."
Credit cards and bank cards have, to a large extent, played a significant role in
this development. How the consumer became king is a story of the rapid evolu-
tion of debt through installment credit.
Debt, once considered as something sinful and still so considered by some,
has become part of the American way of life. "Buy now, pay later," often con-
sidered as a sort of forced savings for those who otherwise never would have
deprived themselves sufficiently to save enough to make all cash purchases, has
brought virtually every type of consumer good within the reach of even many
relatively low income families.62
It is safe to say that the American consumer was not the innovator of debt.
Long before Columbus set foot on American soil, the Babylonians, the Egyptians,
the Celts and the Romans, among other civilizations, extended credit."3 The
ancients used letters of credit to travel on, "a rather antediluvian hybrid of credit
card and traveler's check."64 The first actual credit card was not the same as we
have today. Rather, it was a letter of credit. Called the "Traveletter System," 5
it was introduced in 1894 and used by executives and salesmen to charge travel-
ing and lodging expenses.
A forerunner of today's credit card was the "credit coin"66 which was issued
principally by department stores to their customers as a convenience for prompt
service on credit sales."r During the early development of installment credit, the
customer ordinarily incurred no fee for the privilege of using goods on credit.
Today, the retailer usually exacts a service charge computed monthly on a
percentage of the unpaid balance."
61 Sarfati, Changing Patterns of Consumer Credit, BANKING, March 1970, at 41.
62 Nicholson, The Danger Point in Consumer Credit, MAGAZINE OF WALL STREET, Oct. 3,
1964, at 56, 90.
63 H. BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER 7 (1961).
64 A Friendly Game of Cards, BuSINESS TODAY, Autumn 1970, at 32.
65 H. BLACK, supra note 63, at 14.
66 The credit coin is a metal piece showing the name of the retail merchant and includes a
series of numerals which pertain to the customer's account. The credit card as we know it
today is a piece of plastic or stiff paper which displays the name and/or address of its owner
and his billing number.
67 Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VAL. U.L. Rv.
218 (1967).
68 Most charge accounts work on a "revolving credit basis" which developed out of the
90-day charge account with the addition of a service charge (usually 1% to 1 '%) to the
unpaid balance at the end of each month; purchases may be made against the account each
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The credit card first came into widespread use beginning in the 1920's as
a result of promotion by the large oil companies who began issuing courtesy
cards to certain privileged customers. In those days, credit cards had three basic
functions: "
(1) They were often prestige items issued only to valued customers;
(2) They were more convenient to use than cash; and
(3) They provided some degree of safety.
During World War II the use of credit cards virtually disappeared because
of restraints placed on consumer spending by the Government." With the end
of the war, the restrictions were gradually lifted and many that had previously
issued cards reinstated their plans. Diners' Club7' became one of the pioneers of
the travel and entertainment card and enjoyed a virtual monopoly as a "money
card"72 until October of 1958 when the American Express Company7" entered
the scene to be followed by the Hilton Credit Corporation 4 approximately six
months later.
The services offered by these companies have remained basically unchanged
since their initial appearance. Their primary appeal lies in the selling of a
service rather than a product and should not be confused with bank credit cards.
The travel-oriented cards issued by these three companies provide national and
international coverage for charge purchases for transportation, hotel accommoda-
tion, and dining to meet the needs of businessmen and tourists. For this reason,
they are often called travel and entertainment or T & E cards, even though they
can be used for other kinds of purchases. A person who meets the requirements
set up by these companies is issued a card in exchange for an annual fee. The
average user is charged $15-$25 a year, more if he has supplementary cards for
k
month as long as the balance does not exceed the account limit. The balance may never be
cleared for the credit "revolves" round and round. Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 459 (1960).
69 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT ON BANK CREDIT-CAaD AND CHECK CREDIT PLANS
7 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEM REPORT].
70 Id.
71 It all began one February night in 1950, when a struggling New Yorker, Frank Mac-
Namara, decided to work late at his office, the Hamilton Credit Company. MacNamara. a
35-year-old specialist in commercial credit, took time off to have a dinner at a strange res-
taurant. Upon presentation of the bill, MacNamara discovered he had misplaced his wallet.
Faced with the possibility that he might have to spend the rest of the evening among the
restaurant's pots and pans, he put in a hasty call to his wife on Long Island to bail him out.
She arrived two hours later with the money. The next day MacNamara had lunch with his
lawyer, Ralph Schneider, and together the two hatched the idea of what was to become the
Diners' Club. In the credit card industry, MacNamara's dinner is now fondly referred to as the
First Supper.
72 There are two basic types of cards, the travel and entertainment type, which covers
almost any kind of expense anywhere, and the private label card, which is issued by
a particular organization, such as an airline, for using its services only. The principal
difference between the two is that the travel and entertainment card must be paid
for, while the private label cards are issued free.
The three prominent T&E cards are Diners' Club, Carte Blanche and American Express. How
Credit Cards Can Help Your Firm, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, April 1968, at 56.
73 The American Express Company issues the American Express Credit Card.
74 The Hilton Credit Card came to be called the Carte Blanche Credit Card. Hilton sold
it to the First National Bank of New York effective January 1, 1966, and it has since been
operated by the Carte Blanche Corporation.
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members of his family. Participating establishments send their sales tickets to
the card issuer in return for the amount of sale less a prenegotiated discount.5
Retailers feel that the increase in sales revenue through increased use of the cards
by customers more than makes up for the discount he accepts for the privilege
of accepting the card and transferring his receivables to the credit card
company."
Diners' Club had many difficulties in the beginning since it was treading in
an unknown area. Many establishments were skeptical and doubted that the
system could actually function effectively. Eventually, however, a number of
establishments "form[ed] the nucleus for what was to become a world-wide
multicellular operation."77 The introduction of any new idea of this magnitude
necessarily involved a large initial expense; hence, high volume was needed in
order to reach and exceed the break-even point. This volume was achieved
through a large outlay for advertising coupled with the issuance of cards to
marginal credit individuals. Of course, when the profits started to accrue,
entrepreneurs saw the writing on the wall and took steps to get a share of the
market. This marked the arrival of American Express and Carte Blanche in
1958." Customers of these three travel and entertainment cards have primarily
been businessmen who "'charge' virtually all but pocket-change expenses en-
countered on a typical business trip."79
B. Bank Credit Card Operations
Banks entered the credit card field in the 1950's. The Franklin National
Bank in Franklin Square, New York, marked the introduction of the current
bank cards in 1951."0 In September 1952, the First National Bank and Trust
Company of Kalamazoo, Michigan, entered the charge account banking field as
the first bank credit card plan in the Midwest, and the second in the United
States.
81
As in the travel and entertainment card area, losses were staggering during
the initial stages, due once again to the inordinately high cost of introducing a
75 For example, when you charge a meal at a restaurant with a Diners' Club Card, your bill
is sent to the regional -headquarters and the restaurant is reimbursed the amount of the sale
price less a discount of 7 percent. So in effect, the restaurant or establishment receives 93
percent of the price with the remaining 7 percent going to the Diners' Club for the handling,
bookkeeping and collection of the money from the cardholder, who pays Diners' at the end of
the thirty-day billing period.
76 D. RICxrARnsON, ELECTRIC MONEY: EVOLUTION OF AN ELECTRONIC FUNDS-TRANSFER
SYSTEM 57 (1970).
77 BLACK, supra note 63, at 13.
78 It should be noted that entry into a successful field does not mean instant success. For
instance, during its first full year of operation Carte Blanche reported a loss of $2.4 million,
of which at least $800,000 was in bad debt expenses. It was not until 1963, ,five years after
introduction, that the card company was in the black. Credit Card Companies Come into the
Chips, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1965, at 54, 56. Diners' Club lost $30 million in 1970, and
$13 million in 1969. This was primarily attributable to bad debts. In addition, Carte Blanche
tripled its write-offs for delinquent accounts in 1970 and lost $1.7 million; A Banker's Pipe
Dream?, FoRBns, June 15, 1971, at 36.
79 D. RICHARDSON, supra note 76, at 56.
80 Id. at 76.
81 Id. at 77, 78.
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credit card program.82 Banks discovered quickly that additional equipment and
personnel were needed to handle the intricacies of the system. Because of the
large amount of initial expenses and the inexperience in this form of credit ex-
tension, a number of banks were forced to drop out of the field."8 Only a select
few were able to maintain some type of profitable operation that insured lon-
gevity. For instance, of the nearly 200 banks that had credit card balances out-
standing in September 1967, only 27 had started their card plans before 1958.84
Two of the nation's largest banks, Bank of America and Chase Manhattan,
introduced their credit cards in 1958." The Bank of America quickly ascertained
the requisites of a successful credit card operation: volume and control. Volume
is basic to the economic use of electrical equipment to take over paper work.'
Controls are basic to avoidance of costly collection problems.8 " In order to get
off to a fast start, the Bank of America issued about 2,500,000 cards, 8 many to
individuals who were poor credit risks and some to individuals who did not even
desire them." Unlike the three prominent travel and entertainment card
companies that catered primarily to businessmen, the Bank of America and
other bank credit cards catered to the "average family,""0 enabling the family to
purchase on credit items of everyday living at a large variety of retail outlets."'
Chase Manhattan became discouraged by its inability to generate sufficient
volume and subsequently sold its credit card business in January 1962.92 As a
82 Abouchar, Operational Trends in Bank Charge Cards, BANK A.DINisTRATIoN, April
1970, at 32.
83 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REPORT at 7.
84 Id.
85 H. BLACK, supra note 63, at 115.
86 Allen, A Credit Card Operation That's Hit the Jackpot, BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE,
Sept. 1964, at 50, 51.
87 Id.
88 D. RIcHARDSON, supra note 76, at 80.
89 As one spokesman for Bank America said, "The degree of credit checking we did was
somewhat limited by the urgency to get the card out on the wide basis... we had to move fast."
The Charge-It Plan that Really Took-Off, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 27. 1965, at 58.
90 The following table depicts the profile of charge card ownership according to household
income. Note that the ownership of all types of charge cards is closely related to total
family income.
1970
HOUSEHOLD INCOME
TYPE OF UNDER $10,000 to $15,000
CREDIT CARD $10,000 $14,999 OR MORE TOTAL
Department Stores 70.3% 81.9% 84.6% 78.5%o'
Oil Companies 57.5 74.7 76.7 68.6
American Express, Diners, C.B. 5.0 11.1 24.7 14.6
Bank Cards 45.7 56.9 65.1 54.4
No Credit Cards 16.0 7.0 5.8 10.3
One or More Cards 83.6 92.8 93.9 88.8
ARTHUR S. KRANZLEY & CO., INC., BANK CHARGE CARD GROWTH,
A STATISTICAL SUMMARY (June 1971)
91 Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Iif ant, 48 CALIF. L. Ruv.
459, 462 (1960).
92 Chase Manhattan sold its credit card to Uni-Serv Corp. of Forest Hills, Long Island.
It paid over $8.8 million for almost exactly that amount of Chase Manhattan Charge Plan
receivables '(with all due accounts weeded out) plus the large credit files and lists of names
that Chase had collected. New Shuffle in Credit Cards, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 3, 1962, at
65, 66.
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result, many smaller banks became reluctant to enter into the field and only a
few plans came into existence during the period 1961-1965. However, banks
began to renew their interest in the credit card field early in 1965. This time,
instead of jumping headfirst into the charge card domain, banks made use of
feasibility studies which were conducted by the banks themselves or by outside
research organizations in order to discover problems and to determine market
potential.93 Since 1965, hundreds of banks have either initiated their own card
programs or have agreed to participate in licensee or joint-bank credit card
arrangements.94
C. Interbank Credit Card Operations
Because of the great competitive pressures, several Midwestern banks95
introduced the Midwest Bank Card in 1966. These banks desired to obtain as
many cardholders as possible. Pursuant to this end, the banks not only invited
applications for their cards, but also mailed the cards to persons who had not
applied for them.9 6 This unsolicited mailing resulted in some unfavorable
publicity and legislation was proposed to curb the distribution of these cards.97
The publicity was the result of the inevitable consequences of any blanket mail-
ing, "while the legislation was a kind of reflex action of an aroused public's
representatives.""8
The logic of the cooperative type of credit card is obvious. Since start-up
costs are high, a bank must be prepared to absorb these costs over a short-run
period. In addition, discounts to merchants are lowered as the market becomes
rapidly saturated, thus making it difficult for banks to break out of the "red."
Obviously, it is better to allocate these costs among a number of banks and have
them each absorb a proportionate amount of the costs, rather than having the
entire burden fall on any one bank. Cooperative plans permit the participating
banks to share start-up costs and the high credit risks of a mass distribution of
cards.99
In 1967, eight national banks announced the formal organization of Inter-
bank Card, which marked a step towards the establishment of national and
regional interchanges for bank credit cards."' Interbank, a nonprofit cooperative,
93 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEm REPORT, at 8.
Banks which began issuing credit cards at this time included Marine Midland Trust of
Western New York, Mellon National Bank and Trust Company, Pittsburgh National Bank,
Valley National Bank of Arizona, The Citizens and Southern National Bank of Atlanta and
The Bank of Hawaii.
94 D. RiCHARDSON, supra note 76, at 83.
95 Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, The First National Bank of
Chicago, Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Central National Bank in Chicago and The Pullman
Bank and Trust Company.
96 Comment, Credit Cards-A Survey of the Bank Credit Card Revolution and Applica-
bility of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 DE PAUL L. REv. 389 (1967).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 D. RIcHARDSON, supra note 76, at 85.
100 An interchange system consists of member credit card banks which stipulate the
terms and conditions on which their cardholders are authorized to use their credit
cards in each other's trading area. Major results of an interchange arrangement are
expansion of the geographical coverage of the member bank's plan, and a large in-
crease in the number of credit card outlets available to cardholders.
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quickly became a clearinghouse affiliated with over two hundred banks.'"-
Master Charge, a 5 million plus card group, started by the Western States Bank-
card Association,"0 2 is Interbank's largest member. Thus, through the Interbank-
Master Charge combination, the marketing objectives of a national bank charge
card plan are being achieved.
The interchange system, in addition to providing cost savings for the in-
dividual member banks, provides a certain advantage to its smaller members in
that the smallest bank in the system has the same operational and marketing
opportunities as the largest bank,' thus allowing the smaller bank to service in
this highly competitive area.
An interchange system, however, is not without its negative effects, such as
"increased exposure to fraud because of the bank's lack of control when its card
is used out of its market area,"'" 4 operational costs coupled with "the time con-
suming ... task of clearing the sales tickets back to the card issuing bank," 5
and the "inhibition on converting to descriptive billing systems."'0 8
As these problems are alleviated, it is quite possible that we will see the
gradual evolution of a single national interchange system-another step in the
development of the Less-Check Society. The bank credit card would then
develop as an individual's principal financial statement and means of identifica-
tion.10 7  Banks would issue credit cards which would have five principal
functions: "0
(1) to obtain cash;
(2) to purchase goods and services;
(3) to provide a means of automatic payment of regular bills;
(4) to serve as a consolidation point for all consumer lending;
(5) to operate as a source of accounting information including the
individual's checking account, transfers to savings accounts, etc.
Midwest Bank, Interbank Card and Bank Americard are members of national and
regional interchange systems. D. GInSON, THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE CREDIT CARDS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS, October 1967, at 213 (thesis submitted in
,partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration,
Harvard University).
101 A distinguishing feature of Interbank Card was the regulations covering the situation
when more than one bank in a local trading area joined the system. In these circum-
stances the by-laws were written to authorize interchange outside the local area, but
no interchange was provided between local member banks in their own trading area.
This arrangement avoided any change in the existing competitive relationships in the
local market, but gave the cardholders of all member banks access to credit card out-
lets in other parts of the country.
Id. at 214.
102 "Interbank has purchased the licensing rights for Master Charge from Western States
Bank Card Association. Thus through the Interbank-Master Charge combination, the market-
ing objectives of a second national bank charge card plan are being achieved." Stevens, The
Expanding Role of Bank Charge Card Associations, BANKING, November 1969, at 47, 88.
103 Stevens, Bank Charge Card Associations: Today and Tomorrow, BANK ADMiNISTRATION,
May 1970, at 22.
104 Id. at 61.
105 Id.
106 "Descriptive billing is where the sale is described on the statement but the sales ticket
is not returned with the statement." Id. Descripive billing systems are one of the keystones in
building toward on-line point of sale devices.
107 Impact of Credit Cards on Commercial Banks, NEw ENGLAND BusINEss Ravnmw,
August 1968, at 3. 9.
108 Id. at 9-10.
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In order to supplement their credit card programs, banks initiated check-
credit plans which were basically a form of installment credit connected with a
bank checking account." 9 To a certain extent, these check-credit plans were an
alternative to credit cards and were less costly to operate. However, their im-
portance to the banking industry has been and remains negligible compared to
the tremendous impact of credit cards. This is primarily due to the fact that
check-credit plans usually have been offered only to preferred customers."'
Nevertheless, many banks continue to use the check-credit plans as a means of
profit in their operations."'
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Credit Cards
Both the travel and entertainment card and the bank credit card have
enjoyed a rapid development because they offer certain advantages "2 to their
cardholders. Credit cards permit a certain amount of economizing on the level
of cash that an individual carries. In addition, the single application for credit
conveniently spares the customer the bother of multiple form-filling since his
card can be used in a number of stores where he might wish to make purchases.
A cardholder can also take advantage of seasonal sales even if he is short of
cash at the time of the "clearance special." Instead of being forced to miss the
year end specials due to a low liquidity level, the customer can purchase and
enjoy the item while making deferred payments at a more convenient time. A
cardholder can also dispense with the time-consuming and sometimes embarrass-
ing situation of having to get a check cleared for payment, a procedure resulting
from the reluctance of many merchants to accept personal checks. Furthermore,
payment of bills is simplified since cardholders need to write only a single check in
order to pay for many transactions that have occurred within the previous time
period. This serves a twofold purpose: First, service charges on checks will be
reduced; and second, the one monthly statement received by the customer
enables him to see at a glance all his purchases for the month thus helping him to
simplify his budget process while also saving time. For those customers who can,
109 Essentially, two general types of check credit can be distinguished. First, there are
plans relying on the individual's regular checking account and using his ordinary
checks, but providing a prearranged automatic line of credit that is activated the
moment the individual's account is overdrawn, thereby permitting the honoring of
checks-up to his preauthorized line-that would otherwise be returned to the seller.
These plans are often called overdraft accounts. In some plans the bank covers with
a loan that is exactly the amount of the overdraft; in others, the bank credits the
account with loans in $50 or $100 increments. The second type of check credit in-
volves plans in which a prearranged line of credit is activated by employing a special
checking account and special checks provided by the bank. This is more prevalent
type of check credit.
FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM REPORT at 13.
110 Id. at 15.
111 Id. at 23.
112 For a general discussion, see The Future of Consumer Credit, THE MAGAZINE OF WALL
STREET, June 21, 1969, at 22; How Credit Cards Can Help Your Firm, ADMiNISTRATIVE-
MANAGEMENT, April 1968, at 56; Davenport, supra note 67, at 218; Robinson, New Develop-
ments in Retail Financing, 8 KAN. L. REV. 554, 571 (1960).
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use their cards as a means of obtaining a cash advance, this added feature has
the advantage of enabling the user to handle an unexpected emergency while at
the same time maintaining his budget without having to withdraw from his
savings account. An individual also benefits from the use of the card when
filling out his tax return since the receipts provide a handy documentation of
disbursements and expenses which the Internal Revenue Service may be in-
terested in seeing. Finally, the "money card" may conveniently replace a mul-
titude of special-purpose credit cards in an individual's wallet.
While offering the customer certain advantages, credit cards also benefit
merchants whose businesses permit the use of the card. The merchant benefits
by avoiding accounts receivable records, all billing and collection expenses, and
all bad debt losses. The merchant also circumvents the necessity of tying up work-
ing capital to carry his receivables through the normal collection period because
he is able to obtain immediate cash for his credit sales upon deposit of sales slips
at his bank.
Banks benefit to the extent that their cards often attract new merchant
business to the bank. This helps to shift the bank away from its usual heavy
dependence on individuals as customers. Also, the bank card enables the bank
to extend its business to local areas where it has no branches. The issuing bank
establishes a profitable source of revenue both through the discount percentages
on sales slips and from the service charges based on the unpaid balances where
the cardholder elects to pay only a certain sum each month instead of remitting
the total balance due to the card issuing bank.
Notwithstanding this multitude of benefits, the credit card is not the
panacea of all ills. It also has its disadvantages to the bank or credit card
company, to the merchant, and, finally, to the cardholder. The merchant objects
because he does not participate in the income derived through the annual finance
charge. In addition, since the discount is taken off the cash price, the costs of
financing come out of his retail mark-up resulting in a possible decrease in profit
margin. To many merchants, the amount lost through the discount represents
the difference between a profit year and a loss year. Cash customers are hurt to
the extent that they must bear the added costs created by other customers' use
of credit cards since prices are raised in the store in, order to meet the handling
expenses incident to a credit card operation as well as to make up part of the
merchant's discount. Cards also lead many customers into a sense of false wealth
in that cardholders buy more than they would if they had to pay by cash or
check. This temptation subsequently leads many customers into overindebted-
ness. For the most part, however, the advantages have far outweighed the dis-
advantages since consumer credit outstandings continue to rise. The following
table demonstrates the greatly accelerated growth which bank cards have ex-
perienced during the period from 1957 through 1970.-"3
113 ARTHUR S. KIRANZLEY & Co., INC., BANic CHARGE CARD GROWTH, A STATISTICAL
SummARY (June 1971).
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1957
BANKS 26
MERCHANT
OUTLETS 11,000
ANNUAL
VOLUME $40 Million
CHARGE CARD
HOUSEHOLDS 754,000
1965
79
139,085
1969
5,500
600,000
1970
8,900
900,000
$330 Million $3,800 Million $6,500 Million*
4,819,700 24,000,000 30,000,000
* This differs from the figures published by the Federal Reserve Board. Fed monthly
sample not consistent with the more complete, but less frequent ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES OF COMMERCIAL AND MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS, Pub-
lished and Distributed by the FDIC which reveals about a 20% understatement in
the gross or aggregate figures.
It is clearly apparent from a perusal of the above figures that the great ex-
pansionary period occurred during the last six years. The future looks quite
promising also. The following table illustrates bank charge card growth projec-
tions from 1970 through 1975.114
CHARGE CARD AFFILIATES
(TOTAL BANKS)
CHARGE CARD HOUSEHOLDS
AVERAGE ACTIVE
ACCOUNTS
MERCHANT OUTLETS
(EXCLUDES OVERLAP)
DOLLAR VOLUME
1970
8,900
30,000,000
9,000
32,000,000
12,000,000 14,000,000 20,000,000
900,000
$6.5 Billion
1,000,000
$8.0 Billion
1,100,000
$15.0 Billion
Growth will be due to a greater percentage of accounts that are active as well as the
addition of new services on the card, thus building usage. The card will become more
restrictive and difficult to obtain, but those that apply will be users. The expansionary
phase of cardholder building is clearly ended.
But why do we talk about credit cards? What is their relation to the Less-
Check Society? The answer is that they are the forerunners, the pioneers, the
stepping stones" 5 to the Less-Check Society. The advent and continued use of
credit cards have somewhat relieved the increasing burden caused by the enor-
114 Id.
115 Stepping Stones to the Checkless Society, BusuouGHs CLEARING HousE, June 1967,
at 23; Hazleton, From Credit Card to Instant Banking, FINANCE, Jan. 1968, at 16. For dis-
senting views, see BArx EQuipMRNT NEws, March 1968, at 26; and the Address by James V.
Vergari, Vice President and General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, before the
National Automation Conference of the American Bankers Association, in New York City,
May 8, 1967.
Mr. Vergari does not believe that the credit card is an input or path to the checkless
society. His thesis is that the credit card does not cut down the volume of checks issued or
reduce the paper work involved. In addition he states that the credit card as an identification
tool for use in a checkless society system has many deficiencies and would be very inadequate. He
stated that "an effective identification device to be used in an efficient, all-purpose electronic
settlement and payment system should have a universal identification number." "This is one
of the barnacles on the present credit card system."
1971 1975
10,000
40,000,000
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mous volume of checks present in today's society. Many cardholders are ac-
customed to using one card for all or many of their purchases, thus fostering the
desire for a national system of one "money card" that can be used everywhere. At
the present stage of development, bank cardholders are accustomed to having the
bank doing their billing by sending out a consolidated list of purchases at the end
of the billing cycle. The next logical step would be for the bank to simply deduct
the amount needed to meet the bills directly from the cardholders' account with-
out having to bother the customer.
Before the EFTS becomes a reality, however, a proper legal framework
must be laid. This framework should focus on the legal relationships of the
principal parties--banks, cardholders, and merchants. An examination of the
legal aspects of the credit card industry will provide the starting point.
III. Legal Effect of Credit Cards on Consumers
A. Introduction
Since the law first began dealing with the problems of the credit card
customer,'16 the credit card industry has undergone a marked development, a,
development which has been reflected in the treatment accorded the consumer by
the courts, and, more recently, by the Congress. The courts have concerned
themselves solely with the problem of customer liability for unauthorized
purchases." 7  Congressional concern has been broader, involving the whole
spectrum of legal problems confronting the credit card consumer. This part of
the survey deals with that treatment, the responses of the courts and of the
Congress to the changes in the credit card industry. It is, in a sense, historical.
The analysis of the evolutionary development of the credit card industry from
the simple bipartite credit arrangement through the tripartite arrangement to
the credit card revolution of the early 1960's is, of necessity, historical. Addition-
ally, however, an analysis of the past cases and the present legislation dealing
with this phenomenon and its impact upon the consumer is of great relevance to
an assessment of the Less-Check concept, a concept which will be simply a further
step in that evolutionary process."8 As a preliminary to this analysis, an under-
standing of the legal relationships among the parties to the credit card arrange-
ment is helpful.
B. Legal Relationships
In understanding the mechanics of the credit card plans, it is important at
the outset to distinguish between two-party and three-party plans." 9 In the two-
116 The first reported case was decided in 1915. Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778
(Phila. Munic. Ct. 1915).
117 This problem was ultimately solved by Congress which limited the cardholder's potential
liability to $50. See text accompanying note 242 infra.
118 See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
119 In some plans, a fourth party may be involved. In that case the functions the card
issuer would have had in the tripartite plan will be divided between a card issuer, who will
collect fees and market the plan, and a bank, which will serve as a central collection and billing
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party plan, such as those offered by department stores, the retailer issues a credit
card to a customer, which permits him to make purchases from only that retailer
(merchant) and to pay for the merchandise at some later date. Typically, a
revolving charge account enables the customer to pay a fraction of his total bill
and to pay the remainder in monthly installments with a 1.5 percent monthly
service charge computed upon the outstanding balance. The primary functions
of this plan are to increase sales volume and to provide a convenience to cus-
tomers.1 2 The legal relationships are governed by the ordinary rules of contract.
The three-party plans require a detailed analysis. Any credit transaction of
this type involves an issuer, a cardholder, and a merchant. Such a transaction
entails a series of legal relationships, with each party possessing interrelated rights
and duties.
1. Issuer-Merchant
An issuer has an economic burden of soliciting merchants to participate in
its plan. 2 ' Initially, the merchant agrees to promote the plan by displaying the
plan emblem on his premises and to honor all credit cards of the issuer in return
for the issuer's assumption of what would have been the merchant's accounts
receivable. The merchant further agrees to return all sales slips to the issuer
within three business days following the sale. The sales slip forms are supplied
by the issuer, and usually include the total sales price, the holder's signature, an
imprint of the basic information from the holder's credit card, and the merchant's
name and identifying number. When the issuer receives the sales slips, the
merchant's account is credited with the aggregate amount of all sales less a
discount (usually between 2 and 7 percent), deducted as compensation for the
issuer's services. Most issuers set floor limits on retail purchases by requiring the
merchant to obtain specific approval from the issuer for all sales in excess of a
specified amount. If the issuer is a bank, the merchant usually is required to
maintain a commercial account in the bank.
In any event, in the tripartite plan, most of the rights and duties of the
parties are set out in a form contract drafted by the issuer.'22 In addition to the
agent for accounts. The responsibilities of the parties will not be affected, except to the extent
that the issuer-bank contract apportions the rights and liabilities that normally rest upon the
issuer alone. Claflin, The Credit Card-A New Instrument, 33 CONN. B.J. 1 (1959).
120 It should be noted that department stores do not generate much profit as a result of
their credit card plans. Increased sales volume and customer loyalty alone constitute the
impetus to continue this form of credit service. D. RICHARDSON, supra note 76, at 73. Mr.
Sam Flanel, Vice President, National Retail Merchants Association, on February 29, 1968,
pointed out that factors such as: different capital structure, an "exceptionally high volume of
account activity, purchase, returns, payments, collections and the small amount of most credit
sales transactions and payments" represent a vastly different cost structure than do other in-
stitutions extending credit. As a result, the net cost and income from credit sales on these
plans are almost equal. It remains for advocates of an EFTS to convince participating mer-
chants in two-party plans that an adequate sales volume could be maintained without the
corresponding cost burden. As a result, their profits would be enhanced, allowing a third
party to handle a more broad-based form of credit. Id.
121 Formerly it was a common practice for issuers of credit cards to distribute them either
upon application or by sending them unsolicited through the mails. See text accompanying
notes 233-41 infra. Oil companies and bank credit cards have historically been issued free of
charge, while travel and entertainment card issuers have charged an annual fee.
122 For one example of a specific form contract, see the Member Agreement-Depository
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requirements discussed above, the contract usually obligates the merchant to
assign to the issuer all credit sales accounts, to sell his goods or services at
the regular cash value, and to comply with the formalities surrounding the sales
slip, including the giving of a copy to the cardholder-purchaser. Furthermore, the
merchant agrees to indemnify the issuer for all claims arising from the sales
transaction interposed as a defense, set-off, or counterclaim. In many instances,
the merchant warrants that for the duration of the agreement he will not create
a security interest 23 in his accounts receivable or inventory in favor of any other
person without prior notice to the issuer. Finally, many agreements contain
provisions requiring the merchant to examine the cardholder's signature on the
sales slip with that on the credit card,... and to establish a fair policy of exchange
or return of goods. With respect to the latter provision, the merchant does not
exchange cash for goods purchased on credit. Instead, he prepares a credit
voucher for the issuer and the cardholder. The merchant then includes all credit
vouchers in his next deposit of sales slips. The issuer then credits the cardholder's
account and charges the merchant's account. 2
On the other hand, since the issuer is the catalyst, he must bear the promo-
tional burden of soliciting both merchants and cardholders in enough volume to
assure the profitability of the plan. As for his contractual obligations, the issuer
agrees to furnish all sales slips, credit invoices, credit cards and imprinters; he
assumes the duty to investigate and approve credit ratings and the option to set
floor limits; he may also reserve the right to audit the merchant's books. Most
importantly, once the sales slips are accepted by the issuer, he accepts the re-
sponsibility for collection and assumes all credit risks, subject to certain excep-
tions.'26 As compensation for services to the merchant, the issuer receives the
discount and, in some circumstances, assesses an annual participation fee. Both
parties usually agree upon some provision for termination upon notice, usually
30 days, except when the issuer can establish bad faith on the part of the
merchant, whereupon termination will be immediate.
Bank, used in the Town and Country Charge Plan, a division of Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, in connection with the issuance of Master Charge cards
and participation in the Interbank Card Association and the Midwest Bank Card System.
123 UNIFORM COMMERCrAL CODE .§ 9-203 and 9-204 define what constitutes the creation
of a security interest.
124 In many respects this requirement has little or no practical value. First, in many plans,
a family member is permitted to use cards issued to another household member, making signa-
ture comparison impossible. Second, uneducated comparison does not reveal professional
forgeries. The purpose is obvious, i.e., to create a standard of reasonable care in the hope of
reducing the risk of loss from fraud. See UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 3-406.
125 This procedure is necessary to prevent a customer from making a purchase, then
returning the merchandise for cash, accomplishing, in effect, a credit card cash advance, with-
out incurring the ordinary four percent service fee. Comment, Bank Credit Plans: Innovations
in Consumer Financing, 1 LOYOLA U.L. REv. 49, 68 n.46 (1968).
126 It is generally provided that the issuer will have recourse against the merchant when:
(1) a bona fide dispute on the sale or delivery of merchandise exists between the merchant and
the cardholder-purchaser; (2) the face of the card indicates that the card has expired prior
to the date of the sale; (3) the merchant commits fraudulent acts; (4) the merchant makes a
sale in excess of the floor limit without prior issuer authorization; '(5) the merchant fails to
obtain the signature of the purchaser on the sales slip; (6) the merchant fails to examine void
lists distributed by the issuer prior to the date of sale; (7) the merchant neglects to use the
imprinter; and (8) or when a counterfeit card is used. See generally Davenport, supra note
67, at 229.
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2. Cardholder-Merchant
In most respects, the cardholder-merchant relationship is similar to a two-
party plan. There is one important difference, i.e., the cardholder promises to
pay the issuer rather than the merchant. When making a purchase, the card-
holder presents his card to the merchant, who fills out a sales slip and
imprints on it the card's contents as well as the merchant's name, address
and account number. The cardholder then signs the sales slip and, after the
merchant examines the signature and the "hotcard" lists, 2 ' he receives a copy of
the sales slip as evidence of the transaction. The cardholder's signature demon-
strates his acceptance to a bill of exchange drawn by the merchant on the
purchaser in favor of the issuer; thus the cardholder, in effect, promises to pay the
issuer. 2 In determining whether or not the cardholder's promise to pay the
bank runs only to the bank as promisee or whether he also promises the merchant
to pay the bank, it has been held that, since the cardholder's signature operates
as an acceptance to a bill of exchange drawn by the merchant, it is a promise
to the merchant to pay the bank as well as a promise to the bank. The effect of
this holding is to give the merchant a direct cause of action against the card-
holder for breach of contract when there is nonpayment. 29
3. Issuer-Cardholder
Credit cards are issued today only upon application.' This application
normally embodies the terms of the agreement, which when signed and returned
by the applicant, binds the cardholder.' Cards are usually issued for periods
of either six months or one year, renewable at the option of the issuer. The card
itself is plastic with standard dimensions of 3% inches by 2Y8 inches. The
reverse side of the card usually sets out either a statement of the terms of the
agreement or a provision to the effect that the cardholder agrees to comply with
all the provisions of the agreement contained in the application, a copy of which
is also returned with the card. In essence, the agreement specifies that the card-
holder agrees to pay for all purchases made and all extensions of credit obtained
by any person presenting the card, whether authorized or not; that the card
127 Prior to credit card legislation, most litigation in the credit card area involved what were
known as "hot cards," i.e., cards reported to the issuer as being lost or stolen. It should be
noted that these "hot card" lists distributed to merchants were extremely long and very often
disregarded by busy merchants, despite the duty to examine them imposed by the issuer-
merchant agreement.
128 Note that the merchant is the drawer, the cardholder is the drawee, and the issuer
is the payee. In a check transaction, the roles are reversed, the merchant becoming the
payee, the cardholder the drawer and the issuer the drawee. Comment, Bank Credit Plans:
Innovations in Consumer Financing, supra note 125, at 58 and n.47.
129 Id. at 58 & nn.49-50.
130 As of Jan. 25, 1971, unsolicited mass mailings of credit cards were prohibited. 15
U.S.C. § 1643 (1970); see text accompanying notes 242-55 infra.
131 When credit cards were permitted to be sent on an unsolicited basis, the issuer would
include a copy of the agreement on the card, and, when the individual receiving the card
signed and used it, there was an acceptance of the terms of the contract. However, the fact
that the provisions of the agreement were embodied in small print on the reverse side of the
card left open questions as to whether the cardholder had assented to the duties he purportedly
accepted. For a general discussion of this problem, see Macaulay, Private Legislation and the
Duty to Read, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1966).
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remains the property of the issuer and is subject to repossession and revocation
at any time; that the cardholder will not make any purchases in excess of his
approved credit limit; and that he will release the issuer from all defenses, rights
and claims he might have against the merchant. Although many cards contained
an agreement to the effect that the cardholder has a duty to notify the issuer
when his card is lost or stolen with his responsibility continuing until receipt of
written notice by the issuer of the loss or theft, recently enacted legislation
provides that cardholder liability for lost or stolen credit cards cannot exceed
$5 0.1
In the agreement, the cardholder authorizes the issuer to pay for all items
purchased and all credit extended through use of the card. The issuer agrees to
consolidate all purchases and extensions of credit on a monthly statement. Upon
receipt of the statement, the cardholder has two options: he may pay the full
amount within 25 to 30 days from the date the statement is mailed; or he may
utilize a deferred payment plan,"'3 under which he will pay the greater of either
a specified percentage of the full amount billed..4 or a certain minimum charge'
within a similar period of time. Then the cardholder will pay the deferred
balance in monthly installments and, in addition, any interest, service charges or
credit investigation fees imposed upon the outstanding balance, not to exceed a
certain percentage, ranging from 4 to 12 percenti" per month. The option of
deferred payment contemplates the existence of "revolving credit." In other
words, when a cardholder is given a maximum credit limit, any balance owed is
deducted, limiting the amount that the cardholder may obtain at any given
time.1
3 7
132 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
133 The revolving charge account option is not offered by all travel and entertainment card
companies. Instead, they bill the cardholder on a monthly basis, payable on receipt.
134 Ordinarily five to ten percent.
135 Usually ten dollars.
136 Most credit card companies offering deferred payment plans today charge 1 / percent,
except where state law provides otherwise. During the early 1960's, a significant number of
banks showing profits reported that they would have faced deficits if charges below 11/2 per-
cent were required. It was thought that complete automation of merchant accounting, bank
records, and billing, in addition to increased volume of participation would reduce costs enough
that the service charge could be reduced below 13/2 percent. This has not been the case, how-
ever. Bank Credit Cards Gaining Popularity, FINANCIAL WoRLD, Jan. 4, 1961, at 7.
In summary, income from a credit card plan may flow from four sources: (1) discounts
on merchant's sales slips; (2) service and interest charges on deferred or revolving payment
plans; (3) annual membership fees (travel and entertainment cards only); and '(4) subscrip-
tion and advertising revenue flowing from house organs, which some card programs issue. For
example, suppose X Bank accepts applications for 200,000 cards and charges a five percent dis-
count on gross total billings. If each person charged $50 per month and remitted slightly after
the no charge payment period, total gross billings for one month would be $10 million (5 per-
cent x 200,000 cards). Income from the discount would be $500 000 (5 percent x $10,000,000),
while income on service charges would amount to $150,000 (1! percent x $10,000,000). Thus,
total gross income would be $650,000. If expenses due to start-up costs, administrative over-
head and charge-offs could be held to 5 percent of total billings '(a reasonable amount), net
profits of $150,000 a month could be anticipated. This, of course, does not take into account
possible income emanating from membership fees and advertising revenue not reflected in the
above example. Banks Bet on Cards, BuRnouors CLEARING HousE, Nov. 1965, at 28, 30.
137 For example, suppose a cardholder having a credit limit of $200 makes purchases in one
month totaling $150. If he elects to pay on revolving credit, he pays 10 percent or $15 after
the first month's statement. No service charge is assessed at the end of the first month. During
the next month he will be limited to only $65 in purchases. If he charges $50 of merchandise,
at the end of the month he will have an outstanding balance of $187.02. The l2 percent
charge will be computed on the balance exhibited on the prior month's statement ($150) less
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C. Case Law
An examination of the relatively few cases dealing with the consumer's
civil liability for unauthorized purchases made on his credit card, coin, or plate 8
indicates that the courts, in most instances, based their determinations upon
their view of the function of the credit device. As that device became more com-
mon and sophisticated, the responses of the courts changed and developed. The
case law in this area can be categorized according to four such responses, repre-
senting successive stages of that development. The earliest cases involved credit
arrangements which included no written agreement. Later cases, which arose
before the credit card boom of the 1960's,' 9 turned on strict contracts of liability
printed on or accompanying the credit card. Then, with the advent of the credit
card boom which made the device a significant force in the economy, cases began
to turn on policy considerations: one school of thought focused upon the value
of the credit card to the business world as a tool of economic policy; another
slowly developed an awareness of the credit card's significance to the consumer,
determining the question of civil liability by a balancing of consumer v. business
interests. The former policy resulted in a refusal by the courts to place too great
a duty of care upon the issuer. Courts embracing the latter policy came ultimately
to require of the issuer a high duty of care.
1. No Written Agreement
The courts were confused as to the nature of the first credit coins. Such
devices were uncommon; they were typically used as a means of extending credit,
but they were issued without any written agreement between the parties. The
first reported case, Wanamaker v. Megary,40 evinces this confusion. The court
used a negotiable instrument theory to find the owner of a credit coin liable for
unauthorized purchases. It reasoned that the coin was the equivalent of a note
payable to bearer and that, as between two "innocent'' parties, the owner,
whose negligence had made the loss possible, should bear responsibility. 4"
This interpretation was soon refuted and replaced by another when the
court in Lit Bros. v. Haines4 ' rejected the analogy to a negotiable instrument
because it rested "upon an assumption which an examination of the coin does
not warrant, for it has none of the requisites of a negotiable instrument, for
title to it cannot pass by delivery like securities payable to bearer .... ."'" In-
stead, the court considered all the circumstances of this particular arrangement
payments made before the next statement ($25). Thus the $187.02 will consist of $150 of the
prior month's balance, less $25 in payments, plus $50 in new purchases and $2.02 in service
charges. During the next month, his ability to purchase on credit will be limited to $12.98
plus any additional amounts remitted in payment on the outstanding balance.
138 See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1086 (1967).
139 See chart accompanying note 113 supra.
140 24 Pa. Dist. 778 '(Phila. Munic. Ct. 1915).
141 In referring to two innocent parties, the court meant two parties innocent of wrong-
doing and not two parties free from negligence.
142 24 Pa. Dist. at 779.
143 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (1923).
144 Id. at 660, 121 A. at 132.
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and concluded that the coin was intended to function simply as a means of
identification. Those circumstances were that the defendant had been a credit
account customer of the plaintiff before the plaintiff began issuing credit coins
and that, when the defendant became a charge customer, the plaintiff issued to
her an identification coin bearing the number of her account with the plaintiff. 45
The coin was stolen by a workman who used the defendant's name and address
and had goods sent to his own address. The defendant "was ignorant of the fact
that any one producing her coin at plaintiff's store and giving her correct name
and address could obtain goods and have them sent to some address other than
the defendant's."'" Consequently, there were no facts upon which the court
could infer an agreement between the parties, and, since the function of the coin
was identification, the defendant could not be held liable for unauthorized
purchases:
[T]o give [the coin] any more effect than it purports on its face to be, an
identification of the person to whom it was issued, there must be some proof
that between the issuer and the acceptor it was intended to have a further
purpose not disclosed on its face.'4
7
The next reported case, Wanamaker v. Chase,148 applied the same type of
reasoning to a different set of circumstances to find the customer liable for un-
authorized purchases. The court described the coin as a store coin or token
entitling the defendant to credit.'49 Since the parties had made no express agree-
ment as to responsibility for unauthorized purchases and since the coin was
meant to function as a means of extending credit, the court examined the nature
of the arrangement to establish "the exact relation in which the parties dealt with
each other"'5 ° and thus determine the liabilities of the parties:
[T]he defendant had applied for and received from the plaintiff a store
"coin" or token, with the understanding that upon presentation thereof in
any department of the store she was entitled to purchase goods upon
credit.... But what is still more important, any one presenting the token
and giving the name of the defendant could purchase goods upon her
credit. The defendant... knew... this to be the effect of the possession
of the coin and.., had availed herself of the fact by permitting members of
her family and a family servant to use the coin in the purchase of goods
in her name.., and.., had paid the bills.' 5'
These findings, that the coin entitled one to receive credit, that the defendant
knew the coin could be used by another, and that she had in the past authorized
others to make purchases, resulted in the court's conclusion that the defendant
was liable for the unauthorized purchases.
145 Id. at 658-59, 121 A. at 131.
146 Id. at 659, 121 A. at 131.
147 Id. at 660, 121 A. at 132.
148 81 Pa. Super. 201 (1923).
149 Id. at 202.
150 Id. at 205.
151 Id.
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Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick, 2 decided in 1935, is perhaps the best early
example of a court's basing the question of liability upon its own interpretation
of the specialized function of a credit device. The customer's charge-a-plate had
been stolen. He was fully aware that it could be used by anyone presenting it,
yet neglected to notify the issuer of its theft. In holding the customer responsible
for unauthorized purchases, the court stressed that the charge-a-plate functioned
neither as a negotiable instrument nor as a simple means of identification.
Rather, it represented something of value and thus required that the customer
treat it with due care.153 The customer had ignored this "implied contract of
due care," and thus was responsible for the resulting loss.
The final two no-contract cases are quite recent and, not surprisingly,'5
more consumer oriented than the older cases in their refusal to bind a cardholder
for unauthorized purchases where he had not expressly agreed to promptly re-
port the card's loss or theft. In Thomas v. Central Charge Service, Inc.,'55 the
defendant testified that he had used his card only once, without having signed
it, and had thereafter been unable to find it. He assumed it had been lost but
had neglected to report the loss to the plaintiff and denied having made any of
the purchases in question. 5" The court examined the nature of the credit ar-
rangement and found that the application contained "no contractual language
of any kind and no reference to any duty or obligation on the part of the customer
with reference to the use of the charge plate. . . ." ' Since that language made
no allusion whatsoever to possible liability for unauthorized use, the court ruled
that liability "could arise, if at all, only by implication."'5 8 However, the court
refused to so infer:
We do not think, however, that a promise to pay for unauthorized pur-
chases, restricted even to purchases made prior to notifying the company
of the card's disappearance, can fairly be implied from the described rela-
tionship between these parties. At most, it may be said by implication that
Thomas agreed to exercise due care in the use of his card. And while he
perhaps failed in that agreement, it is plain that such failure is insufficient
to support this action. 5
In so finding, the court declined to follow Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick,"° in
which liability had been based upon an implied contract to honor the card prop-
erly and with due care. Furthermore, the court refused to follow that reasoning
which would attach liability to the customer as the one of two innocent parties
whose negligence most contributed to the loss. Liability, it ruled, must be based
152 24 Pa. D. & 0. 147 (1935).
153 Id. at 150.
154 In the absence of contract terms defining the duties of the parties, courts looked at all
the circumstances to determine the question of liability. These last two cases were decided
in the 1960's after consumerism had become a significant factor, a circumstance to be con-
sidered.
155 212 A.2d 533 (D.C. App. 1965).
156 Id. at 533-34.
157 Id. at 534.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 24 Pa. D. & C. 147, 150 (1935).
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upon an express agreement by the customer to promptly report a lost or stolen
credit card.'
Continuing this approach, the most recent no-contract case, Rayor v. Affili-
ated Credit Bureau, Inc.' 2 also refused to hold a customer liable for unautho-
rized purchases in the absence of a contract defining the duty to notify the issuer
of loss or theft of the card. A lower court had found the customer liable, stating:
"It's the same as cash, as far as the court is concerned. . . . [T]his is just like
a dollar bill, or five dollar bill. If you lose it and you can't find it, then you are
responsible." '163 On appeal, however, this analogy to cash was rejected, and
the court held that, in the absence of some factor such as negligence, bad faith,
or estoppel,"" a finding of consumer liability for unauthorized purchases requires
some contractual obligation.
This first group of cases establishes that the courts, in the beginning, dis-
agreed as to the nature of the credit card or coin. Since there was no contract
defining the rights and duties of the parties, the courts necessarily based their
determinations upon the circumstances of each case-the type of coin or card
involved, the parties' understanding of the arrangement, the way in which the
coin or card had been used in the past by the parties. Because of the relative
insignificance of the credit deviceu' there was no discussion of considerations of
policy-the credit card was as yet simply not important enough to merit policy
consideration. Instead, uncertainty led the courts to reason by analogy-the
credit card was like a negotiable instrument, or cash, or simply a means of identi-
fication. The result was an inconsistency of treatment which led the credit card
issuers to define their own duty and that of their customer by means of contract.
2. Strict Contract
The early cases involving notice or surrender agreements were construed
strictly according to the terms of the contract. The courts were little concerned
with any factors other than compliance with those terms. The credit card boom
would not take place until the 1960's 66 and the credit card was still neither
common enough nor well-enough understood by the courts to justify any devi-
ation from the contract terms.
In the first of these cases, Jones Store Ca. v. Kelly," 7 there was conflicting
testimony as to the existence of an agreement placing upon the customer respon-
sibility for all purchases made with the credit coin. The plaintiff claimed, and
the jury apparently believed, that the defendant had promised to notify the plain-
161 212 A.2d at 534.
162 169 Colo. 353, 455 P.2d 859 '(1969).
163 Id. at 355, 455 P.2d at 860.
164 Id. at 356, 455 P.2d at 860. The holding in Rayor does not seem to be quite as broad
as that in Thomas since Rayor implies that negligence might change the result. Thomas, it will
be remembered, held that the customer's, absence of due care was insufficient to support liabil-
ity. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
165 See chart accompanying note 113 supra.
166 Id.
167 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931).
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tiff if the coin were lost.'18 Furthermore, there was some evidence that use of the
coin by the third party had in fact been authorized. Consequently, the appellate
court felt that the jury could have reasonably concluded that, since the defen-
dant did not notify the plaintiff of the coin's loss, the coin had not been lost,
and that the defendant had authorized the third party to make purchases with
it. Here, the defendant was held responsible for the purchases even though the
purchase slips were signed "Mrs. Kelly" and the plaintiff knew the defendant to
be unmarried.169 The appellate court focused only upon the notification agree-
ment and the evidence of authorization without considering the possibility that
the plaintiff might have been negligent in not investigating the authority of the
actual purchaser whom it allegedly knew to be someone other than the defen-
dant. The court strictly applied an agreement freely undertaken.'7"
The next of these cases, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan,""' involved
a surrender agreement. In finding the cardholder liable for purchases made by
one who, after borrowing the card, had abused his authority by making unau-
thorized purchases, the court considered only the language of the agreement:
"The named holder shall be responsible for all purchases made by use of this
card, prior to its surrender to the issuing company, whether or not such pur-
chases are made by the named holder or into the car described."' 72 The court
did not discuss the possibility of negligence by either party. Rather, the defen-
dant was held liable because he had "obligated himself to be responsible for all
purchases made by the use of the card,"'' an obligation which he had freely
undertaken and which he was bound to honor.
The final case in this group, Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Greif,"4 refused to
place responsibility on the customer for unauthorized purchases made by his
wife after their separation because of his strict compliance with the terms of the
notice agreement, which provided that: "This card is valid until expired or
revoked. Named holder's approval of all purchases is presumed unless written
notice of loss or theft is received.' 75 The issuer contended that the defendant
should be responsible for all purchases until the cards were surrendered. The
court, however, disagreed since the contract clearly provided that notice of loss
or theft was sufficient to shift responsibility from the customer to the issuer. The
issuer was precluded from demanding surrender of the cards because such a
requirement appeared neither on the card nor on the application. Since the
defendant had given timely notice of his wish to close the account, he had satis-
fied his responsibility. The court refused to require more of him than this con-
tractual compliance.
This group of cases represents an intermediate position in the courts' treat-
168 Id. at 834, 36 S.W.2d at 682.
169 Id.
170 The court did not consider this an adhesion contract. Moreover, it would not have
found the customer liable if the purchases had been the result of theft of the coin. The de-
fendant was liable only because he had apparently authorized the use of the coin. Id. at 835,
36 S.W.2d at 683.
171 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 882.
174 10 App. Div. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1960).
175 Id. at 120, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
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ment of the credit card. The inclusion of a contract in the credit arrangement
provided the courts with a definite criterion for determining questions of lia-
bility-certainly an advance over the earlier situation when the lack of such a
criterion made analogy to the negotiable instrument, or to cash, or to the letter
of credit 1 necessary. However, these cases were decided before the credit card
industry had developed into a really significant factor in the economy, an even-
tuality which was to have an impact on the courts' treatment of the liability
issue.
3. Economic Policy
A third line of cases directly reflects the post-1960 credit card boom which
greatly increased the significance of the credit card to the economy. As a result
of this boom, some courts, as a matter of policy, concluded that, since the func-
tion of the credit card was an economic one (stimulation of sales), the credit card
issuer should not be held to too high a duty of care lest the economy suffer. This
policy was first enunciated in Texaco, Inc. U. Goldstein,"7 decided in 1962. The
court first found it necessary to attempt a distinction of Union Oil Co. v. Lull,"18
which had reasoned that, since the position of the credit card customer was anal-
ogous to that of a gratuitous indemnitor, the issuer had a "duty to use reasonable
diligence" in the transactions where the credit card was used." 9 The distinction
was based on the wording of the credit agreements. Unlike the Lull defendant
who had guaranteed payment, the Goldstein defendant merely assumed full re-
sponsibility for payment 80 and was not, therefore, an indemnitor (gratuitous or
otherwise) of the issuer. It followed then, inferentially at least, that the issuer
did not owe his customer this same duty of reasonable diligence.
Instead, the customer was bound by the terms of the agreement which he
had accepted by his use of the card:
Such person, corporation or firm assumes full responsibility for all purchases
made hereunder by anyone through the use of this credit card prior to sur-
rendering it to the company or giving the company notice in writing that
the card has been lost or stolen.' 8'
These terms appeared reasonable to the court 82 in that they complied with state
law which expressly validated such provisions so long as they were conspicuously
printed.'83 Moreover, reasons of economic policy dictated that the court strictly
176 Note, Credit - Credit Cards- Civil and Criminal Liability for Unauthorized or Fraud-
ulent Use, 35 NomRE DAmE LAwYER 225 (1960).
177 34 MAisc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962), aff'd, 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495(1963).
178 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960) '(discussed infra).
179 Id. at ....... 349 P.2d at 250.
180 34 Misc. 2d at 752, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
181 Id.
182 The Lull case also thought the arrangement, a sharing of responsibility for loss, to be
reasonable, but that court required the issuer to first fulfill its own duty toward the customer
before enforcing its agreement. Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. at ....., 349 P.2d at 253.
183 A provision to impose liability on an obligor for the purchase or lease of property or
services by use of a credit card after its loss or theft is effective only if it is conspicu-
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bind the customer by the terms of his agreement but that a high duty of care
not be imposed upon the card issuer:
With the increasing use of the credit card, and its growing importance
to the economy, the imposition of a high duty of diligence upon the major
oil companies in general, most of whom use the same or similar system of
credit card transactions, would result in an impairment of an important seg-
ment of our economic structure.84
The court explained that since the issuer had no control over its dealers,
who were independent contractors, the negligence of the cardholder became par-
amount. Had the defendant lost cash instead of a credit card, he alone would
bear the loss. Having lost the latter, however, he was partially protected since
the issuer was "willing" to share the risk with him. 8 Consequently, the defen-
dant was liable for the unauthorized purchases. 86
In Read u. Gulf Oil Corp.,"8 7 the credit cardholder complied with the notice
agreement by informing the issuer of the theft of his credit card before any pur-
chases were made and was therefore not liable for the unauthorized purchases.'8 8
The case is relevant not simply because it demanded strict compliance with the
terms of the agreement, but also because of the court's reliance on reasons of
economic policy:
The use of credit cards has become a way of life to millions of Ameri-
cans .... The ease with which a credit card can be obtained and the ease
with which the cards are honored present some risks. . . . When there is
no evidence of negligence on the part of any of the parties, the courts should
enforce the terms of the contract in accordance with normal contract prin-
ciples.... Should the courts not take this position .. . the credit card will
no longer be a convenience to the issuer and the merchant and the com-
mercial world will lose one of its greatest innovations. 189
The court did not define what would constitute evidence of negligence on the
part of the issuer, but it seems logical to assume that, given its concern over the
possibility of the commercial world's "losing one of its greatest innovations," the
Read court would probably agree with Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein in refusing to
impose upon the issuer a high duty of care.
ously written or printed in a size at least equal to eight point bold type either on
the card, or on a writing accompanying the card when issued or on the obligor's
application for the card, and then only until written notice of the loss or theft is
given to the issuer....
New York Laws 1961 ch. 549, § 512, as amended, New York Laws 1967 ch. 753, § 512,
repealed, Credit Cards and Credit Identification Devices § 512, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 512
(McKinney Supp. 1971-72). This provision imposed upon the cardholder a duty to read that
which he signed. The issuer was required to print the liability provision in such a way as to
allow it to be read easily. The customer using a credit card had a duty to read these clearly
printed terms and was bound by them.
184 34 Misc. 2d at 754, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (emphasis added).
185 Id. at 755, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
186 Id. at 756, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
187 114 Ga. App. 21, 150 S.E.2d 319 (1966).
188 Id. at 23, 150 S.E.2d at 320.
189 Id. at 22, 150 S.E.2d at 320, quoting Comment, The Lost Credit Card: The Liability of
the Parties, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 79, 89 (1966).
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The most recent "economic policy" case is Uni Serv Corp. v. Vitiello.190
Uni Serv followed Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein in holding a cardholder liable for
unauthorized purchases, in finding that the notice agreement involved was rea-
sonable and was in accord with the state law requiring conspicuous printing of
such warnings, and in requiring the cardholder to treat his credit card at least as
carefully as he would his currency.' Unlike the Goldstein court, however, the
Uni Serw court was confronted with a question of possible negligence on the part
of the card issuer. The cardholder had asked that his credit be limited to $250,
yet over $700 of unauthorized purchases had been made. The court, however,
ignored the possibility that the card issuer might have been negligent in disre-
garding the defendant's credit limit, reasoning that had the defendant himself
made the purchases, not a thief, he could not deny his liability for amounts
greater than $250 based on the $250 credit limit.'92 The court's reasoning was
consistent with Goldstein in concentrating on the cardholder's, rather than the
issuer's, duty. Moreover, it might be said that the decision went beyond its pre-
decessor in its apparent refusal to hold the issuer to, even a normal duty of in-
quiry-9 3
The economic policy as defined by Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein was perhaps
not unreasonable in 1962. The arrangement by which the parties agreed to
share the risk of loss-the customer assuming it before notice and the issuer
assuming all loss after notice-seemed equitable as long as the card's benefits
were being truly shared. The card issuer was extending credit to the cardholder
and the cardholder was buying the issuer's products, or the products of the
issuer's member merchants. However, by the late 1960's, the benefits were no
longer being equally shared; the credit card was more than a sales stimulant.
Most issuers were charging 1Y percent interest per month for delays in pay-
ment; the retailers were paying a discount of from two to seven percent to the
issuer for the privilege of using the card and passing the payments on to the
consumer. 4 Easy credit was leading consumers to overspend, to buy more
than they normally would with cash and, in numerous instances, more than they
could reasonably afford.'95
The credit card industry had developed to the point where a strict sharing
of the risk of loss was simply inequitable since the card's benefits were no longer
being equally shared. Those courts applying the Texaco, Inc. V. Goldstein eco-
nomic policy doctrine in the late 1960's failed to reflect this fact. Some courts
did, however, react to the changes within the industry. They too reflected a
policy consideration, but a different, more realistic policy of balancing the bene-
190 53 Misc. 2d 396, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1967).
191 Id. at 398, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
192 Id. at 399, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
193 In addition to the issuer's allowing the dollar amount of purchases to greatly exceed the
customer's credit limit, the issuer allowed a large number of purchases to be made in only four
days. Id. at 397, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 970. A different court might have considered the issuer's
lack of suspicion of this abnormal account activity to be evidence of negligence. See text
accompanying note 225 infra.
194 See text following note 121 supra.
195 Hearings on S. 721 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.. 1st Sess. 44 (1969).
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fits received by each party to the credit card arrangement in order to determine
each party's responsibilities.
4. Balancing of Consumer v. Business Interests
This final line of cases balanced the interests of the businessman and the
consumer and gradually came to impose an affirmative duty of diligence upon
the card issuer to protect the consumer. Failure to meet that duty resulted in
unenforceability of liability provisions. The issuer's duty varied from case to
case, but, in general, it became more pronounced as the credit card become more
common.
A case which is not properly within this group but which can be described
as one of its precursors is Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co.,' in which
the cardholder was held not liable for unauthorized purchases because of the gross
carelessness of the issuer, Gulf. The defendant had applied for and received
eight credit cards, one for each of his business trucks. He had typed on the cards
the words: "Good for Trucks only." An employee of a Gulf dealer failed to
return one of the cards to the defendant's employee, telling him that the card
would be returned by mail. Thereupon, the dealer's employee embarked upon a
90-day spending spree with the card. 97 Gulf contended that the defendant
should be liable for the unauthorized purchases because of the card agreement
by which "the registered holder assumed full responsibility for payment for all
merchandise or services obtained on credit by any person through its presenta-
tion.... ,,."" The court disagreed, reasoning that the broad nature of the agree-
ment necessarily implied that the person extending credit would do so "in good
faith, in accordance with the provisions of the card and subject to any limitation
appearing on the face of the card." '99 Numerous instances of bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff's dealers indicated that this was not done:
The forger was at all times driving a 1934 Plymouth coach passenger auto-
mobile.... Some of the dealers knew the forger and he had lived in several
of the towns where purchases were made. Tires were sold for a passenger
automobile and in some cases of a different size than was required by the
vehicle the forger was driving. One dealer sold him two radios, one for his
car and the other for his house, which were charged as tires and gasoline
and the house radio was never delivered. In several instances cash was
delivered upon false invoices made out for merchandise. 200
The Gulf Refining Co. court did not, in fact, define a standard of duty for
the issuer; it merely ruled that the gross carelessness0 1 of the plaintiff's agents
precluded the plaintiff from enforcing the contractual liability clause. No court
attempted to define such a standard until 1960. In that year the Supreme Court
196 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945).
197 Id. at 364-65, 186 S.W.2d at 792.
198 Id. at 364, 186 S.W.2d at 792.
199 Id. at 369, 186 S.W.2d at 794.
200 Id. at 365, 186 S.W.2d at 792-93 (emphasis added).
201 -Id. at 368, 186 S.W.2d at 794.
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of Oregon, in Union Oil Co. v. Lull,"2 considered the cardholder's promise to
indemnify the issuer in the light of the respective economic benefits conferred
upon each 03 to conclude that the plaintiff had a duty of reasonable inquiry to
protect the defendant cardholder:2 .4
In determining the liability of the indemnitor in this case we may con-
sider the fact that he is not engaged in the indemnity business, and there-
fore without the opportunity to calculate his risks and charge a premium
accordingly. The defendant is essentially a gratuitous indemnitor, the only
consideration moving to him being the convenience of the use of the credit
card. It is to be noted that the plaintiff has likewise received a benefit con-
sisting of adding another potential customer for the sale of its products by
facilitating purchases through the convenient use of credit. 20 5
Since the cardholder was conferring an essentially gratuitous benefit upon
the issuer, there was an implied promise on the part of the issuer, the indemnitee,
"to exercise reasonable diligence to protect the indemnitor in transactions which
may create . . . liability."2 ' Nonetheless, the court did consider the particular
liability contract reasonable. All the cardholder had to do to protect himself
was to treat his card carefully and to keep track of its whereabouts so that he
might fulfill his duty of prompt notification of its loss or theft." 7 But the court
also demanded that the issuer, in order to enforce the contract, prove its own
compliance with a duty of inquiry which would arise whenever there were cir-
cumstances sufficiently suspicions to lead a reasonable man to make inquiry.20s
Here, such a circumstance was the fact that the imposter was driving a car with
Idaho license plates while the credit card showed an Oregon address. 0 9 The
plaintiff, having failed to make a sufficient inquiry, was-precluded from charg-
ing the defendant with a breach of his duty of notice.
This case was the first to base liability upon a balancing of the correlative
duties of the parties in light of the respective benefits conferred upon each by
the credit card. The cardholder had the duty of caring for his card and giving
prompt notice of its loss or theft. The issuer had the duty of making reasonable
inquiry whenever confronted with suspicious circumstances. Later cases con-
tinued to recognize the issuer's duty, but broadened its scope by defining addi-
tional circumstances under which the obligation to make inquiry would arise.
In Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Waters,21 the defendant had authorized
a third party, Romby, to make some purchases with her card. Later, she re-
gained the card and withdrew the authorization. Romby then phoned the plain-
tiff issuer's credit division, identified himself as the defendant, and asked that a
replacement card be sent to the defendant's address. Romby stole the card from
202 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
203 Id. at ... , 349 P.2d at 250.
204 Id. at ....., 349 P.2d at 254.
205 Id. at ..... 349 P.2d at 249-50.
206 Id. at ......, 349 P.2d at 250.
207 Id. at ...... 349 P.2d at 248.
208 Id. at ...... 349 P.2d at 253.
209 Id.
210 159 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 1963).
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the defendant's mailbox and charged numerous unauthorized purchases.211 He
later attempted to reassure the plaintiff that the bills would be paid by phoning
the plaintiff's representative and informing him that payment would be delayed
because "rains had prevented the use of heavy machinery from bringing timber
out of the woods." '212 The court held the issuer responsible for the purchases
because it had clearly contributed most to the loss. This determination resulted
from the failure of the issuer to make inquiry212 when confronted with factors
clearly suggestive of fraud, viz., the male caller had identified himself as a logger,
but the issuer had actual and constructive knowledge that the cardholder was a
female schoolteacher." 4 When viewed as an extension of the Lull balancing
principle, the significance of this decision is lessened somewhat because of the
defendant's lack of fault and her ignorance of the duplicate credit card's exis-
tence. However, Waters provided additional support for the then emerging doc-
trine that the card issuer's right to enforce the indemnity agreement could be
defeated by carelessness.
The card issuer's duty of care was further defined in Allied Stores v. Funder-
burke1 where the issuer failed in his attempt to attach liability to the cardholder
because of the issuer's lack of care in allowing 237 purchases in a one-month
period without making inquiry. In reaching its decision, the court first had to
distinguish both statutory2 16 and case 7 law. The statute, the purpose of which
was to make fine-point contractual provisions unenforceable, provided that agree-
ments, by which the cardholder accepted responsibility for all purchases made
before notice to the issuer of the card's loss or theft, were effective if the warning
was printed in 8-point type. The arrangement in question complied with this
provision. But the court interpreted the statute to apply only to cases in which
the cardholder had knowledge of the card's loss or theft, reasoning that it would
be illogical to require the cardholder to give notice of an event (loss or theft of
his card) of which he was totally ignorant.2 1 If the defendant did not know
of the card's loss or theft, he certainly could not comply with the statute. There-
fore, the court reasoned, the statute was inapplicable, and it could proceed on
common law principles, viz., that there can be no liability without fault and
that as between two innocent parties, the one making the loss possible should
bear responsibility. Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein was distinguished because that
case involved the more complex tripartite credit card arrangement 19 in which
the issuer's representative "had no reason to question the presentation of the card
by its larcenous holder"2 while the present situation involved a bipartite ar-
211 Id. at 409.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 410.
214 Id. at 409.
215 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1967).
216 New York Laws 1961 ch. 549, § 512, as amended, New York Laws 1967 ch. 753, § 512,
repealed, Credit and Credit Identification Devices § 512, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 512 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1971-72). See note 183 supra.
217 Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962), aff'd, 39 Misc. 2d
552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1963) (discussed supra).
218 52 Misc. 2d at 875, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
219 See text accompanying notes 120-37 supra for a definition of the tripartite arrangement
220 53 Misc. 2d at 878, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
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rangemente2" in which the plaintiff should have been suspicious of the unusual
activity in the defendant's account. The plaintiff, in failing to notice that ac-
tivity, had failed in its duty toward the defendant and had allowed its customer's
credit status to be abused.
222
By applicable common law, while there is a duty on the part of the
credit card holder to exercise reasonable care over the said card, there is a
concurrent obligation ... at least in a bipartite relationshp,223 to protect
its customer from the imposition of unjust charges.224
A 1969 Texas case, Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Duke,22 ' adopted this ration-
ale and similarly extended the issuer's duty of care to encompass notice of unusual
account activity. The defendant, a Texas salesman, had lost his credit card while
in New York. $1,200 worth of unauthorized purchases was made before the
cardholder realized his card was missing. The court, while acknowledging that
the defendant had a duty to guard his credit card as he would his currency,
nevertheless recognized the obligation of the card issuer to take notice of and
deal with questionable activity. "Many purchases were made in the same stores,
and one New York area store inquired of the Lubbock store as to Duke's credit
standing in connection with one large purchase without any question being raised
about the irregularity.1 2 6 Having failed in its duty to investigate excessive ac-
count activity, Sears was precluded from enforcing its liability agreement against
the salesman.
The most recent case, Lechmere Tire & Sales Co. v. Burwick,227 was decided
in January, 1972.22' An imposter had used the defendant's credit card to make
15 unauthorized purchases totaling $611 in 1967. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, after noting that the credit card was beneficial to the issuer as
well as to the cardholder,229 stated that the customer could "fairly expect"
230
the issuer to use due care to prevent his card's use by imposters:
The preferable rule is that requiring the issuer of a credit card, or one
extending credit on the basis of the card, to use due care to ascertain that
the person using the card is its proper holder or one authorized to use it.
The obligation is not merely to use good faith .... The use of due care
in the circumstances also is necessary.
23 1
221 See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra for a definition of the bipartite arrangement.
222 52 Misc. 2d at 878, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
223 The court made a bipartite-tripartite distinction with respect to Texaco, Inc. v. Gold-
stein, inferring that the less complicated bipartite system required of the issuer a greater duty
of care. However, it imposed upon Allied Stores more than a high standard. It imposed an
impossible standard in that Allied's data processing equipment was simply inadequate to pick
out unusual activity in a customer's account within a 30 day period. Thus, the distinction be-
tween Goldstein and Allied Stores appears to be one of policy.
224 52 Misc. 2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
225 441 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1969).
226 Id. at 524.
227 ..... Mass. 2d ...... 227 N.E.2d 503 (1972).
228 The incident took place before Massachusetts acted to limit liability for unauthorized
purchases to $100.
229 ..... Mass. 2d ...... 227 N.E.2d at 506.
230 Id.
231 Id. at......, 227 N.E.2d at 507.
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The issuer had neglected to compare the defendant's signature on the credit
card name panel with those on the invoices, several of which had been misspelled.
The customer could reasonably have expected the plaintiff to check the identity
of the card user at least to the extent of comparing signatures. Its failure to do
so constituted strong evidence of negligence. 2
This final case represents the logical culmination of the interest-balancing
approach which began with Union Oil Co. v. Lull. These cases first established
and then broadened the card issuer's duty to investigate unusual or suspicious
circumstances. Their net effect was to more frequently absolve the cardholder
of liability for unauthorized purchases.
The above four categories of cases each reflected a distinct stage in the
development of the credit card industry. When the industry was in its infancy,
the courts had no contract upon which to rely. Consequently, it was perfectly
reasonable to interpret the various credit devices by analogy to more familiar
devices. Later, when the still unfamiliar credit card arrangement was endowed
with contract terms by the industry, the courts felt no need to consider anything
except those terms. After the early 1960's when the credit card had become
much more commonplace and had taken on a new economic significance, the
courts had to consider that factor as a new element in their determinations. Cer-
tain courts stressed the card's importance to the economy. Others stressed its
overall importance, i.e., its value to the consumer as well as to the businessman.
The evolution of the credit card is approaching another stage, the Less-
Check concept, a development in which the "money card" will come to con-
stitute a new payments system. Consistent with this development, new laws have
been enacted and are being proposed to ease the consumer's transition into the
credit card economy.
D. Legislation
In the past several years Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, and
various state legislatures have attempted to regulate the credit card industry so
as to shield the consumer from some of the more harmful effects of the industry's
spectacular growth. This regulation is a reflection of both the trend toward
consumerism and the realization that the credit card has developed to the point
where it is becoming a substitute for the check in many transactions, a substitute
which lacks the traditional check safeguards. Those safeguards are being grad-
ually provided by a series of regulations and statutes which should eliminate
some of the frustrations connected with today's credit card and ease the con-
sumer's transition to the money card of the Less-Check Society.
1. Unsolicited Credit Cards
The Federal Trade Commission undertook the first national regulation of
the credit card industry in a ruling (later superseded by Congressional action) 233
232 See id. at ..... . 227 N.E.2d at 507.
233 See text accompanying note 242 infra.
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which declared the mailing of unsolicited credit cards to be an unfair trade prac-
tice 84 In so ruling, the FTC weighed the interests of both the consumer and
the industry. The Commission decided that the consumer's convenience was the
determining factor, rejecting the strenuous arguments of the industry which con-
sidered the mailing of unsolicited credit cards to be the only way of entering
into and expanding the business. It saw use of the credit card to be "intimately
related" to the well-being of the consumer."' The practice of sending unsolicited
credit cards had resulted in inconvenience and hardship for the consumer. He
was sometimes billed for unauthorized purchases as a result of misappropriation
of an unasked-for credit card. 6 His credit rating might be jeopardized.237 Even
if an unwanted card did arrive safely, he would be put to the inconvenience of
sending it back or destroying it .2 And even having destroyed the card, an
account, which might result in billing errors, would have been established in
his name. 8 Theft of the cards created law enforcement problems.240 In spite
of these considerations, the industry argued that the practice was necessary as a
marketing technique, an argument that the Commission rejected:
To argue efficiency from a marketing standpoint and to ignore the abuses
arising from the marketing technique, however efficient it may be, is to neg-
lect the balancing of the equities, the right to promote vis-a-vis the right
to .be secure from solicitations which create personal problems, contribute to
law enforcement difficulties, and generally are disliked by a significant por-
tion of the public for the nuisance they become, and the fear of what prob-
lens could arise for them because of the mailing of unsolicited credit
cards.2
41
This defense of consumer interests can be seen as an extension of the interest-
balancing policy of Union Oil Co. v. Lull which continues to influence various
law making bodies and agencies.
2. Loss or Theft of Credit Cards
The Federal Trade Commission's initiative was superseded by an amend-
ment to the Truth-in-Lending Act which prohibited the mailing of unsolicited
credit cards, limited the cardholder's liability to $50 in case of unauthorized use
of his card, and put the burden of proof on the card issuer to enforce that limited
234 16 C.F.R. § 421.1 (1971):
The mailing by marketers of products or services or by others of unsolicited credit
cards constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: provided, however, that
nothing in this rule should be construed to prohibit the mailing of credit cards which
are renewals, substitutions, or replacements of cards expressly requested, expressly
consented to, or accepted prior to the effective date of this rule through use by the
holder.
235 35 Fed. Reg. 4615 (1970).
236 Id. at 4620.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 4621.
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liability.2" Proponents of the legislation made clear that such consumer protec-
tion was required as a result of the explosive growth of the credit card industry
and the development toward "a credit card economy."24 Their intent was to
safeguard the consumer by setting ground rules for the largely unregulated credit
card industry in anticipation of that credit card economy:
In net effect, these provisions confer on consumers the protection they
now enjoy in the use of checks .... If we are in fact moving toward a so-
called checkless society, these provisions are especially important. The credit
card could be a trump card played by lenders in anticipation of the day
when our customary check protections become extinct.
244
Opponents of the legislation were little concerned with the provision which
limited customer liability,4 5 but expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the
provision which prohibited unsolicited mailings of credit cards. They apparently
felt that such a prohibition was unnecessary, especially in the light of a 1968
study made by the Federal Reserve Board. That study found that the credit
card was not leading people too far into debt, that the sending of unsolicited
credit cards was the only practical way of beginning and expanding a credit card
business, that there was no evidence that the use of the credit card was increasing
retail prices,24 6 and that the credit card did not work to the disadvantage of the
small merchant.24 7 Each of these contentions was answered in the course of the
Senate Hearings by the bill's proponents. They argued that the credit card was
indeed leading people into debt. It was a contributing factor to many consumer
bankruptcies which arose when unsolicited credit cards were sent to already
financially-pressed families enabling them to spend beyond their means and to
overextend their credit. This, in turn, resulted in the garnishment of wages and,
ultimately, in bankruptcy.248 Additionally, the practice of sending unsolicited
credit cards contributed significantly to the inflationary trend:
A most compelling argument for the speedy passage and enactment of this
legislation is that the uncontrolled and unsolicited distribution of credit
cards helps stimulate inflation at the very time we are supposedly trying to
curb it. The use of credit cards encourages easier credit and helps encourage
a spending psychology among those very people Who can least resist the
urge to buy and who can least afford to overextend themselves.249
The contention that the credit card was not increasing retail prices was not
directly answered by the legislation's proponents. Instead, it was generally, and
logically, assumed that the costs of implementing and conducting a credit card
242 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
243 116 CONG. REc. 11828 (1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
244 115 CONG. Rac. 1948 '(1969) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
245 One possible reason for the issuers' lack of concern over the liability provision was
brought out in the Senate Hearings where it was stated that the issuers felt they could get
insurance to cover losses greater than $50. Hearings on S. 721, supra note 195, at 80.
246 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT ON BANK CREDIT-CARD AND CHECK-CREDIT
PLANS, at 4, 5 '(1968).
247 Id. at 53.
248 Hearings on S. 721, supra note 195, at 44.
249 116 CONG. REc. 11829 (1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
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business, including the costs resulting from theft and misuse of unsolicited
cards,25 were passed on to the consumer.""
The argument that the credit card did not work to the disadvantage of
the small retailer was at least partially refuted by testimony to the effect that
four out of five of the responding members of a national organization of small
businessmen favored the absolute prohibition of the sending of unsolicited credit
cards. 25
2
The final finding of the Federal Reserve study, that the banning of un-
solicited credit cards would give an unfair competitive advantage to those issuers
already established, presented a more serious objection. However, the action of
the Federal Trade Commission in declaring the unsolicited mailing of credit
cards an unfair trade practice"' provided Congress with the incentive to do like-
wise, notwithstanding any competitive advantage which might follow. In fact,
failure to do so might have resulted in a far greater competitive imbalance on a
broader scale because it was unclear whether the Federal Trade Commission's
jurisdiction extended to bank and common carrier credit card issuers.2 If it
did not, the banks and carriers would be able to mail unsolicited credit cards
while all other issuers would be prohibited from doing so.
In addition to the above arguments, a real impetus for passage of the bill
came from the simple desire to safeguard the consumer. If one could expect the
credit card to substantially replace the check or to be the "vanguard of the end
of currency,'' the dangers and inconveniences associated with its use would
have to be eradicated. The unsolicited mailing of credit cards and the spectre
of unlimited liability were two of these dangers. Their elimination would free
the consumer from apprehension that a lost credit card might result in unautho-
rized bills or in damage to his credit rating; it would free him from the incon-
venience of having to destroy or send back an unwanted card and the offensive-
ness which such an intrusion into his personal affairs represented.
For all of these reasons, the bill was enacted on October 20, 1970 to be effec-
tive 90 days later. With respect to the Less-Check concept, it is the most signif-
icant legislation enacted thus far in that it removes from the consumer perhaps
his greatest objection to use of the credit card-his fear that the card's loss might
lead to unlimited liability and, possibly, to bankruptcy. In so -doing, it is an
encouragement to even greater use of the present credit card and the future
money card of the Less-Check economy.
250 See, e.g., Credit Cards: Nicest Thing Since Money, NEwswEEK, July 17, 1967, at 36,
for an account of the problems and expenses encountered by four Chicago area banks as a
result of the mass mailing of bank credit cards.
251 116 CONG. REc. 11831 (1970) (remarks of Senator McIntyre).
252 Hearings on S. 721, supra note 195, at 131.
253 See notes 234-41 supra.
254 The Commission claimed that banks, common carriers, and air carriers, although nor-
mally outside its jurisdiction, were within its jurisdiction to the extent that they issued credit
cards for use in connection with the sale of merchandise of services. 35 Fed. Reg. 4620 '(1970).
This assertion created some uncertainty, the Congressional belief being that these issuers could
not be included under FTC jurisdiction since they are not covered by the FTC Act.
255 116 CONG. RIc. 11844 (1970) (remarks of Senator Byrd).
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3. Consumer Billing Practices-A Proposal
Currently under consideration, both by Congress and by the Federal Trade
Commission, are measures designed to deal with consumer complaints involving
creditor billing practices. These measures should, once enacted, continue the
trend toward protection of the credit card consumer. The proposals constitute
a recognition that consumer protection laws have lagged behind industry develop-
ments in the credit field. They are an attempt to remove various inconveniences
associated with use of the credit card, an attempted "bill of rights"2 6 for the
credit consumer.
A proposed Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on billing
practices 5 . has been postponed pending Congressional action on the more exten-
sive Fair Credit Billing Act. 8 which contains substantially similar provisions and
which is likely to be acted upon in 1972 since hearings have already been com-
pleted. Both measures offer remedies for a number of improper business prac-
tices which today are considered not much more than inconveniences. Their
solution, however, will prove of greater significance to the Less-Check Society
when the computer and the credit bureau will play a vastly more important
role in consumer affairs.
a. The Shrinking Billing Period
The cardholder is customarily allowed 25 or 30 days in which to pay his
bill free of finance charges. After that period, he is charged 1 2 percent interest
per month. The practice has grown up among some segments of the industry
of sending out billing statements late, thereby cutting down the "grace period"
in which a customer can pay free of finance charges. Section 163 of the Fair
Credit Billing Act, the first national attempt 59 at prohibiting this practice,
would require that creditors mail out their billing statements at least 21 days
before payment is due.26
b. Computer Billing Errors
One of the annoyances accompanying the credit card boom has been the
difficulty of dealing quickly with billing errors. The rapid expansion of the indus-
try and its increasing use of computers have resulted in an impersonality which
often necessitates weeks and months of effort to clear up such errors. Section 161
of the proposed Act would provide an "incentive"2'' for creditors to respond
promptly to consumer billing inquiries: they must acknowledge such inquiries
256 117 CONG. Rac. 966 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1971).
257 Proposed FTC Trade Reg. Rule § 430.1, 35 Fed. Reg. 15842-43 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as the FTC proposal].
258 S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
259 Since 1969 Massachusetts has required creditors who send periodic billing statements to
mail or deliver them at least nine days before the end of the next billing cycle. Noncompliance
results in forfeiture of all finance charges for the preceding cycle.
260 The FTC proposal contains a similar provision.
261 117 CONG. REc. 966 '(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1971).
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within ten days and respond affrmatively to them within 30 days. Moreover, if,
after the 30-day period has passed without the creditor having complied, the
consumer can prove that the bill was in error, he will then be able to recover
from the creditor the greater of $100 or three times the amount in dispute, plus
any actual damages sustained by him and a reasonable attorney's fee.262
c. Adverse Credit Rating
Section 162 of the proposed Act complements the previous provision by
removing any possibility that the creditor might attempt to compel payment
of a disputed bill by threatening the customer with an adverse credit rating.
The creditor who has received written notice of a dispute would be prohibited
from making any such threat until he has both complied with the previous
section and allowed the customer an additional 30 days in which to make pay-
ment. Additionally, before the creditor does report adverse credit information
to a consumer reporting agency, he will be obliged to furnish the customer with
the address of the agency and a copy of the report."' A creditor who reports a
disputed bill as delinquent will also have to report that the account is in dis-
pute, furnish a brief description of the obligor's contention, and report any sub-
sequent disposition of the dispute. 4
d. Preservation of Cardholder Defenses
Section 169 of the Act, a provision which should prove extremely significant
to both the credit card industry and the consumer, will subject the card issuer
"to all claims and defenses arising out of any transaction in which the credit card
is used as a method of payment or extension of credit."2 5 When the Fair Credit
Billing Act was first introduced, this section was considered necessary to protect
the bank credit card holder because the bank, as a "holder in due course or a
cash lender," could enforce payment notwithstanding any dispute between the
cardholder and the merchant.26  While that conclusion is accurate-the card-
holder is precluded from asserting defenses against the issuer in a tripartite
system-these particular theories are not its basis. The bank in this instance is
not a holder in due course,... nor is its status of cash lender controlling. Rather,payment is enforced because of the waiver of defense clause contained in practi-
262 The FTC proposal does not contain this provision. Rather, it states that it is an unfair
trade practice for an issuer to fail to hold in abeyance any further billing statements until an
individual inquiry into the facts has been conducted and an explanation furnished.
263 Once the consumer receives this information, he then has the right under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act to contact the credit agency and submit for inclusion in his credit file
his version of the dispute. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1970).
264 The FTC proposal contains a similar provision, making it an unfair trade practice to:
convey to third parties, including credit bureaus, credit reporting agencies, and retail
establishments participating in a credit card operation, adverse credit information
concerning a disputed amount allegedly owed by a customer account holder without
first notifying the customer account holder of the parties to whom such information
will be conveyed, together with a copy of the report to be conveyed.
265 The FTC proposal does not contain a similar provision.
266 117 CON(. Rc. 968 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1971).
267 In order for there to be a holder in due course, there must be a negotiable instrument
as defined by Uniform Commercial Code § 3-104. There is none in the credit card transaction.
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cally every consumer credit contract. By the waiver of defense clause, the con-
sumer agrees not to assert against the credit card issuer any defenses which he
might have against the merchant. With the exception of a few states, present law
upholds the waiver clause. The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes it, sub-
ject only to state consumer laws and court decisions which make it ineffective.268
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, enacted in six states,269 does deal directly
with the problem by offering the choice of either outright prohibition of the
waiver clause270 or recognition of it subject to certain limitations.2" Unfortu-
nately, these alternatives have no application to the tripartite credit card arrange-
ment, i.e., transactions involving the "lender credit card" are excluded from the
coverage of Article 2 (Credit Sales) of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 2
Thus, protection of the consumer is quite limited in this area. Passage of
the Fair Credit Billing Act will represent a dramatic improvement for most
consumers, allowing them to retain their most effective weapon against unsatis-
factory business practices, viz., the right to refuse payment for defective goods or
services. By declaring the waiver of defense clause ineffective in consumer credit
card transactions, Congress will have taken a most significant step, not only
with respect to the present-day cardholder, but also with respect to the transition
toward the Less-Check Society. It will have ensured that this basic consumer
right to refuse payment for inadequate goods or services will not be eroded by
the gradual change to a credit card economy. As Senator Proxmire said in
introducing the bill: "The inclusion of a third party such as a bank or a credit
card company should not be permitted to weaken the traditional rights and de-
fenses which a consumer might have in any retail transaction entered into di-
rectly with a merchant."'2 7
e. Billing Reforms
In addition to the significant reforms outlined above, the Fair Credit Billing
Act would relieve some of the minor vexations encountered by credit cardholders.
The remedies proposed, however, should do more than eliminate somewhat
trifling consumer inconveniences. They should, in their cumulative impact, prove
as significant as the above provisions in easing the transition to a Less-Check
268 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-206.
269 Utah, Oklahoma, Indiana, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming.
270 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404, Alternative A.
271 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404, Alternative B, states:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease ... an agreement by
the buyer or lessee not to assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out
of the sale or lease is enforceable only by an assignee not related to the seller or lessor
who acquires the buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith and for value, who gives
the buyer or lessee notice of the assignment ... and who, within 3 months after the
mailing of the notice of assignment, receives no written notice of the facts giving rise
to the buyer's or lessee's claim or defense....
272 Article 2 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code pertains to the consumer credit sale.
One of the requirements of a credit sale is that credit be granted by a person who regularly
engages as a seller in credit transactions of the same kind. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 2.104. The tripartite credit card is a lender credit card as opposed to a seller credit card.
Since it does not contemplate credit being extended by a person who regularly engages as a
seller, the lender credit card arrangement is not within the scope of article 2. Hence, the alter-
native waiver of defense sections are inapplicable to the tripartite credit card arrangement.
273 117 CONG. REC. 968 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1971).
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Society by removing some of the objections to a credit card (or money card)
payments systems. Most of these objections have to do with questionable billing
practices.
Section 164 would prohibit the use of the previous balance billing system
under which the customer's account is not reduced by partial payments made
during the current payment period." 4 The effect of this system is that the card-
holder winds up paying interest on money he has already repaid." 5 To remedy
this, the legislation requires any creditor operating the type of credit arrangement
which grants the consumer an opportunity to avoid finance charges by paying
his bill within a reasonable time to make use of the "adjusted balance system."
This system more accurately reflects the status of the debt by applying "a periodic
rate or rates to the amount represented by the opening balance reduced by an
amount equal to all payments and other adjustments received and credited to
the obligor's account during such period." '276
Section 165 would outlaw the minimum finance charge on the ground that
it discriminates against a specific group of customers, viz., those who have not
been able to pay their bills within the specified time period.277
Section 166 would prohibit offsets; i.e., it would prevent creditors from
using funds on deposit as an offset to a credit card debt. The real significance
of this section is that it affirms the consumer's right of refusal to pay for unsatis-
factory services or merchandise.27 More simply, it preserves his bargaining
power.
Section 167 would require the creditor to acknowledge payments at the
date of their actual receipt, while section 168 would require that excess payments
be credited immediately to the consumer's account. 9
None of the above provisions relating to billing practices is of monumental
importance, but, taken together, their impact should be of some significance to
the Less-Check concept. The reform of billing practices related to the credit
card can only serve to reduce consumer fears of and objections to computer
finance.
f. Administrative Reforms
The Fair Credit Billing Act would also respond to the problems caused by
increasing credit card volume by providing several administrative aids for the
consumer's benefit. The first such aid is the requirement that the monthly state-
ment contain a fuller description of each credit transaction, including the
"amount and date of each extension of credit, . .. the vendors and/or creditors
274 Id. at 967.
275 Senator Proxmire gave the following example of the previous balance system: "[I]f a
consumer had an opening balance of $100 and made a partial payment of $90, a creditor using
the previous balance system would charge the consumer 11/2% of the $100 balance, or $1.50."
Id.
276 S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 164 '(1971). The FTC proposal does not contain asimilar provision.
277 117 CONo. REc. 967 '(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1971). The FTC proposal does not contain a
similar provision.
278 Id. The FTC proposal does not contain a similar provision.
279 Again the FTC proposal does not contain similar provisions.
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involved, and, if a purchase was involved, a brief identification of the goods or
services purchased.""28 This provision should prove equally relevant to today's
credit cardholder and to tomorrow's "money card" consumer. Today's card-
holder will be able to more easily keep track of his various credit card purchases
without having to accumulate a month's sales invoices. Although tomorrow's
Less-Check consumer will not have the problem of an accumulation of invoices
(the Less-Check Society is meant to be a less-paper society), the Less-Check
concept does contemplate a type of monthly statement similar to the one provided
here. Thus, this particular provision anticipates and, to some extent, provides
for the future.
The creditor will also be required to list on monthly billing statements an
address and telephone number in order to enable the consumer to obtain quick
action on any complaints or questions concerning his own account.28' This
provision has been described as a means of "humanizing"2"2 the billing system
and, as such, should make the impersonal credit card (and money card) less
objectionable to the consumer.
Finally, the bill would enable the merchant to offer a cash discount of up
to five percent as a means of inducing payment in cash rather than by credit
card," 2 a practice usually contractually prohibited by the credit card industry.
This provision constitutes a recognition of the fact that the merchant's payment
of a discount to the credit card issuer is passed on to the consumer in the form of
a higher retail price. Consequently, the customer paying cash is subsidizing the
customer buying on credit. Under section 170, the merchant will be allowed to
offer to each customer the alternative of making purchases by credit card at the
regular price or by cash at a lesser price, the difference representing the discount
charged the merchant on each credit sale.
This last provision is perhaps of less relevance to the Less-Check concept
than the above provisions since its effect will certainly not be to promote the
advantages of the credit card over other forms of payment. It is a purely con-
sumer-oriented, realistic recognition of the fact that, despite its convenience, the
credit card increases retail costs somewhat. In the long run, however, this pro-
vision, when considered within the context of the Fair Credit Billing Act, will
probably have proved beneficial to the consumer's acceptance of a Less-Check
concept. The Act will eliminate many of the difficulties and inconveniences
280 S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1971). The FTC proposal would make it an
unfair trade practice to:
fail to specify the vendors and/or creditors, the amount, and dates of each exten-
sion of credit or the date such extension of credit is debited to the account during the
billing cycle and, a brief identification, either on the statement or on an accompany-
ing slip or by a symbol of any goods or services purchased or other extension of
credit.
See note 257 supra.
281 S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1971).
The FTC proposal would make it an unfair trade practice to:
fail to include on the billing statement the name, address and telephone number of a
person authorized to act as a contact between the customer and the retail establish-
ment for the purpose of receiving requests by the customer to correct mistakes or
make adjustments to the customer's billing statement. See note 257 supra.
282 117 CONG. REc. 968 '(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1971).
283 S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 170 (1971). The FTC proposal does not contain a sim-
ilar provision.
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associated with the credit card. For the first time the credit card will be truly
safe and truly convenient. The consumer will have an honest understanding of
the cost of the credit card to him. But, weighed against the credit card's newly
established advantages, this cost should prove relatively minor and the card
itself more acceptable.
4. Consumer Liability-A Suggestion
If we are indeed approaching the Less-Check Society, an economy in which
the "money card" payments system will have come to supplant the check pay-
ments system, an additional consumer provision is called for. All civil liability
for unauthorized use should be eliminated." 4 Current law provides that, if
certain conditions are met, a consumer may be liable for up to $50 worth of
unauthorized purchases.2 15 If however, the same consumer loses a blank check, he
will suffer no liability whatsoever in the event the check is forged and cashed.216
Such discrepant treatment is probably due to the equation of the credit card with
currency by the legal community. The belief apparently is that it "would be
ideal if every holder treated his card as if it were a thousand dollar bill,"2 the
inference being that the consumer who has lost his credit card should be treated
no differently from the one who has lost his cash-the value is gone. This posi-
tion ignores the fact that one of the reasons that the consumer makes use of the
credit card is to avoid the necessity of carrying large sums of money. If the
consumer were expected to treat his credit card as if it were a thousand dollar bill,
he would probably be reluctant to carry it with him. As noted above, Congress
has reduced this fear by its $50 limitation of liability, but it has not completely
eliminated the problem. A consumer who has lost a billfold full of credit cards
is still potentially liable for $50 multiplied by the number of credit cards lost. Such
treatment is unrealistic. The industry itself advertises the device as a safe way to
carry money. The law should reflect this proposition by making the credit card
absolutely safe.
The credit card transaction is actually more like the check purchase than
the no-questions-asked cash purchase: some alternative means of identification
is often required and a signature is always required. The credit card should,
therefore, be treated like the check. Such treatment would more realistically
reflect the development of the credit card as check substitute and would impose
no undue hardship upon the industry since current law requires that the card
issuer provide some sort of identification device (usually a signature panel) for
even limited liability to be imposed.28 All that the industry would have to do to
284 See generally Bergsten, Credit Cards - A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND.
& CoM. L. REV. 485, 505-07 (1967).
285 See text accompanying notes 242-255 supra.
286 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404(1): "Any unauthorized signature is wholly in-
operative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from
denying it. .. ."
287 Comment, The Lost Credit Card: The Liability of the Parties, 30 ALBANY L. Rv. 79,
88 '(1966).
288 "[No cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of any credit card . . . unless
.. the card issuer has provided a method whereby the user of the card can be identified as the
person authorized to use it." 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
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avoid loss would be to instruct its member merchants to compare the signature
on the card with that on the sales invoice. This procedure would enable the
merchant to confirm the identity of his customer as the bank teller does, by
comparing signatures (that on the check with the one on file in the bank). Since
the burden of identification would be the same on the merchant as on the
banker, why shouldn't the merchant, as does the banker, assume total respon-
sibility for his own carelessness?
The Uniform Commercial Code allows the banker to charge against the
customer only items "properly payable."2 9 Payment of a check with a forged
signature is not "proper"; hence, the banker cannot charge the payment against
the customer's account. The credit card should be treated similarly; its owner
should not bear responsibility, even to the extent of $50, for the carelessness of a
banker or a retailer. Losses from unauthorized purchases should be considered
as part of the cost of operating a credit card system. This cost could be reduced
by the exercise of a minimum of care by the industry, and, consequently, it
should not be borne by the consumer who is already paying higher prices and a
1 Y2 percent per month late payment fee for the privilege of using the card.
The current $50 potential liability amounts to an implied risk-sharing
between the consumer and the industry and should be eliminated. 21 Such a
change would constitute a more accurate reflection of the status of the credit
card and of its evolution from identification card to payments system.
IV. Toward a Less-Check Society
A. Introduction
The following statement typifies the area of greatest agreement among most
of the writers and investigators of the changing payment system: "My message
is uncomplicated: It is that a Direct-Fund-Transfer system seems to be techni-
cally, operationally, and economically feasible and that it is apparently inevi-
table."2 1 The current writings on this topic indicate that the technical feasibility
of a Less-Check Society is the area of greatest agreement. Assuming that we now
have, and have had for several years, the technical knowledge and equipment
289 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-401.
290 There is some feeling that the abolition of all civil liability for unauthorized credit card
use would eliminate whatever incentive the cardholder now has to report the card's loss or
theft. To meet this objection the present liability provision could be kept in an altered form.
If the customer, after receiving his monthly statement, neglects to inform the issuer within a
reasonable time (i.e., 14 days, in accordance with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406) of any
discrepancy between the statement and his own records, he could be liable for a penalty of up
to $50 for any losses resulting from (i.e., occurring after the 14-day period) that delay. This
approach would have the twofold advantage of placing upon the industry responsibility for its
member merchants' carelessness and of providing an incentive for the customer to notify the
issuer of loss or theft of the card. The notion of an implied risk-sharing between the parties
would be eliminated, but the customer would continue to feel constrained to give notice to the
issuer.
It should be noted that the threat of a $50 penalty would be largely illusory. The turnover
in stolen credit cards is sufficiently rapid that it is unlikely that one would still be in use 14
days after customer receipt of the billing statement. Consequently, the $50 penalty would
seldom be assessed. It would remain an empty threat, but one of some use to the industry.
291 American Banker, Feb. 17, 1967, at 5, col. 1.
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for such a payment system, why is check volume continuing to increase at an
annual rate of 7 percent?. 92 Why have we not yet applied this technical know-
how to implement a viable method to transfer funds electronically, thereby
reducing check volume? One reason has already been discussed. The adoption
of high speed sorting equipment which reads the Magnetic Ink Character Recog-
nition characters has removed some of the mounting pressure upon the system to
offer alternative means for funds transfer. This appears, however, to be only a
stop-gap measure.
While a changing payments system, ultimately leading to a Less-Check
Society, may evolve as forecasted, there are still many hurdles which must first be
overcome. Possession of the technical know-how to implement such a system may
not be sufficient to attract participants away from the usage of the check. Any
new payments alternative, introduced with a goal of attracting present check
users and thus reducing check volume, must offer the user advantages which are
sufficient to induce him to change his present attachments to the check. This
section will consider some of the problems which the EFTS must overcome if it
is to offer a viable alternative to the check as a payments mechanism. This will
be followed with an examination of some of the positive forces now under way
to hasten the development of the EFTS. The more popular suggestions, which
seem most likely to occur during the necessary transitional period from a pay-
ments system heavily reliant upon the check to an EFTS will also be discussed.
1. Changes Required to Accommodate EFTS
If we are to actually experience a payments system substantially different
from our present check-reliant system, several factors must be recognized and
dealt with. Accepting the oft-repeated statement that such a change is tech-
nically feasible, it becomes necessary to look at some of the factors which are
involved in such a change. Before a widely used BFTS can be successfully imple-
mented the following will have to occur:292
(1) Over eleven million business accounting and control systems must be
modified.
(2) Over fifty million people must be positively identified in such a way to
permit identification verifications over a communication system.
(3) Over 70 million new terminals must be installed (including household
units if maximum elimination of checks is to be achieved).
(4) More than 150 million people must change their way of thinking and
acting with regard to credit, money, and purchasing.
(5) An adequate security communication system linking every place of
business and every houseold must be developed.
(6) Paper source records must be eliminated as the major part of the pay-
ments system.
292 FEDERAL RE ERVE BANK OF BOSTON supra note 3, at 4.
293 Long, Checkless Society, AuDITGRAm, June 1967, at 7.
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2. Consumer Opinion
A change in the payments system will affect each of us as users of the
system. Yet until recently, the user of the system seemed to be all but ignored as
future prognosticators foresaw the birth of a new era. The emphasis may now
be shifting, recognizing that the success of any change may well depend upon
the advantages offered its users, not merely the solution it provides for problems
of the banking industry. As one banker has noted:
Even if electronic payment systems are technologically and economically
feasible, and if the security, economic and standardization problems are
solved, the entire effort will be meaningless unless such a system enables
banks to offer desirable and profitable services to customers.294
The key to a successful change in the payments system may well be the
element of desirable services for the consumer. These services must be so ad-
vantageous that they will persuade the consumer to change established habits and
to overcome psychological barriers. The popularity of the check is attested to
by the very fact that the paper volume problem exists. Banks have been so
successful in marketing this service that now more than 65 percent of the popula-
tion over 18 years of age have checking accounts.29 It has been established that
over 90 percent of the total dollar volume of payments are made by check.299
One major contrast between payment by check and use of the EFTS is the
payor's control over the timing of payment. Under the check-payment system,
the consumer is billed for the purchase of many goods and services. He may,
within certain limitations, select the day he wishes to pay this bill and send his
vendor a check. Payment by the EFTS will be simultaneous with the purchase
or the monthly due date of the bill. This deprives the consumer of the advantage
of timing bill payment with his cash flow. A marketing research study conducted
by Arthur D. Little, Inc., for the American Bankers Association "revealed that
bank customers are, for the most part, quite satisfied with the check payment
system in its present form. The element of control of the timing of payments is
the one feature of the check-processing system most favored by our customers." '
A study conducted recently by the Georgia Tech Research Institute under
sponsorship of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, concluded that:
The direct deposit of payroll, an element of an advanced payment system,
has not been popular. Only a very small percentage of households were
paid in this manner. Further, there was strong opposition on the part of
households to the direct deposit of payroll, although the pattern of this
opposition varied by age, sex and gross income level of the household. 298
294 Long, A Marketing Approach to the Electronic Payment Systems, THE MAGAZINE OF
BANK ADMINISTRATION, Mar. 1969, at 2.
295 Clancy, How Close Is the Checkless Society? CREDIT AND FxNA-cLAL MANAGEMENT,
Aug. 1968, 24, 25.
296 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, supra note 3, at 4.
297 THE AMERICAN BANKERS Ass'N., MONETARY AND PAYMENT SYSTEM PLANNING COM-
mITTEE, EXECUTIvE REPORT, April 1971, at 4.
298 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, REPORT ON PHASES I AND II O1 "RESEARCH
ON IMPROVEMENTS OF THE PAYMENTS MECHANISM" (July 8, 1971). This material has been
copyrighted (1971) by the Georgia Tech Research Institute.
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This same study also indicated that overall business attitudes toward direct
deposit of payroll were somewhat more negative than those of households. One
apparent reason for this opposition was the desire of employers to avoid any
labor problems with the employees who were generally dissatisfied with the
plan.299 Such negative attitudes to the direct deposit of payrolls are particularly
significant. Payroll checks accounted for over 40 percent of the business checks
written in the metropolitan areas surveyed, 00 and thus offer an excellent starting
point to both reduce check volume and begin to condition consumers toward less
reliance upon paper documents.
One of the few studies covering customer response to EFTS was conducted
by Hempstead Bank, Long Island, New York, in conjunction with its pilot
test of an EFTS. A mail survey of checking account customers was taken to
ascertain consumer acceptance of an EFTS. A random sample of 2,000 customers
were mailed questionnaires. After a follow-up mailing 1,069 usable question-
naires were returned. The questionnaire included a detailed explanation of an
EFTS to enhance the understanding of those responding."0' The following tables
tabulate sample results when respondents were asked if they would use such a
payments system. 02
Acceptance of Electronic-Funds-Transfer System
Would Use System
if Offered Percentage
Yes, definitely 20.6%
Yes, W/Reservations 26.4%
No 20.8%
Not Sure 32.2%
Responses were also correlated with respondents who were credit card
users.
3 0 3
% with % with % with % with % with
Would Use No Store Gas T & E Bank
System Card Card Card Card Card
Yes, definitely 18.1% 20.3% 22.7% 26.5% 28.9%
Yes, with Reservations 21.1% 27.0% 30.1% 29.6% 29.2%
No 28.1% 19.7% 16.5% 16.3% 12.3%
Not Sure 32.7% 33.1% 30.7% 27.6% 29.5%
299 Id. at 7.
300 Id. at 4.
301 Jablon, Marketing an Electronic Fund Transfer System, BANK MARKETING MANAGE-
MENT, Dec. 1970, at 18.
302 Id. at 19.
303 Id.
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As this table shows, those respondents presently using credit cards were more
ready to accept a further change in the payments system than the sample as a
whole.
Another indication of the resistance patterns to a change in the payments
system was highlighted when responses were correlated with the age of the
respondent."'
Under 25 to 35 to 45 to 55 to 65 and
Would Use System 25 34 44 54 64 Over
Yes, Definitely 36.6% 21.6% 21.7% 18.7% 15.1% 8.1%
Yes, with Reservations 30.4% 32.5% 24.0% 27.8% 22.4% 16.2%
No 7.1% 11.9% 20.5% 23.8% 28.9% 37.8%
Not Sure 25.9% 34.0% 33.8% 29.7% 33.6% 37.8%
A direct correlation between age and acceptance of the alternate payments
system is readily apparent. If the younger respondents retain this attitude as they
grow older, and if succeeding generations are less negatively inclined toward the
alternate system, then an EFTS, gradually introduced over an extended time
period, should receive more unanimous approval.
A survey of opinions of bank executives from the 300 largest commercial
banks, conducted by San Diego State College indicated that:.. 5
(1) 68 percent believe checks will never be eliminated completely;
(2) 93 percent believe cash will not be eliminated;
(3) 58 percent believe some form of Less-Check Society will become
a reality by the end of the century.
These executives also recognized the existence of certain barriers. Some of the
barriers mentioned in this study were:"30
(1) Customer resistance to immediate transfer of their funds;
(2) Problems of customer identification;
(3) Cost to the customer;
(4) Problems of universal numbering system;
(5) Lack of demand for benefits of the Less-Check Society;
(6) Customer resistance to elimination of checks;
(7) Customer resistance to public access to credit information files.
The results of the above limited marketing studies, together with the demon-
strated popularity of the check, highlight a major obstacle to any short term
radical change in the payments system. The check, from the customer's view-
point, does a good job. Banks have successfully sold their public on the desirabil-
304 Id. at 20.
305 SAN DrEso STATE COLLEGE, SCHOOL OF Bus. ADMIN., SUMMARY BANK SURVEY REPORT
1-2 (1968).
306 Id. at 2.
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ity of paying by check. Major selling points, such as cancelled checks serving as
proof of payment, the checkbook as a record of expenditures, and convenience
of payment have been successfully communicated. The ability to stop payment,07
protection from forged signatures,"0 " and decreased service charges0 9 have been
additional factors increasing the popularity of checks.
Most check users are aware of, and often take advantage of, a phenomenon
peculiar to the check-clearing system generally known as "float." Depending upon
the number of units in the check-clearing process through which the check must
pass on its trip back to the payor bank, the drawers account may not be debited
for the amount of the check for several days after it's delivered to the payee.
Float, coupled with the ability to control the timing of payment, is a feature of
the check-payment system which will not be available in an EFTS. These added
advantages of the check over electronic funds transfer will make such a new
system more difficult to successfully market.
3. Elements of an EFTS Present Today
The development toward a Less-Check Society occurring over a longer time
span, with various elements being introduced in successive stages may have the
cumulative effect of stabilizing check volume, and creating new habit patterns at
such a slow rate that the full impact of the new system will not be realized until it
is practically operational. The public has already accepted some phases of the
Less-Check era. Almost 2 million insurance policyholders pay their premiums
monthly without writing checks to the insurance company."0 The preauthorized
payment of insurance premiums was promoted by the insurance industry to
reduce the lapse of policies caused by failure to make renewal payments, and to
speed up their flow of funds through prompt payment of premiums. The policy-
holder authorizes his bank to accept drafts drawn by the insurance company on
the policyholder's account for a fixed amount. The insurance company indemni-
fies the bank for losses due to failure to pay the draft or overpayment of the
authorized amount. The policyholder is later provided with a verification of pay-
ment in his regular monthly statement. He neither receives a bill nor writes a
check. The insurance company has access to the funds practically as soon as the
payment is due by drafting on the policyholder's account. Since the policyholder
loses control of the timing of his payment, the insurance industry recognized that
some incentive would be necessary to induce participation. In addition to con-
venience of payment for the customer, the insurance company offered participat-
ing policyholders reduced premium rates in return for their participation. Thus,
the insurance company and the policyholder share the benefits of the plan. The
307 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. § 4-403.
308 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404.
309 To attract new checking account customers many banks have offered service charge free
checking accounts if a minimum balance ranging from $100 to $200 is maintained in the
account each month. Some banks have offered the additional option of a service charge free
checking account if the account holder, rather than maintaining a minimum balance in
his checking account, maintains a $500 minimum balance in an interest bearing passbook
savings account.
310 E. WEIss, THE MARKETING IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHECKLESS SOCIETY 8 (1968).
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success of this program illustrates a good marketing lesson-when sufficient
benefits are offered to offset any disadvantages of a change, the new proposal
will meet with greater acceptance. This seems particularly true when contrasted
with the limited acceptance of other preauthorized payment programs.
B. Preauthorized Payment Plans
1. In General
An orderly change in our payments system can come about through a step-
by-step introduction of the various elements envisioned in the Less-Check Society.
As one commentator has noted:
While it is fairly easy and very exciting to engineer a system that takes a
completely new and radically different approach to a problem, such a
system seldom works. It generally runs into trouble by ignoring the old
system it is supposed to replace-a system that is firmly established, has
substantial economic value, and despite some shortcomings, serves a useful
function. What's more, there usually has grown up around the old system
a pattern of 'human behavior that cannot be changed very easily or rapidly.3 1
One step in this evolutionary process that is currently receiving considerable
attention is the preauthorized payment. These plans are based upon an agree-
ment between an account holder and his bank under which the bank has stand-
ing instructions to debit or credit the customer's checking account for certain
transactions without further authorization. Rather than issuing a check each
month for the payment of recurring bills, the vendor sends the "bill" to the
bank where the funds are automatically transferred from the customer's account
and credited to the vendor's account. They are primarily limited to those types
of transactions which recur on a periodic basis such as utility bills, insurance
payments, and telephone bills. While preauthorized payment plans have been
in existence for several decades, they have not enjoyed general acceptance. The
most common plans are with insurance companies and bank plans which facilitate
regular internal transfers from a customer's checking account to his savings or
other accounts. While these automatic deposits within the bank do reduce the
number of checks written, the eliminated checks are the ones causing the least
trouble since they never enter the interbank collection system. 12 The effect,
however, of preauthorized bill payment is to reverse the normal payment flow.
As pointed out in the study of the check-collection system conducted by the
Bank Administration Institute:
This reversal of the normal payment flow in which banks receive a payment
authorization directly from their depositor, instead of indirectly from a
vendor who sold his goods or services to the depositor, is an important
change in payment system patterns. It is important because this reverse
311 D. SCHNEB & W. TRABBOLD, PROoRESS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS '(5th ed. 1970).
312 BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 26, at 27.
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flow would change the order-to-pay from a well-traveled, much-processed
piece of paper into a one-stop payment instrument31
2. Current Problems
One problem with most preauthorized payment plans is the necessity for
the vendor to maintain an account with each bank in which participating custom-
ers have accounts."1 4 An additional obstacle is the necessity to maintain a direct
billing routine, because the proportion of customers who view preauthorized
payments as a desirable development has, so far, been surprisingly low."1 5
Furthermore, some customers simply do not use checking accounts. To adopt
the preauthorized program as an exclusive means of billing requires the vendor
to either persuade these customers to open a checking account or simply not deal
with them-hardly an attractive alternative. Other customers prefer to see each
bill before it is paid or prefer to determine the paying date themselves. Still
others have always paid by check and are unconvinced that preauthorization
offers them any particular advantage.
The customer who participates in a preauthorized payment program does
lose the flexibility of determining when the bill is to be paid. Also, since his
account is credited automatically and he may not receive notice of the credit
until the end of the month, it is more difficult to maintain an accurate day-to-day
record of his account balance.
The key to future success of preauthorized payment systems probably will be
in marketing design, i.e., what new advantages does the program offer to
compensate the participant for the loss of the advantages associated with pay-
ment by check. Convenience plus some cost savings by doing away with check
writing and mailing are certainly advantages. The insurance industry seems to
have found one answer in their benefit sharing approach. Passing some of the
advantages of increased cash flow and fewer lapsed policies back to the consumer
in the form of reduced premiums has made the preauthorized insurance premium
program more successful. Perhaps a similar approach by other vendors would
increase the acceptability of the concept.
Customer participation in a preauthorized funds transfer conditions him to
a new mode of payment where he doesn't directly initiate the payment order.
This would be an important bridge to some of the more radical changes en-
compassed within the broader context of the Less-Check Society. A closely allied
payment system is the one-check payroll. Wide adoption of these concepts could
have a significant impact on check volume.
As stated previously, preauthorized payment programs have not enjoyed
widespread success. For example, in the Bell Telephone Companies, where
there is vast potential, the four companies offering the service find its usage
313 Id.
314 The transfer of funds from the vendee's account to the vendor's account must take
place within the same bank. Most banks have not provided an inter-bank clearing process to
allow the vendor's bank to effect debit entries at various banks where the vendor's customers
maintain their account. Therefore, the vendor is required to maintain an account with each
bank where a participating customer has an account.
315 FDERAL REsERVx BANK OF BOSTON, supra note 3, at 13.
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running between 2 percent and 4 percent of subscribers.31 In Philadelphia, the
electric companies and banks have been able to attract far less than the 50,000
customers needed to break even.317 In Louisville, where it has been available
for over 30 years, only 10 percent of the customers take advantage of the service,
although interestingly enough half of these were added in the last three years. 1
Further, consumer attitude, as indicated in the Georgia Tech study, doesn't in-
dicate a strong desire for such services.1 9
3. California's SCOPE Project
a. An Experiment with "Paperless" Preauthorized Payments
A California experiment, known as SCOPE (Special Committee on Paper-
less Entries), has as its primary objective the study, development and formula-
tion of uniform standards and procedures for the exchange of paperless entries
between banks. 2 SCOPE could be one of the most significant tests of the ac-
ceptability of preauthorized payments, including the one-check payroll, that has
been offered by the banking community. A major limitation of the preauthorized
payment programs discussed above was the lack of inter-bank exchange facilities.
Lack of such exchange capability required the vendor to maintain an account in
each bank where his customers had accounts. The SCOPE project provides this
exchange capability between all participating banks. Participants in the SCOPE
project will handle "paperless" preauthorized entries which arise through the
existence of recurring payment obligations. Settlement of these obligations be-
tween vendor and vendee will be accomplished by direct entries to the demand
account of each party.
As of October, 1971, 56 banks with 2,800 branches have agreed to par-
ticipate in the SCOPE project.32' Only seven banks with a total of 20 branches
have refused. 2 ' Eighty-three banks, having a total of 314 branches have not
indicated whether or not they will participate.2 3
b. Participating Entities
Five separate entities will participate within SCOPE's operating structure.324
(1). CUSTOMER (EMPLOYEE). The "paperless" entry will be directed to the
account of the customer (employee). Funds will flow to or from his account
depending upon the type of obligation to be settled. As a customer he obtains
services or merchandise from a company. Rather than the company billing him
directly, the customer arranges with his participating bank to have the amount
316 Address by W. Putnam Livingston, A.M.A. Briefing Session, Mar. 25, 1971.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, supra note 298.
320 ScoPE PROCEDU.AL GUIDE, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PAPERLESS ENTRIES, Los AN-
GELES AND SAN FRANCISCO CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, Aug. 18, 1970, at iii.
321 Minutes of the Scope Committee Meeting, Oct. 6 and Oct. 28. 1971, at 4.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 SCOPE PROCEDURAL GUIDE, supra note 320, at 1-2.
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of the bill debited directly from his checking account. As an employee, he will
arrange to have his paycheck credited directly to his checking or savings account.
(2). COMPANY. The company originates the "paperless" entry. Rather
than billing the customer, it originates a "paperless" debit to the customer's
demand account. A "paperless" credit to the employee's checking or savings
account is generated in place of the issuance of a pay check.
(3). ORIGINATING BANK. The participating bank initially receiving a
"paperless" entry is the originating bank. Entries are received from the company
and forwarded into the commercial banking clearing facilities.
(4). AUTOMATED CLEARING HousE (ACH). The exchange of inter-bank
"paperless" entries is effected by the ACH. The inter-bank settlement mechanism
is also provided by the ACH.
(5). RECEIVING BANK. The bank maintaining the customer (employee)
demand account which has been selected to be debited or credited by "paperless"
entry is the receiving bank.
c. Processing of "Paperless" Entries
The SCOPE project will provide a fertile experimental ground for "paper-
less" entry banking. It will also provide increased flexibility to the concept of pre-
authorized payment. Since there will be multiple bank participation and a
vehicle for inter-bank transfers, the vendor need not maintain an account in each
bank where his customer has an account. The use of the one-check payroll will
not require the employee to maintain an account at the same bank as the
company. The SCOPE system provides a clearinghouse for these transactions,
thus greatly increasing the flexibility of the preauthorization concept. It also
accomplishes the transfer of funds without any paper documents.
The distribution of a payroll by a participating company will work as
follows. The company will furnish the originating bank with payroll information
in an acceptable form (actually the bank may prepare the information in the
proper form as an additional service). An identification of each employee, the
amount of the check, the employee bank account number, and his bank of ac-
count will be furnished by the company. The originating bank processes this
data and "out sorts" all "on us" items. The data is then forwarded to the ACH.
There the information is sorted and routed either directly to the receiving bank
or to another regional ACH where it is routed to the receiving bank. Each
employee checking or savings account is then automatically credited with his pay
for that period. During this entire process, no paper is handled. 2
The preauthorized payment of bills works in the following manner. The
customer signs a preauthorization agreement which is a two-part form. The
first part is the customer's authorization to the company to initiate debits to his
checking account and to the receiving bank to accept and post these debits.
The reverse side is the company's indemnification to the receiving bank. The
company then provides the originating bank with the bills of all participating
customers. The originating bank processes this data and debits the customers'
325 Id. at 7.
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accounts for any payments which are drawn on the originating bank's participat-
ing customers. The data is then forwarded to the ACH where it is routed to the
proper receiving bank. Each participating customer's account is debited for the
amount of the entry.32 6
The settlement procedure is controlled through the ACH. The Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco has agreed to perform this role in the following
manner:
Settlement will be effected through the individual reserve accounts which
each participating bank or its designated correspondent maintain at the
Federal Reserve. The reserve accounts will be posted to reflect the total
amount of debits and credits each participant submitted and received.32 7
d. Advantages to SCOPE Participants
The success of this project will depend upon many factors. One of the most
obvious and important will be the participating banks' ability to attract partici-
pants, both customers and companies. The flexibility which is built into the
SCOPE design will help to eliminate some of the limiting factors that have been
discussed. Once again, however, overall success still will depend upon the ad-
vantages which are offered to the participants. The SCOPE Procedural Guide
lists the following as some of the advantages:328 Advantages to the Customer
(Employee):
The automatic payment of recurring obligations provides the following
benefits to the customer: The time and cost of making the payment is
eliminated; for example, issuing a check and postage costs. Since the
customer has arranged for the obligations to be paid automatically when
presented, possible delinquency resulting from customer oversight is avoided.
Payments are displayed and identified on the customer's demand account
statement assuring the customer proof of payment.
Automatic deposit of wages provides the following benefits to the employee:
The time and cost involved in depositing his paycheck at the bank or pre-
paring a mail deposit is eliminated; for example, elimination of travel,
postage, waiting in branches during peak lobby traffic periods.
The employee's funds are consistently available to him on a timely basis
through automatic deposits to his demand account-even during vacation,
illness or business trips.
The employee's funds are safely deposited-danger of lost or stolen pay-
checks is eliminated.
Advantages to the Company:
Companies periodically billing for merchandise or services are afforded
several operational advantages:
Cashiering and remittance processing functions are essentially eliminated
yielding reductions in operating costs.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 18.
328 Id. at 3-4.
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The company is better able to plan and control the flow of funds since
transactions are resolved automatically on prearranged presentation dates.
A reduction in the collection effort is probable since automatic debiting
should reduce the occurrence of overdue accounts through customer over-
sight.
Companies which make periodic payments to employees or to other groups
achieve the following benefits:
Check preparation and reconciling are eliminated resulting in reduced
operating costs.
Special arrangements for check handling, distribution and control are
eliminated.
Improved employee relations or improved services to other groups are
afforded through automatic deposits.
Whether or not these advantages are sufficient to overcome some of the
objections previously discussed seems questionable. It may be questioned if some
are even advantages. Listing "improved employee relations" as an advantage
to the company which uses direct deposit of payroll is certainly inconsistent with
the conclusions of the Georgia Tech study." 9 An experiment such as SCOPE
will provide significant insight into the acceptability of certain elements of the
Less-Check Society.
e. Legal Framework
The legal framework within which SCOPE will operate consists of a series
of indemnification agreements and other contractual agreements. Customers
(employees) authorize the company to initiate automatic debits or credits to
their demand deposit accounts. The receiving bank is authorized to accept these
entries. Each participating company indemnifies the participating bank against
losses attributable to information submitted incorrectly by the company, and
agrees to comply with ACH rules."'
Below is a pictorial diagram of the proposed direct legal arrangements
among participants. 3 '
329 See text accompanying note 298 supra.
330 ScoPE PROCEDURAL GUmE, supra note 320, at 51.
331 Id. at 5.
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PREAUTHORIZED DEBITS
PREAUTHORIZED CREDITS
- ACH Rules
- Indemnification Agreements
SIm -M mrU - Authorizations
- Confirmation of Customer (Employe) Account
Preliminary drafts of the legal agreements have been completed. These docu-
ments may be modified prior to use, but they do provide us with an outline of the
legal setting within which the SCOPE project will operate.
The customer (employee) executes either a debit or credit agreement
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authorizing the company to initiate, and the receiving bank to accept, certain
entries to his checking account. The customer (employee) agrees that neither
the receiving bank, any participating bank, nor the ACH shall have any re-
sponsibility for the correctness of the amounts debited or credited. 32 Further,
the customer (employee) agrees that any disputes arising from any errors or
omissions which may occur will be handled by the customer (employee) directly
with the company and "shall not involve or be the responsibility of the bank." 3 '
The reverse side of these authorization agreements contains the company's
acknowledgement that it has executed the "Company Indemnification Agree-
ment," and a recognition of the status of the bank as a "Participating Bank." In
the Company Indemnification Agreement-Credit, the Company:
[A]grees to indemnify and hold each PARTICIPATING BANK and the
AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE harmless from any claims incident
to the operation of this plan, including without limitation any claim based
on alleged loss as a result of non-credit of any deposit, and any claim which
may be made by any depositor as a result of the rejection of any of his
checks, because of insufficient funds arising from the failure to credit
deposits to his account. 34
The Company Indemnification Agreement Debit contains a similar in-
demnifying provision, which provides that:
Company hereby agrees to indemnify and hold each PARTICIPATING
BANK and AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE harmless from any
claim or claims incident to the operation of this plan, including without
limitation any claim based on payment of any charges in the wrong ac-
counts or at lesser or more frequent intervals than provided in the customer's
authority, any claim based on alleged loss to the customer as a result of non-
payment of any charge, and any claim which may be made by any customer
as a result of the rejection of any of his checks because of insufficient funds
arising from the charging of payment hereunder to his account.33 5
By execution of either the debit or credit agreement, the customer (em-
ployee) agrees to settle any disputes with the company directly and, in the case of
a debit entry, to release the bank from any responsibility for the correctness of any
such charge. This would seem to be reasonable. The company is the source of
the entry and its records must be checked to determine the correctness of an
entry. If these inquiries-each time a customer questioned the amount of a bill,
or an employee questioned his paycheck-were directed to the bank, it would
result in an unworkable situation. The bank would first have to consult the
company to determine the correct entry amount. Requiring the customer to go
directly to the company would seem to be a reasonable alternative.
However, when the company indemnification agreement is added, the net
effect of this structure of agreements is to provide the bank complete protection
332 Id. at 52-53.
333 Id. at 52.
334 Id. at 56-57.
335 Id. at 58-59.
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from claims arising from the initiation of "paperless" preauthorized debits and
credits. Contract terms are usually the result of bargaining between the parties.
The final agreement depends upon the relative positions of each party and what
they are willing to concede in order to gain the benefits resulting from the con-
tract. Since success of this program will depend upon the participating banks'
ability to sell the merits of SCOPE to companies and employees, modification of
the company indemnification agreement may be required. It would seem that
the bank has a much greater stake in the success or failure of this venture than
the company. While indemnification against losses resulting from incorrect en-
tries provided by the company is certainly necessary, these agreements may need
to clarify that this protection is afforded the participating bank only from claims
arising from an incorrect entry in the source material provided by the company.
If modification is required, the banks' conflicting goals of limitation of liability
and marketability of this service will have to be reconciled to determine the
extent to which they are willing to limit the former in order to achieve the latter.
The ultimate form and acceptability of these agreements will be of interest to
many other groups who have organized to design similar programs.
Additionally, the success or failure of the SCOPE experiment may have a
significant import on the future development of our payments system. It will
provide valuable experience in the marketing of a different form of payment
process, provide valuable "live" experience with a "paperless" payments system,
and test the acceptability of contractual agreements between participating parties.
C. Hempstead Bank Experiment (ITS)
In addition to the SCOPE project, several other regional groups have
formed to investigate alternative payments systems, or to establish mini Less-
Check Societies. One such test which more closely parallels the model set out
in the introduction of this survey was introduced by Hempstead Bank, Garden
City East, New York. This program became operative on November 1, 1971.
Called the Instant Transaction System, it will perform the following functions:
(1) Verify card ownership through the use of a confidential code.",, This func-
tion will insure, prior to the transmitting of the transaction, that the individual
using the card is the authorized owner. (2) Authorization of financial transac-
tions. 7 The system will insure that either available funds or a line of credit
with a sufficient available balance..8 exists before any transfers occur. (3) Auto-
matic collection of source data." 9 The system will collect and record all data
relating to the financial transaction. For example, a participating merchant need
not go to his bank to deposit checks, cash or charge card slips for crediting to
his account.
336 HEMPSTEAD BANK, INSTANT TRANSACTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1-2.
337 Id. at 2.
338 Hempstead Bank customers may apply for a line of credit which is tied into their check-
ing account. If a transfer of funds from their checking account would result in an overdraft,
the line of credit is activated and funds are transferred into the customer's checking account.
Such cash advances will continue as long as the borrower has a sufficient unused available
balance from his line of credit.
339 HEMPSTEAD BANK, supra note 336, at 2.
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A typical transaction under the Hempstead Plan would occur as follows."'
Mrs. Buyer completes her shopping and the retail sales clerk fills out a sales
slip. The sales slip is then inserted into the printer which is part of the "on
line" terminal that has been installed in every participating retail merchants
store. This terminal consists of three compact electronic components: the printer,
the card reader and the verifier. Mrs. Buyer's Instant Transaction ("IT")
card is inserted into the card reader. Mrs. Buyer then enters her secret code
into the verifier by depressing numbered keys on the verifier. Unless the code
entered by Mrs. Buyer agrees with the identical code embedded in the "IT"
card, the transaction will not continue. After the secret number is verified, the
sales clerk enters the amount of the sale in the card reader and presses a button
to signify the end of the message. The card reader is connected directly with
the bank's computer (on-line) and the computer determines if there are sufficient
funds in Mrs. Buyer's account to cover the sale. Mrs. Buyer may also have an
established line of credit with the bank so if there are not sufficient funds in her
account the line of credit will be activated automatically, creating a loan to cover
the sale. If there are sufficient available funds, the printer prints the sales slip
which Mrs. Buyer will sign. She is given a duplicate copy of this sales slip.
Mrs. Buyer's checking account is debited and the funds are credited automatically
to the retail merchant's account.
The only written document utilized in this system is the sales slip. This
allows Mrs. Buyer to validate the transaction and serves as a written record
which may be used to update her checking account balance and reconcile her
monthly checking account statement. Likewise the merchant's copy of the sales
slip allows him to update his bank balance and reconcile his monthly statement.
The Hempstead Bank plan will provide a useful test of the "money card"
regarding consumer and merchant acceptability, protection against fraud
through the use of the identification device, and general operational and legal
problems likely to arise when a transaction is challenged.
One of the primary limitations of the Hempstead plan, as contrasted with
the SCOPE project, is the requirement that both the card holder and the mer-
chant maintain accounts with the sponsoring bank. In large areas, where several
banks serve the same market area, more sophisticated inter-bank clearing proce-
dures will need to be developed in order to test the acceptability of the concept.
D. Other Groups Studying the Payment Systems
In addition to the SCOPE project and the Hempstead Bank experiment,
several other groups and associations have organized for the purpose of studying
alternatives to our present payment system. Projects similar to SCOPE have
been initiated in 19 areas: 34 ' the Atlanta Federal Reserve district, Boston,
Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Dallas, Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas
City, Long Island, Maryland/Virginia/D.C., Minneapolis, New York City,
340 See IIEMPSTEAD BAN:, INSTANT TRANSACTION PROMOTIONAL BROCHURE.
341 4 PAYMENT SYSTEMS NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1971, at 1.
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Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Richmond, St. Louis, and Seattle. The Boston and
Atlanta projects are patterned on the California SCOPE system.
Other organizations which are actively studying the payment system in-
clude: 4 2 the Bank Administration Institute, BankAmerica Service Corporation,
Bank Marketing Association, Bank Stationers Association, Canadian Bankers
Association, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Federal Reserve System, Indianapolis Clearing House Association, Inter-
bank Card Association, Inter-Bank Research Organization, Northwestern Uni-
versity, Payments System, Inc., "4 ' and the American Bankers Association.
1. American Bankers Association
The American Bankers Association, through its Monetary and Payment
System (MAPS), Planning Committee, is doing continuous research in all areas
of the payments system.
In April, 1972, the MAPS Committee published an Executive Report pre-
senting some of its conclusions and recommendations based upon research
it had conducted. The Committee, formed in 1968, undertook a study of
the payments system to address three major questions: . .
1. Why change the present system?
2. If changes are needed, what changes?
3. What impact would these changes have on commercial banking and
the public?
The Committee presented an Interim Report during the American Bankers
Association annual convention in Miami in October, 1970. This Report:
[C]oncluded that change in the payment system could and should proceed
in an orderly and somewhat pragmatic manner. This contrasted with some
earlier prognosticators' views that we are facing a fairly immediate crisis
in processing checks and that we are missing out on markets requesting pay-
ment services presently unavailable from commercial banks. 45
The Committee concluded, after thorough research on the outlook for check
processing and an extensive investigation of the soundness of the present check-
payment system, that the check-processing system can be sustained in an opera-
tionally sound condition for at least the decade of the 1970's.146 Further, the
Committee concluded that there are two major routes to be pursued regarding
change in the payment system: "(1) The establishment by the banking industry
of a clearing and distribution system for electronic payments, and (2) the devel-
342 BANK ADmINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 26, at 30-31.
343 Payments System, Inc., has been conducting seminars focusing on new concepts of
electronic movement of money and money information. They also publish a monthly newsletter.
Payment Systems Newsletter.
344 THE AMERICAN BANKERS Ass'N, supra note 297, at 1.
345 Id. at 3.
346; Id.
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opment of the full potential for change available through the bank charge
card."' Eventual realization of such objectives would result in a payment sys-
tem similar to the Less-Check model set out in the introduction to this survey.
Furthermore, the overall approach of the Committee substantiates the opinion
earlier expressed that such a development will be a long-term evolutionary
change.
2. Federal Reserve System
Another important force involved in our changing payment mechanism is
the Federal Reserve System. As indicated above, several Federal Reserve District
Banks, as well as the Federal Reserve System, have been studying the payments
system. On June 17, 1971, the Federal Reserve Board issued a press release
calling for basic changes in the nation's system for handling money payments.
The proposed changes were said to be essentially transitional steps toward re-
placement of the use of checks with electronic transfer of funds. The statement
further noted that modernization of the nation's manner of making financial
transactions through the banking system "is becoming a matter of urgency." 48
While this sense of urgency seems to be somewhat inconsistent with the findings
of the American Bankers Association's MAPS Committee, it is further corrobora-
tion of the general need for some modification in the payments system. The
immediate priority of the Board's statement was to urge that the public be pro-
vided with faster, more convenient and more dependable check-clearing services
by the establishment of regional clearing centers throughout the country. 49
Such a structural change would serve to minimize the number of banks in the
clearing process, thus reducing actual check handling and decreasing the time
that certain checks are in the clearing process. It would not, however, change
the basic means for payment settlement.
Another change proposed by the Federal Reserve aims at reducing the use
of checks. This would be accomplished by encouraging banks and their cus-
tomers to make greater use of the expanded capabilities of the Federal Reserve
System's communication network. The Board indicated that:
Inducements to begin replacement of money transfers by check with trans-
fers via wire would be offered by (1) removing charges and other restric-
tions upon the use of the Federal Reserve's wire network by member banks
for transfers of $1,000 or more for their customers, (2) increasing the num-
ber of hours the network is open for business daily, and (3)" expanding facil-
ities at Reserve offices, where justified by traffic potentials, to equip them
for high speed tape transmission and computer-communicatons. 50
The establishment of such an expanded computer-to-computer communication
network may well be the forerunner of the nationwide computer-to-computer
communication network which is a requirement of a full-scale Less-Check Society.
347 Id. at 6.
348 Federal Reserve System Press Release (June 17, 1971).
349 Id. at 2.
350 Id. at 3.
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Recognizing that the above are only transitional steps in the evolution of
the payments system, the Reserve System has three projects under way directed
toward further study and improvement of the payments mechanism:...
(1) Construction of a payments mechanism simulation model for the
System. This will be used to aid in understanding the present pay-
ments system and to indicate the ways it can and should be im-
proved.3
52
(2) An in-depth study of exactly how payments are effected in Florida
and Georgia. 53
(3) The cooperative participation of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco and its Branch at Los Angeles with the Special Commit-
tee on Paperless Entry (SCOPE)."'
The most difficult problem faced by the many groups and organizations
studying the payment system may be the coordination of their various efforts and
the sharing of their joint knowledge and experience, which will lead to a com-
patible national system for the settlement of transactions and efficiently replace
the overburdened check clearing process.
An additional essential element to the development of the Less-Check So-
ciety is an hospitable legal environment. Adequate protection must be afforded
both the banking system and the user of the system. The following section dis-
cusses selected areas of existing law as they will relate to an EFTS.
V. Legal Problems and Solutions for the EFTS
Before the payments mechanism develops into an EFTS, practical solutions
will be needed for the legal problems engendered by the new system.
We would not expect our new system to always operate without fault or
flaw. Murphy's Law ("If a thing can go wrong, it will!") would come into
play; its effect would be to create problems-only some of which had been
foreseen by its planners.3 55
Whether special laws will be required to meet the exigencies of the EFTS or
whether the present laws are adequate to cope with any problems that may arise
must be resolved. The leading commentators within the area differ as to the
answers.
35
6
351 Id. at 5.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Clarke, Automation-The Banks' Legal Problems of the Present and the Future, 87
BANKING L.J. 110, 130 (1970).
356 See, e.g., Clark, An Item Is An Item Is An Item: Article 4 of the U.C.C. and the
Electronic Age, 25 Bus. LAW. 109 (1969); Clarke, Check-Out Time for Checks, 21 Bus.
LAW. 931 '(1966); Dunne, The Checkless Society and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. LAW. 127
(1968); Dunne, Variations on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Checkless Society; 75 YALE L.J. 788 (1966); Penney, Articles 4 and 8
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. RFv. 259 (1966); Note, Alternatives to the
Present Check-Collection System, 20 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1968).
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A. Application of the Uniform Commercial Code
1. In General
There are various schools of thought on the methods and legal framework
which will be needed to handle the EFTS. Gerald T. Dunne, one of the leading
commentators on the EFTS, suggests that Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, dealing with Bank Deposits and Collections, should be amended, since
Article 4 "will both facilitate the thrust of the future and be consumed as that
future unfolds." ' 7 Dunne states that:
CIhe existing design of Article Four is, conceptually and verbally, hospitable
to incorporation of a transfer system, and, perhaps, this is one of the cases
in which the law might lead rather than follow the world of affairs by pro-
viding not only an initial foundation for relationships, responsibility and
vocabulary, but also an infrastructure capable of supporting development as
experience unfolds.3,5 8
The reasons for amending Article 4 are diverse. Basically, the banking
profession is known for its conservatism; its philosophy is one of "look before
you leap." By providing a legal framework to govern an EFTS before its very
existence, you solve the problem before it arises. Dunne's view is that "[h]ow-
ever valuable an itch for change and a taste for experimentation may be else-
where, they should be minimal in organizations handling other people's
money.335 9
Dunne foresees two problem areas in revising the Uniform Commercial
Code: nomenclature and structure."' 0 The problem of terminology can be easily
solved and will not be dealt with since its importance for our purposes is minimal.
The structure problem, however, gives rise to two possible courses of action. The
first course could be called "total incorporation," if we may borrow from Justice
Black's constitutional perspective of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
states. This approach would involve integrating the EFTS into Article 4 as it
presently exists. Proponents of such a step point out that the draftsmen of the
Code recognized the need and made ample provision for flexibility sufficient to
meet the problem of the large volume of checks handled and the changing re-
quirements of the future. 8 ' The second course would involve the addition of
Part Six to the present Article 4 which would be called "Transfers of Bank
Credit," and also the recaptioning of the Article as "Bank Deposits, Collections
and Transfers." 2 Such a revision would "be an element in the process of produc-
357 Dmne, The Checkless Society and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. LAW. 127 (1968).
358 Dunne, Variations on a Theme by Parkinson, or Some Proposals for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 YAL, L.J. 788, 796 (1966).
359 Id. at 797.
360 Id. at 799.
361 UNrORM CoMMERcIAL Conn § 4-101, Comment.
362 As part of the process of change, Dunne proposes a number of amendments to Article 3
as well as the addition of Part Six to Article 4. Two of the amendments in Article 3 are in-
tended to obviate the possibility of negotiability becoming involved in transfers of funds by
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nipping in the bud any legal encouragement to use bank transfer orders as checks. Following
are Dunne's suggestions for Articles 3 and 4.
ARTICLE 3
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Part I
"Section 3-102. Definitions and Index of Definitions.
(3) The following definitions in other Articles apply to this article:
'Bank transfer order.' Section 4-601.
"Section 3-103. Limitations on Scope of Article.
(1) This Article does not apply to money, documents of title, bank transfer orders
or investment securities.
"Section 3-805. Instruments Not Payable to Order or to Bearer.
This Article applies to any instrument whose terms do not preclude transfer and
which is otherwise negotiable within this Article but which is not payable to
order or to bearer, except that there can be no holder in due course of such an in-
strument. This Section has no application to a bank transfer order."
ARTICLE 4
BANK DEPOSITS, Transfers AND COLLECTIONS
Part 1
General Provisions and Definitions
"Section 4-101. Short Title.
This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code-
Bank Deposits, Transfers and Collections."
"Section 4-104. Definitions and Index of Definitions.
(2) Other definitions applying to this Article and the sections in which they ap-
pear are:
'Bank transfer order' Section 4-601.
'Transferor' Section 4-601.
'Transferee Section 4-601.
'Transferor bank' Section 4-601.
'Transferee bank' Section 4-601."
NEW MATERIAL
ARTICLE 4
Part 4
Relationship Between Payor Bank and Its Customer
Section 4-408. Destruction of Paid Items.
*(1) A payor bank is authorized to destroy any item upon which it has made final
settlement, provided it first makes a photocopy of the item and all endorse-
ments thereon.
(2) Any such copy accompanied by a certificate of destruction under seal of the
bank shall be admitted in all proceedings without further authentication or
attestation to the same extent as the original check.
Part 6
Transfers of Bank Credit
Section 4-601. Bank Transfer Order; Transferee Bank; Transferee.
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Bank transfer order" means an item issued by a transferor directly to a
transferee bank directing the payment of a sum certain to a designated trans-
feree bank for the credit of an indicated transferee;
'(2) "Transferor" means any person from whom a bank has agreed to take bank
transfer orders and includes another bank;
(3) "Transferee" is the person designated to receive ultimate credit for the amount
of a bank transfer order;
(4) "Transferor bank" means any bank receiving a bank transfer order from a
transferor;
'(5) "Transferee bank" means a bank on whose books the account of the transferee
is carried.
Section 4-602. Methods of Transfer and Payment.
(1) If the transferor bank and transferee bank are the same, a bank transfer order
is effected by being charged to the account of the transferor and credited to
the account of the transferee.
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ing an environment in which banks will be more receptive to presenting, and
their customers to receiving, proposals for new ways of making payments.""s
Another legal commentator, Norman Penney, also believes that the Uni-
form Commercial Code is inadequate to meet the task of grappling with the
EFTS. He devotes specific attention to section 4-406--"Customer's Duty to Dis-
cover and Report Unauthorized Signature or Alteration." The customer has
an affirmative duty to examine promptly the statement of account which is made
available to him and to "discover and report forgeries and alterations."""4 If the
customer fails to comply with this duty, the bank is relieved of liability as to the
items bearing forged signatures or alterations provided that the bank has exer-
cised ordinary care in making payment of the items."'5 The Code also provides:
[I]f, after the first item and statement becomes available plus a reasonable
period not exceeding fourteen calendar days, the bank pays in good faith
any other item on which there is an unauthorized signature or alteration by
the same wrongdoer, which payment is prior to receipt by the bank of noti-
fication of such unauthorized signature or alteration on the first item, the
customer is precluded from asserting the additional unauthorized signature
or alteration.8 6
An example of such a situation would be as follows: John Doe forges the
name of his employer, John Smith, to a check drawn on First Bank, Smith's
(2) Where the transferor bank is not the transferee bank, it may effect a bank
transfer order by charging the account of the transferor and directing a bank
with which it has an account to charge such balance with the amount of the
order and pass credit to or for the account of the transferee. If the bank re-
ceiving such order is not the transferee bank, it may pass such credit by a bank
transfer order directed to the transferee bank or a bank holding an account of
the transferee bank. A telegraphic or electronic transmission of any such direc-
tion between banks is an "item" within the definition of Section 4-104(g).(3) A trasferor bank must effect a bank transfer order by a reasonably prompt
method, taking into consideration any relevant instructions, the nature of the
transfer, the number of such orders on hand, the cost of transfer involved and
the method generally used by it or others to effect such transfers.
Section 4-603. Responsibility for Transfer; When Action is Timely.(1) A transferor bank must use ordinary care in
(a) effecting a bank transfer order;
(b) giving notice to the transferor of any delay in or failure of transfer within
a reasonable time thereof.(2) A transferor bank taking proper action before its midnight deadline following
a receipt of a bank transfer order acts seasonably; taking proper action within
a reasonably longer time may be seasonable, but the bank has the burden of so
establishing.
'(3) Subject to subsection (1) (a), a transferor bank is not liable for the insolvency,
neglect, misconduct, mistake or default of a transferee bank.
Section 4-604. Delays.
Delay by a transferor bank beyond time limits prescribed or permitted by this
Act or by instructions is excused if caused by interruption of communication facilities,
sspeson of payments by another bank, war, or emergency conditions beyond the
control of the bank, provided it exercises such diligence as the circumstances require.
Section 4-605. Finality of Transfer.
A transfer is considered accomplished when the amount thereof has been posted
to the account of the transferor or other person to be charged therewith.
Dunne, supra note 358, at 800-03.
363 Dunne, supra note 358, at 797.
364 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406, Comment 2.
365 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CooE § 4-406(2).
366 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406, Comment 3.
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usual bank of deposit. First Bank pays the item on June 1 and the paid item
is sent to Smith with his monthly bank statement on June 7. Meanwhile Doe
forges five more checks under Smith's name. Smith does not look at his vouchers
and bank statement until June 26, but on June 23 the five additional forged
checks are presented to First Bank and paid. Since Smith did not examine his
returned statement within 14 calendar days after he received it, he cannot hold
the bank liable for paying out the additional forged checks on June 23 absent
a showing of negligence on the part of the bank. He is limited to holding his
bank liable only for the first forged check paid on June 1.
In addition, failure on the part of the customer to discover and report his
unauthorized signature within one year from the time the statement and items
are made available bars him from asserting any claim and failure to discover any
unauthorized indorsement within three years will preclude him from asserting
against the bank such unauthorized indorsements." 7 The Code treats differently
alterations to the drawer's signature and unauthorized indorsements because the
person can more easily and quickly detect an alteration of his own forged signa-
ture than he can of a forgery of an indorsement.
With the advent of the EFTS, problems would arise in that a customer
would have difficulty complying with these requirements of section 4-406 since
there would be no vouchers to examine. Without the vouchers, the customer
cannot be held accountable for failure to examine for alterations or forgeries.
An argument could be made for reading the requirements of "statement and
items" of 4-406(1) in the disjunctive rather than in the conjunctive36 so that
a bank could comply with this section's requirements by furnishing its customer
only a statement for the period in order to show that debits and credits have
been made to the customer's account. But before we reach this point we must
resolve what may be the central issue concerning the applicability of Article 4
to an EFTS, viz., whether a record of magnetic tapes, arranged so as to convey
orders or requests to pass money and embodied in magnetic tape or disc, may be
classified as an "'item" within the meaning of Article 4 of the Code. 69
The Code provisions of Article 4 provide the legal rules applicable to the
deposit of an "item" in a bank. An "item" is defined in the Code as "any in-
strument for the payment of money even though it is not negotiable, but does
not included money." ' Many legal commentators are reluctant to apply such
a definition to a stored electronic message since Article 4 deals primarily with
relationships which are dependent on the use of paper.3 ' John J. Clarke of
the Federal Reserve System believes, however, that the definition is applicable
and hence Article 4 covers the situation. He states that:
[I]n those situations in which, though the messages are items, Article 4 pro-
vides either no explicit rule or an inappropriate rule to govern the relation-
367 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406(4).
368 Penney, Bank Statements, Cancelled Checks, and Article Four in the Electronic Age, 65
MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1358 (1967).
369 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
370 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(1) (g).
371 Clarke, An Item Is An Item Is An Item: Article 4 of the U.C.C. and the Electronic
Age, 25 Bus. LAw. 109 (1969).
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ships between the parties, the Article is congenial to being supplemented
and varied by agreements, while affording, in Section 4-103, an effective
screen against unfairness. 72
Clarke's rationale is this: At the present time many insurance premiums
are paid without the customer ever writing a check. The insurance company,
with the permission of the policyholder, will create an insurance premium draft,
drawn on the customer's bank, usually at monthly intervals. The policyholder
will order his bank to honor these drafts as they come in. The payment approxi-
mates 1/12 of the annual premium but is less than what it would cost if the
customer were to pay directly each month. The insurance company deposits the
draft with its bank and it goes through the regular banking channels. The
policyholder does not sign the draft since in fact he never sees it. Such a system
has many benefits,"73 one of which is that no bill need be sent out by the insurance
company to its policyholders. In addition, all premiums will be paid on time,
assuming that the depositor-policyholder has funds in his account sufficient to
cover the draft. From the standpoint of the depositor-policyholder, he saves a
service and postage charge by not having to write a check for his premium and
then mailing it to the company.
Since such a plan relies on the documentary draft to communicate deduction
orders, it is governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. 4
These deduction orders satisfy the definition of "items" since they are instru-
ments for the payment of money. By taking the process one step further, the
preauthorized payment plans will be combined with electronic data processing
in the EFTS which will use magnetic tapes instead of paper "to convey the same
information from the insurance companies to the insureds' banks through the
banking system."" 8 Thus we come to the question of whether a stored electronic
message can be classified as an "item" so that Article 4 will apply to what is ac-
tually the same transaction as before except for the fact that we have replaced
paper with an electronic message. Article 4 as it now stands contains no definition
of "instrument."
Clarke would then have us turn to the dictionary for the definition of "in-
strument" as "any object or artifact capable of conveying a message from a sender
to a recipient."37 This definition necessarily implies that an "instrument" may
take many forms "from the ancient clay tablets of Assyria to the sheet of Braille
characters used to transmit messages to blind persons." ' 7 Clarke goes on to
state that:
It is a short step from Braille to ASCII, a Code in which conventional num-
bers, letters, and other signs are represented by agreed-upon combinations of
electronic states (either plus or minus). It seems . . . that when a series
of magnetic impulses are sent to a payor bank and 'received and stored in
372 Id.
373 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
374 Id.
375 Clarke, supra note 371, at 110.
376 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
377 Id.
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ASCII on tape, disc, or other storage medium, that the payor bank has
received an instrument for the payment of money. The payor bank may be
considered to have received an instrument because it obtains a message in
a form on which it may rely in acting upon it, and which is capable of
being retained as a durable record of the reason for that action. 78
Following Clarke's logic, we would conclude that stored electronic messages
do constitute "instruments" for the payment of money and are covered by Article
4.
Assuming that the stored electronic message does constitute an "instrument"
for the payment of money, i.e., an "item," it must be determined which of the
provisions of Article 4 will be applicable to the EFTS. Perhaps the best way
of providing a somewhat cursory look at the typical debit clearing plan 79 is
to trace its progress from deposit to payment or nonpayment and return.
2. Collection of Items: Depositary and Collecting Banks
The Code, at section 4-201 (1), provides that the relationship between the
owner of an item and each collecting bank in the chain is presumptively that of
principal and agent or subagent."8 ' In our example, the insurance company is
the principal while its bank of deposit is the agent and later collecting banks
would be the subagents of the insurance company. Mr. Clarke believes that
since the item would not bear an indorsement, section 4-201 (1) would be in-
applicable."8 ' However, since the Code states that the agency relationship exists
regardless of the form of the indorsement or lack of indorsernent, it would appear
that 4-201 (1) would be applicable.
The standard of care required by Article 4 is one of ordinary care in han-
dling the item in the collection process.8 2 Whether this standard will be adequate
to cope with the new technological improvements in the payments mechanism or
whether a higher standard will be required is another question to be resolved.
378 Id.
379 Debit clearing plans, as opposed to credit clearing plans, result in an automatic flow of
funds out of a bank customer's account. Payment of an insurance premium is an example of
such a plan.
Credit clearing plans bring an automatic flow of funds to one bank account from another.
Typical plans involve prearranged demand deposits to a checking or savings account from a
payor corporation, periodic transfers of funds from a checking account to a savings account
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account, and payroll processing arrangements.
380 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-201(1) states:
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and prior to the time that a settlement
given by a collecting bank for an item is or becomes final (subsection (3) of Section
4-211 and Sections 4-212 and 4-213) the bank is an agent or subagent of the owner
of the item and any settlement given for the item is provisional. This provision ap-
plies regardless of the form of indorsement or lack of indorsement and even though
credit given for the item is subject to immediate withdrawal as of right or is in fact
withdrawn; but the continuance of ownership of an item by its owner and any rights
of the owner to proceeds of the item are subject to rights of a collecting bank such as
those resulting from outstanding advances on the item and valid rights of setoff.
When an item is handled by banks for purposes of presentment, payment and collec-
tion, the relevant provisions of this Article apply even though action of parties clearly
establishes that a particular bank has purchased the item and is the owner of it.
381 Clarke, supra note 371, at 113.
382 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-202.
The assumption should not be made that what has worked well in the past will
work equally as well in the future since it is doubtful that the draftsmen ever
contemplated an electronic transfer of money. A change in this section is not
necessitated since a higher standard of care may prove to be an unreasonable
burden for the banks to bear, and hence we will accept the present standard as
being adequate to cope with the EFTS.
The "chain of command" theory 8. of section 4-203'" covering the effect
of instructions by the immediate transferor to his collecting bank concerning the
handling of an item is an indication of the desirability of speed in the collection
process and should be retained. Note that this section deals only with collecting
banks. Payor banks are required to make proper payment of an item and whether
the payment is proper should continue to be based on the facts of the case in
conjunction with the applicable rules of Articles 3 and 4. s85
Section 4-204 on the methods of sending and presenting items would be
applicable to the EFTS. The Code provides that the collecting bank must send
its items by a reasonably prompt method.8 " By transferring the stored message
through one bank's computer facility to another's almost instantaneously, the
requirements of this section would seem to be met.
An individual may deposit an item in his bank which is payable to his order
and forget to endorse it. In order to avoid any undue delay which would be
caused by the bank returning the item to the depositor, the Code in section 4-205
permits the depository bank to supply the missing indorsement unless the item
contains the words "payee's indorsement required" or the like. Such a provision
would be inapplicable to the EFTS since an indorsement would not be needed by
the depositor in order to effectuate the collection process.
Section 4-206 dealing with transfers between banks would be applicable
as long as the depository bank added something so as to identify its source and
date of deposit; and succeeding collecting banks would add routing information
at the time of each further transfer."'
The Code, at section 4-207, sets forth certain warranties of the customer
and collecting bank on transfer or presentment of items. 8s Such warranties
383 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-203, Comment
384 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-203 states:
Subject to the provisions of Article 3 concerning conversion of instruments (Sec-
tion 3-419) and the provisions of both Article 3 and this Article concerning
restrictive indorsements only a collecting bank's transferor can give instructions
which affect the bank or constitute notice to it and a collecting bank is not liable to
prior parties for any action taken pursuant to such instructions or in accordance with
any agreement with its transferor.
385 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-203, Comment.
386 UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-204.
387 Clarke, supra note 371, at 113.
388 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-207 states:
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an
item and each prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other
payor who in good faith pays or acepts the item that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is un-
authorized, except that this warranty is not given by any customer or
collecting bank that is a holder in due course and acts in good faith
'(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
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would be generally applicable to the new payments mechanism with certain
exceptions. Section 4-207 (1) (b) would not apply since signatures would not
appear on the "instrument," nor would the "except" clauses of section 4-207
(1) (c) apply because of the nature of the instrument."s
Section 4-208 covering security interests of the collecting bank and section
4-209 which makes the security interest in the preceding section sufficient to con-
stitute the "value" requirement for a holder in due course will be applicable in
the new system and will be incorporated. Usually, an item is presented for ac-
ceptance or payment by exhibiting the item to the payor in person or by mail.
The Code provides a method of presentment to nonbank payors which permits
the collecting bank to send notice to the nonbank payor that the bank holds the
item for acceptance or payment.""0 This notice imposes a duty on the payor to
respond if the item is not to be considered dishonored. 9' Under the new pay-
ments system, such a requirement would be obviated by the instantaneous trans-
fer which the depositor-payor has authorized beforehand.
'(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether or
not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of an item if the holder in due course took the item
after the acceptance or obtained the acceptance without knowledge
that the drawer's signature was unauthorized; and
(c) the item has not been materially altered, except that this warranty is not
given by any customer or collecting bank that is a holder in due course
and acts in good faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also the
drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of an item with respect to an alteration made prior
to the acceptance if the holder in due course took the item after the
acceptance, even though the acceptance provided "payable as
originally drawn" or equivalent terms; or
(iv) to the acceptor of an item with respect to an alteration made after
the acceptance.
(2) Each customer and collecting bank who transfers an item and receives a
settlement or other consideration for it warrants to his transferee and to any sub-
sequent collecting bank who takes the items in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is
otherwise rightful; and
"(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c) the item has not been materially altered; and
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with respect
to the maker or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted item.
In addition each customer and collecting bank so transferring an item and receiving
a settlement or other consideration engages that upon dishonor and any necessary
notice of dishonor and protest he will take up the item.
(3) The warranties and the engagement to honor set forth in the two preceding
subsections arise notwithstanding the absence of indorsement or words of guaranty
or warranty in the transfer or presentment and a collecting bank remains liable for
their breach despite remittance to its transferor. Damages for breach of such war-
ranties or engagement to honor shall not exceed the consideration received by the
customer or collecting bank responsible plus finance charges and expenses related to
the item, if any.
(4) Unless a claim for breach of warranty under this section is made within a
reasonable time after the person claiming learns of the breach, the person liable is
discharged to the extent of any loss caused by the delay in making claim.
389 Clarke, supra note 371, at 113.
390 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-210.
391 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-210, Comment 1.
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3. Remittance
The Code provides a number of methods by which a payor bank or a non-
bank payor may remit the proceeds of an item to the collecting bank.3 92 How-
ever, any inter-bank settlements of electronic items probably will be effectuated
through credit and debit entries on the books of a Federal Reserve Bank thus
eliminating the need for section 4-211."' 8
It is difficult to comprehend the practical applicability to the new system
of section 4-212 dealing with the right of charge-back or refund. Under the
present system, many banks make provisional settlement for items received from
their customers and then await later determination of whether the item is even-
tually paid. The reason for this is that it has been statistically proved that 99
percent of items are eventually paid. Consequently, it is usually unnecessary
for the banks granting provisional settlement to make any further entries.3 9'
However, under the EFTS, the bank receives almost instantaneous notice of
whether the "instrument" is acceptable so that little time elapses between the
instant when the bank receives the order to pay and the instant when a check
is made of the adequacy of the payor's account.
Section 4-213111 deals with final payment of an item by the payor bank.
392 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-211.
393 Clarke, supra note 371, at 113.
394 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-212, Comment 1.
395 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213, states:(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the
following, whichever happens first:(a) paid the item in cash; or
'(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and
without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or agree-
ment; or(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the set-
tlement in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule
or agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) the payor bank shall be
accountable for the amount of the item.
(2) If provisional settlement for an item between the presenting and payor
banks is made through a clearing house or by debits or credits in an account between
them, then to the extent that provisional debits or credits for the item are entered in
accounts between the presenting and payor banks or between the presenting and suc-
cessive prior collecting banks seriatim, they become final upon final payment of the
item by the payor bank.(3) If a collecting bank receives a settlement for an item which is or becomes
final '(subsection (3) of Section 4-211, subsection (2) of Section 4-213) the bank
is accountable to its customer for the amount of the item and any provisional credit
given for the item in an account with its customer becomes final.(4) Subject to any right of the bank to apply the credit to an obligation of the
customer, credit given by a bank for an item in an account with its customer becomes
available for withdrawal as of right(a) in any case where the bank has received a provisional settlement for the
item-when such settlement becomes final and the bank has had a
reasonable time to learn that the settlement is final;
(b) in any case where the bank is both a depositary bank and a payor bank
and the item is finally paid-at the opening of the bank's second banking
day following receipt of the item.
(5) A deposit of money in a bank is final when made but, subject to any right
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Final payment marks the "end of the line in the collection process and the turn
around point commencing the return flow of proceeds."'9 6 This provision could
be applicable to the EFTS with the exception that 4-213(2) may be omitted
since provisional settlement would probably not exist in the new system.
If the "item" was sent by the collecting bank to a payor bank which, at
the time of receiving it, was insolvent, then section 4-214 would be applicable.'
7
The main difference in the new payments mechanism would be that the "item"
would not be in transit nearly as long as a check so that the collecting bank would
become aware of the insolvency almost at the very moment of transfer, thus
giving rise to an automatic return of the "item." Section 4-214(2) would be
inapplicable since an EFTS item would not go through the posting process of
the payor bank, being finally paid and then having the payor bank suspend pay-
ment before settlement has been made for the item which is final, thus eliminating
the need for permitting the owner of the item to have a preferred claim on the
payor bank's assets.
4. Collection of Items: Payor Banks
Sections 4-301 and 4-302 provide specific rules concerning deferred posting
and delayed returns."' 8 Once again, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where
these sections would be applicable when an electronic "item" is to be returned
"either to enable the payor bank to avoid becoming accountable for the item,
or to entitle it to recoup a provisional payment made for the item." '99 When
writing these sections, the draftsmen undoubtedly envisaged a deferred posting
procedure which involved a certain length of time, perhaps 24 to 48 hours or
more-not a high-speed electronic process as contemplated by the EFTS. Under
of the bank to apply the deposit to an obligation of the customer, the deposit becomes
available for withdrawal as of right at the opening of the bank's next banking day
following receipt of the deposit.
396 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213, Comment 1.
397 UNIFORM COMMnRCIAL CODE § 4-214, states:
'(1) Any item in or coming into the possession of a payor or collecting bank
which suspends payment and which item is not finally paid shall be returned by the
receiver, trustee or agent in charge of the closed bank to the presenting bank or the
closed bank's customer.
(2) If a payor bank finally pays an item and suspends payments without making
a settlement for the item with its customer or the presenting bank which settlement
is or becomes final, the owner of the item has a preferred claim against the payor bank.
(3) If a payor bank gives or a collecting bank gives or receives a provisional
settlement for an item and thereafter suspends payments, the suspension does not
prevent or interfere with the settlement becoming final if such finality occurs auto-
matically upon the lapse of certain time or the happening of certain events (sub-
section (3) of Section 4-211, subsections (1) (d), '(2) and (3) of Section 4-213).
(4) If a collecting bank receives from subsequent parties settlement for an item
which settlement is or becomes final and suspends payments without making a settle-
ment for the item with its customer which is or becomes final, the owner of the item
has a preferred claim against such collecting bank.
398 Deferred posting and delayed returns is that practice whereby a payor bank sorts
and proves items received by it on the day they are received, e.g., Monday, but does
not post the items to the customer's account or return "not good" items until the next
day, e.g., Tuesday.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-301, Comment 1.
399 Clarke, supra note 371, at 114.
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the system, a payor bank would know in a matter of seconds whether or not the
item was properly payable.
Hence, in the case of such an item that was not to be paid, there would be
no need to keep the time to return open by making a provisional payment;
the statute would be satisfied if the item were returned on the banking day
of receipt. The use of the direct-return procedure, where permissable, to
recoup the amount provisionally paid, would thus be unnecessary. 400
For the purposes of satisfying section 4-301(4) dealing with the return
of an item,"01 it would seem that "either a print-out of the item (with a descrip-
tion of its routing) or a tape facsimile (with the same description) would be the
writing to be returned. 4 2
When a payor bank receives an item, payment is withheld if the bank has
received knowledge or a legal notice which affects the item, such as notice
that the drawer has fied a petition in bankruptcy.4 3 In addition, the bank may
not make a final payment of the item if it receives a stop payment order from
the drawer, or if a creditor of the owner of the item levies on it, or if the bank
exercises a right of set-off against the drawer's account.0 " However, the Code
sets out five situations in which the above circumstances may come too late to
be effective."0 ' Whether one of these situations occurred so as to terminate the
bank's right should be as easily ascertainable under the EFTS as under the paper
payments method currently in operation.
5. Relationship Between Payor Bank and Its Customer
Section 4-401 (1) provides the basic rule that when an item is properly paid
out of the drawer's account, the bank may charge his account; and when there
are insufficient funds to cover the item, the bank has the option of either re-
turning it for "NSF" or providing an overdraft. It is apparent that this section
should be maintained part and parcel under the new system since overdraft
banking is considered as one of the prerequisites to the implementation of the
EFTS because of the elimination of the float. The overdraft, in effect, creates
an implied promise on the customer's part to repay the bank if the overdraft
arises.
If an item is drawn on a bank and the bank wrongfully dishonors it, then
under section 4-402 it is liable to the customer for damages proximately caused
by the wrongful dishonor of the item. It is obvious that in the new payments
400 Id.
401 UNIFORMd COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-301(4), states:
An item is returned:(a) as to an item received through a clearing house, when it is delivered to the
presenting or last collecting bank or to the clearing house or is sent or
delivered in accordance with its rules; or
(b) in all other cases, when it is sent or delivered to the bank's customer or
transferor or pursuant to his instructions.
402 Clarke, supra note 371, at 114.
403 UNxIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303.
404 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303, Comment 1.
405 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303(1) (a)'(e).
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system such a wrongful dishonor could prove to be extremely embarrassing in
some cases. For instance, suppose one Saturday morning Mrs. Smith goes to
her local grocery store to do her week's shopping. After filling her basket, she
patiently waits in the line which seems extremely long this morning. Finally
she empties her basket on the counter and the clerk rings up her bill. After it is
totalled, Mrs. Smith presents her identification card and the clerk inserts it into
the store's electric communicator apparatus which is hooked-up with Mrs.
Smith's bank. A few seconds later the reply comes back on the card-reading
device saying "Mrs. Smith's account overdrawn--do not allow purchase." One
can easily imagine Mrs. Smith's reaction, especially if her balance was actually
sufficient to cover the cost of the groceries. The Code states in section 4-402 that
when the dishonor occurs through mistake, liability is limited to actual damages.
Many commentators may advocate a change in this limitation in light of the fact
that Mrs. Smith would suffer a great deal of embarrassment4 6 as a result of
the reactions of the other Saturday shoppers behind her in the check-out line.
However, the actual damage limitations should be retained if the system is to
work expeditiously. Mrs. Smith's case is analogous to that of the merchant,
trader, or fiduciary who is defamed in his business, trade, or profession by a reflec-
tion on his credit as a result of an item being mistakenly dishonored. Although
these people argue for awards based on defamation "per se" without proof that
damage has occurred, the draftsmen of the Code suggest that they be placed on
the same footing as any other drawer in all cases of mistaken dishonor.4 " It should
be noted that most preauthorized insurance premium payment agreements pro-
vide that upon dishonor, "whether with or without cause and whether intention-
ally or inadvertently, a bank shall have no liability whatsoever even though such
dishonor results in the forfeiture of insurance."4 8 However, the courts may find
that if such agreements exist in the EFTS they may be voided as a matter of pub-
lic policy since they contravene section 4-402 which places liability on the payor
bank for damages proximately caused.
Another service which customers expect and are entitled to receive from a
bank besides preauthorized payments is that of stopping payment." 9 Section 4-403
permits the customer to stop payment of an item provided it is timely, i.e., re-
ceived at such time as to enable the bank to have a reasonable time to act on it
prior to any action which would constitute "final payment." One problem which
arises is that the typical preauthorization agreement requires the customer to
exercise his revocation power only by written notice. "In substance this has the
same force and effect as a provision requiring written communication of a stop-
406 See Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W. 2d57 (1968), where plaintiff recovered
$631.50 for the wrongful dishonor of two small checks. This sum included the following items
of damage: $1.50 for a telephone call, $130 for two weeks' lost wages, and $500 for "illness,
harassment, embarrassment and inconvenience. Dishonor was due to a mistake and was not
malicious. In reversing the amount allowed for wages and embarrassment, the court stated
that "these nebulous items of damage bore no reasonable relationship to the dishonor of her
two checks and consequently they could not be classified as actual damages proved." Id. at 58.
Whether the embarrassment suffered by Mrs. Smith is a damage proximately caused so as to
afford her a right of recovery under section 4-402 is a question that must be determined accord-
ing to the facts of the particular case.
407 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402, Comment 3.
408 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
409 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-403, Comment 2.
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payment order. ' 41' This is in direct controversion of section 4-403(2) which
provides that an oral stop-payment order is binding on the bank for 14 calendar
days. Whether a provision which prohibits the effectiveness of an oral stop-pay-
ment order contravenes public policy will be left to judicial determination.. 1
Perhaps the Code could be amended to resolve this problem since a written
communication will obviously be ineffective because of the speed of the electronic
transfer system.
Section 4-404 dealing with stale checks, i.e., checks presented more than
six months after their date, would be inapplicable in the EFTS since checks
would be eliminated.
Under section 4-405 (1) the drawee-payor bank is freed from liability for
the payment of a check prior to receipt of notice of the death or incompetence
of the drawer. The rationale for this rule is that it would place an undue burden
on a bank to ascertain the continued life and competency of every one of its
customers." 2 Such a theory will be especially applicable to the new system with
its increased reliance on electronic transmission of items by almost every person
within the United States. Section 4-405(2) provides a ten-day period after
death in which a bank with notice of death may continue to pay checks. Such
a provision should be applicable in the EFTS since it will facilitate the payment
of certain recurring bills, thus eliminating the need to go through probate since
such bills would probably require payment. Thus the logic for having such a
rule in a paper-based system will carry over to an electronically based system.
Perhaps the area in which some of the greatest debates concerning the appli-
cability of Article 4 to an electronic payment system wil occur is section 4-406
dealing with the customer's duty to discover and report unauthorized signatures
or alterations. As was mentioned earlier, Norman Penney would find it difficult
to accept the section as applying to an EFTS.1 s However, Mr. Clarke foresees
no serious problems in its applicability:
The issue to be determined is the nature of the "item" which, by hypothesis,
the bank received and acted on when it was but a conglomerate of electronic
states, invisible to human sight, though capable of being "read" by machine.
Should the bank printout the essentials of the messages on the statement;
or should it print it out completely and send it as the item... ?
It is submitted that the courts should regard either form as a sufficient
satisfaction of the statute if the customer were able to determine, from the
data given, whether the item was properly payable and chargeable to his
account. ... If the item was not the customer's, but was someone else's,
the customer has an obligation, quite independent of section 4-406, to
examine the statement with reasonable dispatch and with reasonable care,
and to inform the bank of errors discovered.414
Accepting this rationale, one problem is foreseeable. If the bank were to
410 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
411 Any conflict within this area could be resolved by looking to section 4-103 which pro-
vides that "the effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement . . ." Banks
by agreement could rule out any oral stop payment orders.
412 UrMoasx COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-405, Comment 2.
413 See text accompanying notes 364-69 supra.
414 Clarke, supra note 371, at 115, 116.
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print out the essentials of every message on the statement, this could conceivably
give rise to a computer print-out which would stretch from the customer's bank
to his home, thereby increasing the paperwork, the very thing which the EFTS
would be trying to eliminate. Although this may be an extreme hypothesis, it
is not totally unrealistic.
Finally, section 4-407 dealing with the payor bank's right of subrogation on
improper payment would continue to be applicable in the EFTS and would
be retained.
At this point it is perhaps appropriate to recall that the above discussion of
the applicability of the Code, particularly Article 4, to the EFTS is completely
contingent upon a prior determination that a stored electronic message is within
the coverage of the Article; that is, whether it is an "item."'4 1 5 Certainly, a cogent
argument can be made that a stored message does not constitute an "item."
Even assuming that an electronic message does come within the coverage of
Article 4, one problem remains. The Code deals only with debit transfers,41
while making no provision for credit transfers which will play a significant role
in the EFTS. For instance, when the system is operating at its potential optimum
level, the amount of money which we earn at work will be credited to our ac-
counts at our banks by the minute. Companies in which we own stock will send
dividend checks directly to our banks instead of to our homes. There are various
other credit transfers that could be handled similarly, yet the Code does not
contemplate how to handle the legal problems that may arise from such transfers.
This is not at all surprising. At the time the Code was drafted, no one foresaw
that the future of the payments mechanism would lead to electronic debits and
credits. In fact, the computer had barely made its appearance on the American
scene.41 . Thus the need arises for ground rules which will supplement the existing
body of law found in the Code in order to deal with electronic credit transfers.
In fact, it may be more beneficial to depart entirely from the Code as it now
stands and opt for something else which would cover both debit and credit trans-
fers. One possibility would be the drafting of a more comprehensive statute.
However, most legal commentators believe that "it is far too early to draft statu-
tory language that would control the operation of a system not yet fully planned,
let alone operative.""4 1 As Mr. Clarke stated in his talk before the National Auto-
mation Conference in New York City, on July 15, 1964:
One point that continues to baffle me is that of anticipating the possible
factual situations on a sufficiently broad scale, of spelling out the possible
combinations of factors that should influence a determination of liability on
the part of one of the banks and of reaching, in each case, a nice balancing
415 For the definition of "item," see UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(i) (g).
416 See supra note 379.
417 The Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, with the endorsement
of the American Bar Association, in the fall of 1951. Article 4, however, adopts many of the
rules of the American Bankers Association Code of 1929, long before computers were in
existence. REPORT No. 1 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE. See text accompanying note 526 supra.
418 Clarke, Check-Out Time for Checks, 21 Bus. LAw. 931, 940 (1966).
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of the equities as between the banks that would clearly dictate an acceptable
result.419
B. Is Contract the Answer?
Another means for covering both debit and credit clearing plans and for
allocating responsibility for errors associated with the use of computers and com-
munications facilities may be found in private contract rather than in public
legislation. Even the Code provides that variation of Article 4 may be made
by agreement so long as no agreement disclaiming the bank's responsibility
of ordinary care or lack of good faith is made.4 20
Because of the great technical complexity of the EFTS, there will exist a
greater chance of error due to technical malfunction. Certainly any system
which would involve over 200 million people, thousands of banks and highly
expensive and complex communications facilities is bound to eventually en-
counter some sort of malfunction. One need only look to the MICR encoding
system presently being employed to see that, no matter what type of precautions
are taken, errors will creep into the system. And the errors will subsequently
give rise to liability on someone's part. For example, one of the dangers= of
the MICR system arises from the scratched-out check. Illustrative of this danger
is the hypothesis of the two women who go shopping together. Mrs. Borrower
finds herself without any money and borrows a blank check from Mrs. Lender.
Mrs. Borrower crosses out the name of Mrs. Lender's bank, substitutes the name
of her bank, and then presents the crossed-out check to the retailer, obviously un-
aware of the significance of the MICR characters on the bottom of the check.
Eventually the check is sent through the collection process by means of high-
speed processing equipment and is charged against Mrs. Lender's account since
the machine only picks up the magnetic characters and ignores any other altera-
tions. The result could prove disastrous to Mrs. Lender. This check may have
overdrawn her account so that subsequent checks would not clear due to insuffi-
cient funds, which in turn could result in her credit rating being impaired.
Although the above example is not likely to be an everyday occurrence, it
could happen. Certainly under the EFTS, with the tremendous burden placed
on computers and advanced technological communications devices, the prob-
ability of perfect execution of every transaction is slim indeed. Assume for the
moment that the setting is the year 1990 when funds are transferred electronically
and the system is in full operation. Customer A from New Jersey goes to New
York City one weekend and purchases a number of items from department store
B. A directs his bank through a voice recognition device to pay B $100 in settle-
ment of his account at the store. But then suppose something goes wrong. "The
originator of a transaction, being human, could make a mistake; the computer,
being man-made, could malfunction or not function at all. ' 22 Perhaps the bank
would pay too much or not enough. Or perhaps the right amount is transferred
but to the wrong payee. Or the funds may be debited to the wrong account. A
419 Id. at 941 n.13.
420 Uzqwpo= COmmERcrAL CODE § 4-103(1).
421 See text accompanying notes 47-60 supra.
422 Clarke, supra note 371, at 131.
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computer malfunction is an inevitable occurrence in any system of this magnitude
so the question of culpability for misfire must be resolved. If we could immedi-
ately determine who caused the misfire, then fixing responsibility for the loss
would be an easy task. In all probability, however, the question of causation
would be extremely difficult to determine in most instances. A may have given
an incorrect instruction or the computer may have misfired at the moment of
instruction. One way to discover and solve this problem is to provide A with a
playback of his instructions by means of a voice-answer-back mechanism and
a print-out of those same instructions.42 This would enable A to compare his
oral instructions with those received by the computer in order to ascertain
whether or not he was responsible for any error. Assuming that the print-out cor-
responded with his instructions, we would then look to either the bank or the
proprietor of the system to determine culpability for error. "As a matter of
general legal principles, it would seem that, only if the proprietor could show the
intervention of some force majeure,4" could it be relieved of responsibility for the
loss." '425 If the proprietor could show that the malfunction did occur as a result
of such an occurrence, then the problem of who is liable is compounded. A's
bank account would be debited to reflect payment to the payee-department store.
But because of the misfire, A might still owe the money, or his bank may have
parted with funds without the proper authorization from him.
As between the two, the equities do, perhaps, slightly favor fixing the loss
on the proprietor, although it is recognized that no principle of law should
fix the loss in that way without a specific agreement to that effect on the
proprietor's part. Thus, the latter, in effect, would have to guarantee the
proper working of devices under its control, despite the intervention of force
majeure. Indeed, it may be thought that, unless such a guarantee were
to be extended, banks and their customers, in general, might be reluctant
to avail themselves of the services the system offered.42 6
This is not to say that the proprietor would be culpable at all times. The
terminal and communication facilities of A's bank may break down due to
neglect on the bank's part or A himself may have given the wrong instructions
and failed to rectify the problem within a reasonable time. It will not be unusual
to have mechanical breakdowns due to the manufacturer's failure to detect some
defect during its quality control checks. Such a failure could lead to a situation in
the future where a large computer manufacturer would have to call back some
of its hardware because of an inherent defect in the same manner in which many
cars have been recalled by the automotive manufacturers in the past. Indeed,
any number of problems can and will arise in such a system so as to shift the loss
from the proprietor.
423 Clarke, supra note 418, at 939.
424 Force Majeure is an event or effect that cannot reasonably be anticipated or controlled.
425 Clarke, supra note 355, at 131-32.
426 Clarke, supra note 371, at 939. Clarke also advocates the idea of "mutualization of loss"
whereby the proprietor of the system as well as the manufacturer of the equipment would con-
tribute to a type of mutual fund in order to protect themselves against loss. In addition, once
the system is in operation, insurance companies would be sure to come out with a policy cover-
ing malfunctions and subsequent risks of loss.
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Legislation does not appear to be the viable answer to meet these problems
because of the difficulty of getting uniform legislation throughout the fifty states,
in addition to the District of Columbia. Uniformity would be a necessary
ingredient in order to meet the challenges of the national interchange system
which is ultimately planned.
Only if Congress could obtain total leverage, or enough leverage to make
almost obligatory conformity by the individual jurisdictions, would it be
desirable to propose such legislation as might be necessary to correct any
court-made rules that were obviously unjust, or to offset any abuses that
could be dealt with only by means of legislation.42
In addition to the difficulty of attaining uniform legislation, there is the
problem of attempting to anticipate all the possible legal problems which the
system would give rise to so that the legislation could be geared to provide the
appropriate answers. As Roy N. Freed has said: "The different types of legal
implications that might flow from banking mechanization are as varied as the
many sources of legal rules out of which they might arise." '4 28 With the tre-
mendous advances being made almost daily in the technological area, it is con-
ceivable that by the time the American Law Institute and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws draft legislation to meet the
EFTS's problems, the legal principles involved would be so antiquated that there
would then be a need for more legislation.
Resort to contractual arrangement could provide the answer for a smoother,
more effective legal environment in the paperless system. Basically, the EFTS
will involve three relationships: (1) between the cardholder and his bank; (2)
between the retailer or other payee and his bank; and (3) among banks.42
This is analogous to the tripartite arrangement of the present bank credit card
system43 '0 a system which many believe to be the forerunner of the EFTS. Since
the relationships will be the same, it would seem reasonable that the rules and
regulations of both systems would be similar. Under the present system, the
bank and its cardholders ordinarily execute an agreement which covers such
things as the maximum credit limit allowed to that particular customer, interest
rates chargeable on certain balances, billing period, etc. In addition, the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act establishes various legal responsibilities. Thus, the basic
relationship between the customer and his bank is already fixed by statute, custom
and agreement.43 ' Since the present system appears to be functioning relatively
well in the bank card area, there is no reason why it should not be extended to
the EFTS. Contractual arrangements could be expanded to include the man-
ufacturers of the equipment, the proprietors and all others who could have a
stake in the system. For instance, the bank and its customers could enter into a
427 Clarke, supra note 418, at 941.
428 Freed, Some Legal Implications of the Use of Computers in the Banking Business, 19
Bus. LAw. 355, 358 (1964).
429 Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, 20 STAN. L. REv. 571, 584(1968).
430 See text accompanying notes 121-37 supra.
431 Clarke, supra note 418, at 940. See text accompanying notes 242-55 supra.
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contract whereby the bank agrees to exercise a prescribed standard of care. A
failure to fulfill this standard which results in a malfunction would place liability
on the bank. Or the bank may have undertaken the completion of its transac-
tions as ordered by its customer, yet some error occurs which is beyond its con-
trol. An agreement previously made between the bank and the proprietor of
the system should cover any contingencies of this nature. These contractual
provisions should spell out "all the possible combinations of factors that should
influence any determination of liability on the part of the parties affected."482
For example, these contracts should "define how the respective parties will suffer
losses, either by paying out damages or by foregoing the receipt of damages as
compensation." 3 ' It is hoped that this approach will allow the proposed system
to develop unfiltered and unfettered by the inability of the Code to provide for the
coningencies of a system of this magnitude.
C. Federal Reserve System
In addition to the use of contractual provisions to fill the gaps created by
the inability of the Code to handle the EFTS's legal problems, an alternative
route has been suggested which contemplates the use of Federal Reserve regula-
tions and operating letters.
The Federal Reserve System was inaugurated in 1914 under the terms of
the Federal Reserve Act4 4 which was designed to "furnish an elastic currency,
to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective
supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes."4 5 The
Federal Reserve System consists of five main divisions:4"6 (1) the Board of
Governors which is the main policy forming and supervisory body; (2) the 12
Federal Reserve Banks" 7 and their 24 branches which carry on most operating
functions and translate the policies of the Board of Governors into action; (3) the
Federal Open Market Committee which forms the policy on open market opera-
tions of the system; (4) the Federal Advisory Council which advises the Board of
Governors on matters of policy; and (5) the thousands of banks that have taken
out membership in the Federal Reserve Sytem.
Under the Federal Reserve Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System has the authority to direct the Federal Reserve Banks to exercise
bank collection functions. For example, section 16 of the Act authorizes the
Board of Governors to make regulations governing the transfers of funds, and
therefore charges, among Federal Reserve Banks and their branches and to ex-
ercise the functions of a clearinghouse for its members." 8 These regulations
432 Clarke, supra note 355, at 133.
433 Freed, supra note 428, at 357.
434 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seq. (1970).
435 38 Stat. 251.
436 3 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 1 35,104 (1968).
437 District No. 1, Boston; District No. 2, New York; District No. 3, Philadelphia; District
No. 4, Cleveland; District No. 5, Richmond; District No. 6, Atlanta; District No. 7, Chicago;
District No. 8, St. Louis; District No. 9, Minneapolis; District No. 10, Kansas City; District
No. 11, Dallas; District No. 12, San Francisco.
438 12 U.S.C. § 248 (o) (1970).
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authorize the Federal Reserve Banks to promulgate rules governing operating
details. 439
Turning to the Uniform Commercial Code once again, it is recalled that
section 4-103 (1) confers "blanket power to vary all provisions of the Article by
agreement" (so long as the agreements do not disclaim the bank's responsibility
for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care).440 The Code
also provides that "Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters, clearing
house rules, and the like, have the effect of agreements under subsection (1),
whether or not specifically asserted to by all parties interested in items
handled."441 The question is then raised whether this "variation by agreement"
under section 4-103 permits the "addition of substantive matter to the statute,
as well as the derogation or change of matter already contained in the statute? 442
In answering in the affirmative, Mr. Clarke states that:
If resort is had to Section 1-102 (to which Section 4-103 seems ancillary),
it is seen that one of the underlying purposes and policies of the Code is to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through... agree-
ment of the parties.
This provision of Section 1-102 points toward an unequivocal answer:
substantive matter may be added by agreement." 3
It would appear that the flexibility provided by the use of clearinghouse
rules and the Federal Reserve System would permit ad hoc reaction to problems
as they are encountered.444 Once again answers must be given to two problems.
At the present time, Regulation J covers the collection of checks and other items
by Federal Reserve Banks. Whether a stored electronic message constitutes an
"item" so as to bring it within the coverage of this regulation or whether the
Board of Governors would have to promulgate a new rule to cover the EFTS
must be resolved.445 The second question concerns the fact that the power con-
ferred on the Board of Governors extends only to the 12 Federal Reserve Banks
and their 24 branches.44 The Board's power quite dearly does not extend to
the so-called "member banks" of the Federal Reserve System. Gerald Dunne,
however, foresees no problem in expanding the section to include "member
banks." He states:
It would not strain this authority.. . for the Federal Reserve to promulgate
a uniform and comprehensive set of ground rules which not only cover wire
439 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 4-103, Comment 3.
440 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDa § 4-103, Comment 2.
441 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(2).
442 Clarke, supra note 371, at 117.
443 Id.
444 Address by John 3. Clarke, supra note 53.
445 The term "item" means any instrument for the payment of money, whether
negotiable or not, which is payable in a Federal Reserve district, is sent by a sender
or a nonbank depositor to a Federal Reserve bank for handling under this part, and
is collectible in funds acceptable to the Federal Reserve bank of the district in which
the instrument is payable; except that the term does not include any check which
cannot be collected at par.
12 C.F.R. § 210.2(a) (1970).
446 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1970).
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transfers going through its books but which bind all parties in interest
between the starting and ending points in the commercial banking system. 4 7
Dunne's thesis is difficult to accept since he appears to confer authority on
the Board of Governors beyond that set out in the statute. Were the Board to
attempt to set down legal rules governing all parties in interest, the courts would
certainly nullify such enactments as beyond the scope of the Board's authority.
In order for the Board of Governors to have effective control over the EFTS,
Congress would have to amend 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) to bring member banks
within the control of the Board. But if Congress were to grant the Board this
expanded power over member banks, the problem of providing a legal frame-
work for nonmember banks would remain.
Of the approximately 13,600 commercial banks"' operating within the
United States, not quite half are member banks of the Federal Reserve System.
These member banks, however, hold about 5/6 of all commercial banking
assets.' 49 The advent of the EFTS is certain to bring about changes within the
banking structure. One of these changes will probably be the reduction and
perhaps total elimination of the smaller banks. Four factors will be influential in
bringing about any future reduction in the number of chartered banking offices:
(1) remote control banking will make it possible for large banks to cover
wider geographic areas;
(2) remote control banking would reduce the need for branches;
(3) the cost of automating will be prohibitive for small banks; and
(4) small banks will merge in order to meet competition.450
The president of a small bank in Wisconsin perhaps best summed up the plight
of small banks after the introduction of the EFTS when he stated:
Since banking is a personal matter and customer contact so important, I
feel if this were eliminated due to a checkless society, there would be no
advantage for a customer to do business with his local bank. The large
powerful city banks would end up doing all the business. It's hard enough
to compete with them now.451
If the smaller banks do have to merge in order to survive within the system, the
probability is that they will merge with the larger banks which are already
members of the Federal Reserve System. Such a development would bring the
great majority of the banks within the coverage of the Board of Governors.
However, the Board's control, as pointed out, would be contingent upon Congres-
sional adoption of an amendment to 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) such as that discussed
above. Whether this hypothesis is correct is problematical. Perhaps the smaller
447 Dunne, The Checkless Society and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. LAW. 127, 129 (1968).
448 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
449 WHITTLESEY, A. FREEDMAN & E. HERMAN, MONEY AND BANKING: ANALYSIS AND
POLICY 211 (2d ed. 1968).
450 SAN DIEGO STATE COLLEGE, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY BANK
SuRvEY REPORT 3 (Oct. 1968).
451 Banks in a "Checkless Society," BANKING, Oct. 1968 at 50, 52.
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banks will not be forced to merge in order to survive within the EFTS. But if
they do, the question of potential antitrust violations under section 7 of the
Clayton Act will certainly emerge as a critical consideration for the success of such
merger activity.
D. Bank Mergers and Their Antitrust Implications
In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act4 2 as a means of supplementing
the Sherman Act."'3 Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended in 1950 by the
Celler-Kefauver Act4  prohibits the acquisition of stock or assets of any corpora-
tion "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission." '455 Because
of this language, it initially appeared that bank mergers were exempt from
coverage under the Act since banks were not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission. Subsequently, Congress passed the 1960 Bank
Merger Act456 in order to maintain competition within the banking industry.
Written approval from three federal agencies was needed in order to approve
any bank merger."' However, the finality of the approval by these agencies soon
became uncertain. In refusing to accept the contention that the Comptroller's
approval under the Act immunized bank mergers from scrutiny under the
Clayton Act, the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia National
Bane 58 held not only that section 7 of the Clayton Act was applicable to bank
mergers, but that bank mergers were to be judged only by competitive factors 59
The 1960 Act was followed by the Bank Merger Act of 1966460 which
developed a "convenience and needs standard" in order to determine whether
or not a proposed merger would be anticompetitive and therefore disallowed.
Under the standard the merger might be approved if it served the con-
venience and needs of the community and if such -benefit clearly outweighed
the merger's anticompetitive effects. Thus, Congress was willing to allow
certain mergers even if they reduced competition.461
The Court in United States v. First City National Bank"2 dealt with the
interplay between the 1966 Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Speaking
through Justice Douglas, the Court stated that: "[t]here is no indication that an
action challenging a merger on the ground of its anticompetitive effects is
452 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
453 26 Stat. 209 '(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
454 Anti Merger Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1970).
455 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
456 Act of May 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129.
457 Written approval was needed from (1) the Comptroller of the Currency if the result-
ing bank was to be a national bank; (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
if the resulting bank was to be a State member bank (except a District bank); and (3) the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation if the resulting bank was to be a nonmember insured
bank '(except a District bank). Id. These same provisions remain in the 1966 Act.
458 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
459 For an excellent discussion in this area, see Note, Antitrust and Bank Mergers: United
States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co., 25 Sw. L.J. 317 (1971).
460 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970).
461 Note, Antitrust and Bank Mergers: United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and
Trust Go., supra note 459, at 321.
462 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
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bottomed on the Merger Act rather than on the antitrust laws." '468 Accordingly,
"it is the court's judgement, not the Comptroller's that finally determines whether
the merger is legal."" 4
The Court after, looking at the legislative history of the 1966 Act, did state
that while the principle of the antitrust laws-that substantially anticompetitive
mergers are prohibited-applies to banks, an exception is permitted "where it
is clearly shown that a given merger is so beneficial to the convenience and needs
of the community to be served . . . that it would be in the public interest to
permit it."46 Thus, the convenience and needs standard provides a defense to
an antitrust attack on a bank merger. The Court in United States V. Third Na-
tional Bank stated that:
The task of the district courts was to inquire de novo into the validity of
a bank merger approved by the relevant bank regulatory agency to deter-
mine, first, whether the merger offended the antitrust laws and, second, if
it did, whether the banks had established that the merger was nonetheless
justified by the "convenience and needs of the community to be served."86
The Court narrowed the "convenience and needs" defense when it held
that "before a merger injurious to the public interest is approved, a showing
should be made that the gain expected from the merger cannot reasonably be
expected through other means. '
It is obvious from the above analysis that if the advent of the Less-Check
Society does bring about a change in the banking structure by forcing the smaller
banks to merge, such mergers must meet the requirements handed down by the
Supreme Court. Whether a merger will be justified by the "convenience and
needs" of the community to be served and whether it is the only viable alternative
for the survival of the smaller banks is one more question that must be answered
before the system can reach its maximum effectiveness.
The bank merger problem is, however, only one of the antitrust questions
that is anticipated in the EFTS. More fundamental and more varied antitrust
problems such as unlawful combinations, concerted refusals to deal and tying
arrangements among others may be associated with the EFTS.
E. Other Antitrust Problems
1. Monopolization
While the development of credit card plans witnessed the emergence of a
group of highly competitive bank card associations, it is not certain whether or
not the implementation of an EFTS will be accompanied by a comparable
number of competing multibank associations. It appears more plausible that
463 Id. at 364.
464 Id. at 369.
465 H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1966), cited in 386 U.S. at 366.
466 390 U.S. 171, 178 (1968).
467 390 U.S. 171, 190 (1968).
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eventually all local or regional systems, such as the SCOPE project,'6 will merge
into an integrated national association.46  Considerations of uniformity, econom-
ics, and pragmatism would dictate this development as a means of insuring that
the EFTS will enable the banking industry to realize profits from the new
services which computerization will make possible.7 However, there will prob-
ably still be competition among banks and nonbanking entities for the more
profitable segments of the system. These factors may very well necessitate that
such a system be integrated into an "amalgam of financial and quasi-financial"
organizations." 1 In view of this possibility, banks must be wary of both the legal
and regulatory impediments imposed by the various antitrust statutes.
Of course, some commentators eventually envision an ideal EFTS in which
bank "money cards" will become universally acceptable, replacing oil, travel and
entertainment, and department store cards. Not only do they hope that public
demand will mount in favor of a universal credit card, but they also foresee new
technological advances which will increase the versatility of the credit card. 72
In addition, banks will be able to provide a number of significant services un-
related to the development and extension of credit card uses. One of these, the
preauthorized payment plan, 47 provides an opportunity for banks to suppress
competition. Under such a plan, if extended to include the payment of all bills
by banks, account holders would authorize merchants to forward all bills to
their respective banks, or would forward the bills themselves. Consequently, the
banks, in paying all bills, would extend credit whenever necessary up to a certain
maximum credit limit. In effect, banks would be substituting their own credit
for that of retail stores and other competitors who presently sell on installment or
revolving charge plans, with a resulting loss of any interest income they might
otherwise have gained. This possibility would be even more acute in an EFTS
context. There, all payments made by a customer would have to be cleared and
processed instantaneously through the bank association's computerized clearing-
house. If the customer's account was overdrawn or if he indicated that he wished
payment to be made on credit, the clearinghouse computer would immediately
connect itself with the account holder's bank, which would pay the bill and
provide a line of credit to the customer. While other credit card institutions
would obtain the benefit of immediate payment due to the elimination of float, 74
468 See text accompanying notes 320-35 supra.
469 Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, 20 STAN. L. REv. 571, 586
(1968).
470 These services may include advising a customer whether to take a discount for
prompt payment or to defer payment, making periodic transfers from a customer's
checking account to his savings account, investing excess corporate funds in appro-
priate security instruments, transferring fixed payments automatically on predeter-
mined dates, and keeping track of business' inventories and ordering to replenish
them when necessary.
Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, supra note 469, at 588, citing
Kramer & Livingston, Cashing in on the Checkless Society, HAV. Bus. Rav., Sept.-Oct. 1967,
at 141, 144.
471 Address by Clifford G. Zimmer, Jr., Director of Marketing, The Diebold Group, Inc.,
December Meeting of the Advertising Data Processing Association at the Hotel Lexington, New
York City, Dec. 28, 1967.
472 Nadler, Bank Credit Cards in the 1970s, BANKING, Sept. 1969, at 45, 46, 114.
473 See text accompanying notes 311-35 supra.
474 See text following note 309 supra.
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this benefit would quite possibly be outweighed by the loss of interest income
those institutions would have obtained by financing their own credit. A per-
suasive argument could be made that the effect of this substitution of credit for
that of traditional credit lending institutions would constitute a violation of
section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes any act of monopolization, or
attempt to monopolize, or combination or conspiracy to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the states. 475 To establish the violation of actual
monopolization, two essential elements must be proven. A recent statement of
these elements can be found in United States v. Grinnell Corp.
The offense of monopoly under § '2 of the Sherman Act has two ele-
ments: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.4 7 6
"Monopoly power" has been defined to mean "the power to control prices
or exclude competition" in the relevant market,17 and, when coupled with some
act in furtherance of the monopoly, courts have been inclined to find an offense
of monopolization. On the other hand, certain section 2 violations, viz., attempt
or conspiracy to monopolize, have been premised upon activity that falls short
of actual and successful possession of monopoly power. A specific intent to mo-
nopolize becomes the essential element in proving these violations. 8 In Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court stated the rationale underlying
these principles:
To establish this violation of § 2 as charged, it was not necessary to
show that success rewarded appellants' attempt to monopolize .... "[W]hen
that intent [to monopolize] and the consequent dangerous probability exist,
this statute [the Sherman Act], like many others and like the common law
in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as
against the completed result."47 9
In defining the relevant market, two questions must be answered before the
requisite monopoly power can be established. First, the geographic area of
effective competition in which the product or service is sold must be ascer-
475 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Section 2 now provides in full:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceed-
ing fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both
such punishments, in the discretion of the court.
476 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) '(emphasis added).
477 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 '(1966); United States v. du Pont &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811
(1946).
478 See von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation, in 16 BusiNEss ORGANIZA-
TIONS § 8.01 '(1971).
479 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951).
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tained. 8 ° Second, the relevant product market, or that area of goods or services
in which products are actually competitive with one another, must be deter-
mined.4"' In this determination, the availability of a substitute product will
invariably be an important factor to be considered. Once the relevant product
and geographic markets have been delineated, the courts then would have to
decide whether or not the requisite degree of monopoly power was present.
Monopoly power has been inferred from evidence of the actual use of power over
prices48 2 or over entry of competitors, 8 ' the relative size or percentage of market
supply controlled,"" and the presence of anticompetitive business policies, con-
duct, and performance." 5 In- short, what section 2 prohibits is the effort to
obtain or maintain dominance in the relevant market, and not the mere status of
monopoly.
Quite arguably, the power that banks would possess in a local, regional, or
national EFTS or within a preauthorized payments context would give them an
opportunity to gain effective control over credit, coupled with a power to exclude
nonbanking competition from the credit market. That such power had been
lawfully acquired would make no difference. 8 Since actual dominance of the
relevant market need not exist as a precondition to finding a section 2 violation,
banks occupying a less than dominant status must make certain that as the out-
growth of the EFTS expands their control over the credit market, they do not
engage in concerted acts that could be interpreted as conspiracies, combinations,
or attempts to monopolize, especially since the possibility exists that the banks
thus combined could in fact dominate the market or exclude competition.
In deciding whether a potential legal problem of monopolization would
exist in a Less-Check Society, the policy underlying the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code should be noted. It has been said that:
A basic underlying assumption and policy embodied in the UCCC is that
the supplying of consumer credit needs in society today can best be provided
by a system of freely competitive institutions. Just as the consumer is best
served by free and open competition... so too the UCCC proceeds on the
policy assumption that the marketplace should determine by whom and
how the consumer's needs are supplied. The premise of the UCCC is that
the best protection for the consumer and the best interests of those engaged
in supplying consumer credit are served not by arbitrary legislative rules,
480 See generally United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
481 United States v. du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-404 (1956).
482 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); Denver Petroleum
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 304 (D.C. Colo. 1969).
483 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183 '(1911). In Woods Explora-
tion & Pro. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 438 F.2d 1286, 1307 (5th Cir. 1971), the court
stated the rule that "absolute success in excluding competition is [not] an essential element to
providing monopoly power under section 2. It is enough that defendants' market position is
such that they have substantial power to thwart competition."
484 The Supreme Court has stated that "size is of course an earmark of monopoly power."
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 n.10 (1948). The relative size may, without more,
warrant an inference of the existence of monopoly power. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
485 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); see Stocking, Economic
Tests of Monopoly and the Concept of the Releuant Market, in 2 HOFFmAN'S ANTrTRUST LAw
AND TECHNIQUES 171, 178-80 (M. Hoffman & A. Winard ed. 1963).
486 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
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not by regulations issued by some supervisory agency, but by competition in
the marketplace. s8
Since consumer credit needs should be provided by competitive institutions,
the question that must be answered is whether a Less-Check Society would
remove credit from the competitive market and give banks or a national multi-
bank association monopoly power in the consumer credit market. If so, a charge
of monopolization under section 2 would probably be sustained. The only solu-
tion would be to keep the consumer credit market open by permitting freedom of
entry and access to the EFTS,"' thereby rebutting any suggestion of "willful
acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly power in the consumer credit area.489
However, it will be seen that even within a system containing minimum open
market standards, other antitrust implications of the Less-Check Society, such
as concerted refusals to deal and tying agreements, offer potential problems to
be dealt with.
2. Concerted Refusals to Deal
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... 490
An integrated national association of banks would clearly be a "combina-
tion" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.491 As such, bank refusal to allow
competing credit card institutions to utilize the clearinghouse facilities available
in an EFTS might amount to a concerted refusal to deal,4 92 which is illegal per
se under section 1."' While it has been suggested that nonbanking entities
487 Moo, Legislative Control of Consumer Credit Transactions, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
656, 664 (1968).
488 See Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, supra note 469, at 588;
see also note 497 infra.
489 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
490 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
491 Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, supra note 469, at 587,
citing Address by Robert A. Hammond, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, Depart-
ment of Justice, Federal Bar Association- Bureau of National Affairs Briefing Conference,
Oct. 27, 1967.
The term "combination" was originally defined within the meaning of section 1 of the
Sherman Act to mean "[T]he union of two or more persons, the conscious participation in the
scheme of two or more minds, is indispensable to an unlawful combination, and it cannot be
created by the action of one man alone." Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737,
745 (8th Cir. 1909).
492 Nadler, Bank Credit Cards in the 1970s, supra note 472, at 46. In Klor's v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 '(1959), the Supreme Court said that:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have
long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have not been saved by allega-
tions that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show
that they "fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought
about a deterioration in quality."
493 The classic statement of the per se rule is found in Northern Par. R. Go. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
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might themselves own and operate their own computerized payments mecha-
nism, 94 the present legal environment would not seem to justify that conclusion.
It seems that the only possible operational premise for a workable
transfer of funds network, capable, as in the hypothesized DFT [EFTS]
system, of instantaneous debit and credit transactions, is the maintenance
of demand deposit accounts. Nonbanking entities are forbidden to exercise
this function. Yet, while prevented by present law from assuming the role of
depositories of funds, it is possible that the present legal environment would
not be an obstacle to their providing to banks the processing and com-
munications services envisioned as the core of a DFT [EFTS] center's
activities .... 495
While it is not presumed that the money card will be the only payments mecha-
nism in a Less-Check Society, nonbanldng entities will find themselves in need of
the facilities utilized by the bank association unless the laws are changed. Main-
taining their operations as they do now would be a much more time-consuming
alternative. As a result, they may be unwillingly forced into use of the money
card in return for bank cooperation in making available processing and com-
munication services. If so, section 1 of the Sherman Act might preclude banks
from prohibiting access to the EFTS to nonbanking entities or from conditioning
access upon an agreement by them to relinquish the right to finance any credit
extended to their customers and from collecting the interest therefrom. The
anticompetitive effect of such an agreement, which could be attacked either as
a concerted refusal to deal or a tying agreement,"" would lie in the bank or
bank association's ability to coerce the nonbanking entities to follow a prescribed
course of action through their control over demand deposit accounts. Within the
structure of the banking industry itself, it would also be necessary that there be
a guarantee of free entry for all banks into the association operating the EFTS 97
Without such provision, competition among banks would be rendered impossible
since the enormous cost of implementing and administering an EFTS would
make the possibility of maintaining a competing system prohibitive for individual
or small groups of banks. 8
Of course, nonbanking entities could attempt to override the effects of the
EFTS by making certain contractual agreements with their customers restricting
the 4ght to bypass their credit extension facilities. Indeed, the bank association
would have to make its credit plan at least as accessible and desirable as those
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints that are prescribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation ....
494 Address by John J. Clarke, supra note 53.
495 Id.
496 See text accompanying notes 510-25 infra.
497 In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), a section 1 violation was found
when a by-law required nonmembers seeking membership in the Association to pay enormous
admission fees. The Court indicated that the arrangement was designed to limit competition
and, as such, could not be immunized by adopting a membership device to accomplish that
purpose. This rationale would seem to be applicable to a bank association context. See Note,
Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, supra note 469, at 588.
498 Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, supra note 469, at 588.
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of its nonbanking competitors; otherwise, account holders would not consider
utilizing the association's services. In the present check collection system, or in a
Less-Check Society, nonbanking entities might have to require payment by check
in order to prevent wide-scale bank financing of customer accounts. This would
be inadvisable. Nonbanking entities should seek a program in which they
would obtain the benefits of both instant money and interest income from credit
financing. In such a program, a credit transaction would consist of a procedure
slightly different from a normal debit transfer. In lieu of debiting the customer's
account at the time of the purchase and crediting the merchant's account, the
computer would verify the customer's revolving credit limit and authorize the sale
on the credit of the nonbanking entity. 99 At a later date the customer would
instruct the bank to pay the bill to the nonbanking credit card issuer. 0 As a
corollary, as consumers move toward having one cash-credit account with one
financial institution, most credit investigations will probably be conducted by
banks and the information stored in central information files. An individual's
credit rating will follow him wherever he goes. Denials of credit might be viewed
under such circumstances as concerted refusals to deal50' or may be enjoined as
blacklisting under the Clayton Antitrust Act. 2
Dr. Paul .Nadler, Professor of Finance at New York University, has dis-
cussed a similar problem of entry into the relevant market with respect to savings
and loan institutions. He wondered whether a savings and loan association would
be given sufficient access to the EFTS to allow funds from an individual's demand
deposits to be transferred into a savings and loan account. The solution might
require utility treatment for the EFTS. Dr. Nadler has stated that:
While no one can predict all the implications of this possibility, one can
assume that savings banks, savings and loan, and other competitors of
commercial banks will have to use the checkless society in the same way
that nonfinancial institutions use it.
Otherwise there is a likelihood that the automated transfer system will
be called a public utility and that the banks will be forced to act as common
carriers do in the transportation business-having to accept business from
any and all comers.
One can conclude, then, that either the banks will offer the checkless
society to their competitors willingly, or they will be forced to do so by gov-
ernmental intervention. No matter which approach is taken, one can
assume that banks and their deposit-type competitors will become even more
alike in form and function than is now the case. The step from this blending
of service to outright amalgamation into one financial form does not seem
too great from this vantage point.5 0 3
499 Will Associations Fit into the Checkless Society?, SAVINGS AND LOAN NEws, May
1967, at 28, 30.
500 Id.
501 Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Per-
sonal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 376 '(1966).
502 Id. at 376 n.157.
503 Will Associations Fit into the Checkless Society?, supra note 499, at 33.
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In order, then, to eliminate the risk of violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the bank association cannot condition entry into its program for small banks,
nor can it condition entry for savings and loan or nonbanking institutions in any
manner that might tend to reduce competition significantly.
As an analogy, the Supreme Court in the past has used the Sherman Act
to force industries maintaining pooling arrangements to modify the terms of
their agreements to permit competitors to have access to their pooled facilities.'0 4
For instance, in Gamco, Inc. u. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, the court
stated that:
Reasonable criteria of selection . . .would not violate the standards of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. But the latent monopolist must justify the exclusion
of a competitor from a market which he controls. Where, as here, a
business group understandably susceptible to the temptations of exploiting
its natural advantage against competitors prohibits one previously acceptable
from hawking -his wares beside them any longer at the very moment of his
affiliation with a potentially lower priced outsider, they may be called upon
for a necessary explanation. The conjunction of power and motive to
exclude with an exclusion not immediately and patently justified by reason-
able business requirements establishes a prima facie case of the purpose
to monopolize.50 5
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the antitrust laws are applicable
to a national securities exchange, a regulated industry, despite claims that the
presence of another statutory scheme, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
insulated such activity from antitrust liability. Beyond this narrow holding, the
Supreme Court, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,"'0 found that section 1
of the Sherman Act was violated when the Exchange directed two of its members
to discontinue private wire connections with two nonmembers who were over-
the-counter security broker-dealers. It was held that such action constituted a
concerted refusal to deal, a per se violation,0 7 since it denied the petitioners "a
valuable business service which they needed in order to compete effectively as
broker-dealers in the over-the-counter securities market."5 The Court held that
the private wire connection, which provided instantaneously available market in-
504 United States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Gainco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952); cf. United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
323 U.S. 612 (1945).
505 194 F.2d 484, 487-88 (1st Cir. 1952). This reasoning has been suggested as applying
to dominant newspapers, that ought to be forced to permit smaller competing papers to have
access to their printing plants. Barber, Newspaper Monopoly in New Orleans: The Lessons for
Antitrust Policy, 24 LA. L. Rxv. 503 '(1964). It appears to lend itself to an equally persuasive
argument for application to an association of banks.
506 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
507 Commentators have failed to agree whether the Court precisely held that the conduct
on the part of the Exchange constituted a per se violation or whether it applied a rule of reason
with respect to the regulated industry. It is arguable that the Court intended that the alleged
violation standing alone would have amounted to a per se illegal boycott, but that, although not
exempted by the regulatory scheme from the antitrust statutes, it should under the circum-
stances of the case balance the reasonableness of the Exchange's conduct with the objectives of
the securities legislation. Perhaps, a more accurate view is that the Court examined the reason-
ableness of the restraint to determine whether there was a concerted refusal to deal, which
when found to be present was labeled as illegal per se. For a discussion of this decision, see
Note, Stock Exchange Regulation of Nonmember Brokers, 71 YALE L.J. 748 (1962).
508 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963).
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formation, was an essential part of the process of constant communication.
Without membership in the network of simultaneous communication, the over-
the-counter dealers would have experienced a significant loss in volume of trading
due to the accessibility members had to the network."5 9 A distinct parallel could
be drawn with respect to an EFTS unless the bank association permits accessi-
bility to the system by nonmember banks and nonbanking entities having credit
extension programs. It would not matter that any legitimate business purpose
might outweigh in social importance the anticompetitive effects the system would
have; any concerted refusal to deal by the association would tend towards monop-
oly.
3. Tying Agreements
The tie-in sale utilizes "the market power of one product to increase the
market power of another product."51 A tying agreement has been defined as:
[A]n agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that
he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.5 1'
Tying agreements have been deemed illegal per se under both the Sher-
man51 2 and Clayton Antitrust Acts513 because they "serve hardly any purpose
beyond the suppression of competition." '5 14 While it is certain that an improved
payments mechanism will enable banks to provide many new services to their ac-
count holders, there will no doubt be resistance from those organizations whose
functions may be usurped by the banks who control the vast system of com-
puterized financial information. The expansion of bank services will be ac-
companied by challenges that:
The volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be
insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to ac-
complishment of monopoly seems obvious. Under the law, agreements are
forbidden which "tend to create a monopoly," and it is immaterial that the
tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full gallop; nor
does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the direction of
the movement.
51 5
509 Id. at 348.
510 E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 47 (1964).
511 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 '(1958).
512 See Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
513 See Clayton Antitrust Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). With regard to an EFTS, it
would appear that the Sherman Act would be applicable rather than the Clayton Act, which
applies only to contractual restraints involving sales or leases of commodities and not to ser-
vices. In United States v. Investors Diversified Services, 102 F. Supp. 645 (D.C. Minn. 1951),
it was held under the doctrine of ejusdem generis that money (in this case a tying product)
was not a commodity, good, ware, merchandise, machinery, or supply within the meaning of
section 3 of the Clayton Act.
514 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
515 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), appeal dismissed,
332 U.S. 747 '(1947).
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Banks must be wary of litigation directed against new programs until courts
become receptive, with respect to both market definition and the tying problem,
to expanded bank services. Even within an open market, banks could be sub-
jected to arguments that their control over demand deposits and/or computer-
ized clearinghouses enables them to engage in ilegal tying arrangements. Many
questions remain unanswered. For example, could the bank association success-
fully condition the extension of credit (the tying product) to small, nonmember
banks or nonbanking entities with participation in their credit card plan or in
the EFTS? Could the association condition entry into the system or use of its
facilities upon an agreement to relinquish competing credit plans? Could banks
with their ability to monopolize the credit industry through the use of an EFTS
or preauthorized payment plan tie in any of the new services made available by
the use of computer processing equipment? Whether any of the above questions
could be answered in the affirmative will ultimately depend upon the ability of
the banks to couple new services and improved technology with reasonable pro-
cedures enhancing continued competition.
The Supreme Court has explicitly included the control over credit within
the purview of the antitrust statutes. In Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel, the
Court stated:
[We can find no basis for treating credit differently in principle from other
goods and services. Although money is a fungible commodity . . . credit
markets, like other markets, are often imperfect, and it is easy to see how a
big company with vast sums of money in its treasury could wield very sub-
stantial power in a credit market. Where this is true, tie-ins involving
credit can cause all the evils that the antitrust laws have always been in-
tended to prevent, crippling other companies that are equally, if not more,
efficient in producing their own products. Therefore, the same inquiries
must be made as to economic power over the tying product and substantial
effect in the tied market, but where these factors are present no special
treatment can be justified solely because credit, rather than some other
product, is the source of the tying leverage used to restrain competition.1 6
As a result, it is evident that banks cannot legally extend credit to small,
nonmember banks or nonbanking organizations on the condition that they
participate in a present credit card plan or a future EFTS. Such a condition
would impose an involuntary burden upon nonmember banks and nonbanking
entities attempting to maintain a competitive system, since banks would have
sufficient economic power in the relevant credit market to restrain competition
in the market for the tied product."' Even if it was not possible to demonstrate
that banks maintain the requisite market dominance, sufficient economic power
could be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from
the uniqueness of its attributes.1 8
Similarly, banks by contract could effectuate an illegal tying agreement if
they directly or indirectly coerced consumers into utilizing new services made
516 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969).
517 See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
518 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
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possible by technological innovations. One such service, the one-check pay-
roll plan, 1 ' has been unsuccessfully attacked as constituting an illegal boycott
and an illegal tying agreement in violation of both section 1 and section 2 of the
Sherman Act. In Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank 20 a dispute
arose between two banks over the implementation of a one-check payroll plan.
Under the plan, teachers complied with their school boards' request to retain
checking accounts in the bank handling the payroll. The petitioner claimed
that, as a result, its growth rate had decreased as well as its ability to "cross-sell"
other bank services to lost checking account customers and to attract new teacher
accounts. However, the Supreme Court adopted the trial court's conclusion
that:
"The setting up of special acounts, when coupled with two free checks to
withdraw the funds and the provision for automatic transfer of the funds
to other banks, is a reasonable procedure. . ." and not an unreasonable res-
traint of trade.521
In addition, the Supreme Court found no evidence of any intent to destroy com-
petition or to build monopoly power in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 2 2 While the Court was satisfied that the employees were not sufficiently
restrained by having to take some affirmative action on their own to transfer
their funds to some other bank, it went even further in citing to the trial court's
approval of the plan, stressing the plan's competitive nature:
"I see no reason why banks should not expand upon the use of modem
computers and perform payroll accounting services for customer employers.
There is nothing inherently wrong or questionable for banks to render such
service. Plaintiff banks can, and 'have, offered the same type of service. They
and other banks are completely free to compete with defendant in this field.
Progress and the utilization of new instrumentalities and procedures are
not prohibited by the Sherman Act. . ...5'3
The progressive attitude expressed by the court is persuasive authority that
new and increased bank services will find favorable judicial reaction in an EFTS.
However, one must be aware that in Bank of Utah the service provided was
able to actually generate a competitive impetus to others. Other services might
not have such potential. Banks must proceed cautiously into new ventures so
as not to tip the competitive balance too heavily in their favor. The mere fact
519 The court in Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, 369 F.2d 19, 22 (10th Cir.
1966), explained the operation of such a plan as follows:
Briefly the "no-check" payroll plan operates as follows: the bank computes the
payroll from basic earnings and deductions data provided it by the board. The board
issues to the bank one check in the amount of the total net payroll due. The bank in
turn credits the net wages due each employee to special checking accounts set up with
the bank in the name of each employee. Finally, the bank sends the employee a
monthly statement showing gross pay, deductions, and the net pay deposited to his
special account. The bank also prepares various other documents, such as social
security and withholding tax forms.
520 369 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967).
521 Id. at 23.
522 Id. at 26.
523 Id. at 23 n.5.
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that the power to monopolize was "thrust upon" banks by reason of the superior
skills, better products, natural advantages and efficiency524 made possible by the
use of computerized financial information will not serve as a defense to a charge
of actual monopolization if the acquisition or retention of monopoly power is in
part caused by other business actions having an exclusionary effect. 25 Tying
agreements and concerted refusals to deal would have such exclusionary effect.
F. Admission of Computer Print-Outs
as Business Records
1. In General
The increasing use of computers in the electronic payment system context
is altering the nature and the form of evidence that lawyers have become ac-
customed to encounter. According to the American Federation of Information
Processing Societies, in 1950 there were approximately 10 to 15 active computers
in the United States. By 1967, there were 35,200, and it is estimated that by
1975 the number will have risen to 85,000.526 As a result, record-keeping in
its traditional manner is being replaced by a new concept in which many of the
traditional written records created at intermediate stages no longer are neces-
sary. The incredible speed of the computer maximizes the availability of needed
information by minimizing and avoiding unnecessary duplication of records.
Several other characteristics distinguish computer record-keeping. Whereas
traditional record-keeping systems are usually cumulative in nature, computerized
systems, to reduce costs, correlate information as it is fed into the computer,
destroying old records in the process. Also, the form and content of computer
records are substantially different. In pure physical form, the computerized rec-
ord consists of patterned punch cards and magnetic or paper tapes. As such,
it is unreadable as contained in the computer's storage device. Since the record
must be translated in the form of a computer print-out, it is subject to the objec-
tion that it is a document created especially for trial and therefore not within the
business entries exception to the hearsay rule." 7
We are concerned primarily with the impact of computers upon the law
in the area of their use by banking and other industries affecting the payments
system. The mature automation demanded in a Less-Check Society makes it im-
perative that the state of the law concerning the admissibility of computer print-
outs as an exception to the hearsay rule be discussed. As new systems are im-
plemented and many of the indicia of sales and bank accounts are eliminated,
disputes among cardholders, merchants, and issuers will inevitably lead to con-
troversy over what records, if any, comprise the best evidence and fall within the
scope of admissible business records. Since our society is now deeply committed
to computerized record-keeping, it will be the duty of the lawyer to acquaint
524 United States v. B. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 '(D.C. Del. 1953),
aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
525 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
526 McCarthy, Information, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 1966, at 65, 67.
527 Freed, Evidence, in CoMPuTERS AND THE LAW 139, 141 (2d ed., Bigelow, 1969); see
text accompanying note 554 infra.
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himself sufficiently with computer fundamentals so that he can effectively assure
the admission of computer records into evidence.
The most widely used general purpose computer is the digital computer. It
is separated into five basic components: input, memory, control, arithmetic, and
output.128 When information is collected, it is placed into an input device which
translates the data into machine readable language, using a system of signals
to convert the information onto punched cards, magnetic or paper tapes, electric
typewriters, printers or voice response units. Once translated and put in the
proper form, the input device feeds the information into the computer memory
device, which essentially acts as a storage center until information is needed.
Storage is accomplished by use of internal devices called magnetic cores and by
external devices such as magnetic tapes, drums, disks or cards, paper tapes,
electronic circuits, or punched cards. The core devices are high speed and fast
access devices that contain data that must be readily available at any time. The
external devices contain backup and other data that are removed from the
computer and filed, making it possible to store an almost unlimited amount of
information with less speed and slower access. When information is needed, it
can be collected by means of a program, which, when placed into the computer,
activates the control unit. The control unit responds to the instructions in the
program by selecting the necessary information from the memory device and
sending signals to the other elements of the computer, commanding them what
they are to do when the information arrives. The control unit first sends data
from the storage device to the arithmetic unit, which, through a system of com-
ponents and circuits, breaks down, combines and rearranges information to
achieve the requested result. The answer is then delivered back to the memory
device and forward to the output device, which either delivers the answer in
machine-readable form or translates it into English. Both results are known as
print-outs.52
In examining the questions regarding admissibility, it must be noted that
since no written records are retained during the process by which the computer
arrives at its final conclusions, evidence of the proof of actions taken by the
computer is merely circumstantial. As a result, attention must be focused not
only upon the admissibility of computer records as evidence and the weight to
be accorded such evidence, but also upon matters of proof, viz., the laying of a
proper foundation to prove that the information is trustworthy and that the
performance of the computer is reliable.
In ascertaining the impact, if any, computer records have on the rules of
evidence, all possible problems of proof will not be considered. A rather complex
variety of computer-derived evidentiary materials may be involved in litiga-
tion." ' The emphasis here will be on records created by computers, known as
528 Freed, Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, in 16 Am. JUaR. PROOF OF FACTS 273, 280
(1965).
529 Id. at 279-93.
530 Professor Freed lists a representative number of these materials:
1. Original documents in traditional form, such as purchase orders, invoices, and
credit memoranda, which provide basic information for input to a computer
system.
2. Media by which information is inserted into or taken from computers, such as
1266 U.une, 1972]
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print-outs. Specifically, the problems encountered by the business records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, as applied by the common law and by statute, and the
applicability of the best evidence rule to computer records will be analyzed. In
addition, there are problems concerning discovery of computer records, including
the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum, and the use of expert witnesses to make
statistical analysis of large masses of information; these particular problems re-
late to laying the proper foundation to assure the accuracy and reliability of the
computer records.
2. Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted." 1 A
"statement" in this context "means not only an oral or written expression but
also nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for words
in expressing the matter stated."5 2 As such, it is patently clear that a print-out,
which is a written statement, is hearsay, and to be admissible it must fall within
one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
a. The Common Law Shop-Book Rule
Historically, an exception arose whereby regular entries were admissible
if (1) made routinely during the course of business, (2) entered contemporane-
ously or within a reasonable time of the transaction recorded, (3) by a person
unavailable as a witness, (4) who had personal knowledge of the event, and
(5) no motive to misrepresent or misstate.533 This common law exception be-
came known as the "shop-book rule." '534 This exception is justified because of
the presence of two elements: unusual reliability and necessity. 35 The reli-
ability stems from a high degree of accuracy attributable to business records.
While it is true that computer accuracy has not been perfected, it is a key factor
to be considered both in assessing the admissibility of computer print-outs in
evidence and the weight to be given that evidence. Both machine and human
error predictably will occur.
Despite the common high regard for personal responsibility and the
exercise of judgment, human participation in computer operation is a sub-
punched cards and punched paper tape.
3. Records created by computers, perhaps, in the form of punched cards, magnetic
tapes, or print-outs.
4. Computer programs, both verbal and in machine language.
5. Logs of computer operations.
6. Manufacturers' specifications for computers.
Id. at 295.
531 0. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF TEE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 225 (1954).
532 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 62(1).
533 E. FISCH, NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 831 '(1965); for further discussion see C. Mc-
CoaixcK, supra note 531, at § 283.
534 For an early statement of the rule, see Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 461 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct 1815).
535 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 531, at § 281.
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stantially greater source of inaccuracies and fallibility than the machine
mechanism itself, and precautionary steps are required. 38
Simply to contend that computer print-outs are inadmissible because a de-
gree of error is present would be to place a discriminatory restriction upon com-
puter records, which traditionally has not been placed upon man-made records.
In a landmark decision, Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib,537 the court indicated
that the consideration of computer accuracy and human error should go only
to the weight and credibility of the evidence and not to its admissibility.53 A
complete foundation was laid in this case. Witnesses testified that the methods,
practices, programming and systems utilized were part of "a well-established
business procedure not only in the trade, but specifically in the very com-
pany. . . .,3 In this determination that computer reliability is a function of
the weight to be accorded the evidence and not its admissibility, the court inter-
preted the Nebraska Business Records Act,"4 ' which contained no express pro-
vision regarding this point. Some states,5 4' however, and the federal government
have included a provision specifically designating that: "All other circumstances
of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge
by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but such circum-
stances should not affect its admissibility.
542
It appears, then, that those prerequisites involved in the formulation of the
shop-book rule543 that tend to show probable reliability need not be demonstrated
in order to admit computer print-outs within the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. Nevertheless, all factors which would bear on the reliability
of the records are still necessary to assure that the evidence will be accorded its
proper weight. Therefore, the proponent has to present to the court testimony
establishing not only compliance with the common law or statutory business
records exception to get that evidence admitted, but also has the burden of
establishing a proper foundation for the accuracy and reliability of the print-outs.
In this connection, Professor Roy Freed has said:
The following facts tend to establish the accuracy of the computer, the
precautions taken to prevent errors, and the use of the computer in the
usual course of business and as an integral part of the record-keeping pro-
cedures of the business ...
-Identity of record custodian
-Familiarity of record custodian with machine accounting procedures
-Description of machine accounting procedures
-Precautions taken to prevent errors
536 Freed, A Lawyer's Guide through the Computer Maze, 6 PRAO. LAW. 15, 25 (Nov.
1960).
537 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
538 Id. at - , 132 N.W.2d at 875.
539 United States v. Olivo, 278 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1960).
540 NEB. RyV. STAT. § 25-12,109 (1964). Nebraska's act is based upon the UNIFORM
BusINEss RECORDS AS EviDENcE ACT.
541 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico,
New York, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin.
542 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
543 See text accompanying note 533 supra.
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-Correction of errors discovered
-Explanation of the reason magnetic tapes are erased
-Establishment of the usual and customary business methods
-Explanation of reason for elimination of unnecessary machine opera-
tions.
Such testimony would be most effective if given by a supervisor or computer
expert, with an emphasis upon error-prevention and safety measures. However,
the emphasis should not be so effective that it would raise an impression that the
computer is error-prone. "5
Prior to the development of the shop-book exception, the common law re-
quired that all witnesses connected with an entry be produced before a business
record would be admitted. The second element underlying the recognition of
the business records exception, necessity, is based upon a realization that the
purpose of the historical requirement is outweighed by the burden of a time-
consuming and practical inconvenience to the numerous persons involved. As
a result, all states that have considered the complex and specialized systems for
keeping business records have found it a matter of necessity to eliminate this
cumbersome aspect of the common law. They have done so either by adapting
the common law to a more practical view towards computer print-outs54 6 or
by interpreting and enacting statutes that eliminate the need to identify, locate
and produce as witnesses the individuals who made the entries in the regular
course of business . 47
b. Codifications of the Shop-Book Rule
The first attempts to codify the shop-book rule arose before use of com-
puterized business records became prevalent. The eventual problem in those
states will revolve around the question whether or not computer print-out rec-
ords satisfy the requirements of the business record statutes, which were enacted
in light of conventional forms of record-keeping. An alternative suggestion is
that states may, in lieu of stretching statutory language beyond its original scope,
treat the problems of computer records independently and find that the statutes
are not applicable to computer print-outs. In doing so, courts could free them-
selves to use the more flexible standards provided by the common law.r
In order to reduce the burden of producing or demonstrating the unavail-
ability of every person who participated in the entry, a Model Act was proposed
in 1927. Its avowed purpose was to reduce this burden by permitting records
to be substantiated by anyone who knew they were made in the regular course
of business. In 1928, New York became the first state to enact this statute as a
consequence of its judicially expressed disfavor of the technical common law
544 Freed, supra note 528, at 310.
545 Note, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records, 55 CORNELL L. Rv. 1033,
1044 (1970).
546 King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
547 For example, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act provides that a business
record shall be competent evidence "if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation... ." (emphasis added).
548 Note, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records, supra note 545, at 1048.
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rules."' In effect, it extended the shop-book rule to allow the admission of
records made in the ordinary course of business that had been shown to be
trustworthy and eliminated the requirement that all those who participated in
the entry testify.5"' This Act provided the impetus for the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to propose the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act in 1936. The Act reads as follows:
§1. Definition.-The term "business" shall include every kind of busi-
ness, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether
carried on for profit or not.
§2. Business Records.-A record of an act, condition or event, shall,
insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other quali-
fied witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it
was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act,
condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of in-
formation, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its ad-
mission.551
This Act went further than the Model Act in that (1) it included "condi-
tions" within its scope; (2) it was more specific than the Model Act in elimina-
ting the need to produce all available participants. Whereas the Model Act
does this by inference from the absence of that requirement, the Uniform Act
provides that the evidence will be admissible if it is attested by its custodian "or
other qualified witness;" (3) the Uniform Act confers upon the court a clear
discretion to admit the evidence if it believes that the "sources of information"
would justify it. 52 This provision could be relied upon to rebut the argument
549 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Rule 4518 '(McKinney 1963), replacing without substantive change
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 374(a), N.Y. Laws 1928, c. 538, § 374(a), provides:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise,
made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall
be admissible in evidence in proof of that act, transaction, occurrence or event, if
the judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business and that it
was the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction,
occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances
of the making of the memorandum or record, including lack of personal knowledge
by the maker, may be proved to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admis-
sibility. The term business includes a business, profession, occupation and calling of
every kind.
550 Id.
551 Twenty states have enacted statutes either identical to or substantially the same as the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Ten states have
enacted statutes identical with or substantially the same as the Model Act: Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode
Island. Three states combine aspects of both the Uniform Act and the Model Act: California,
Iowa, and Wisconsin. Kansas and New Jersey have enacted the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
Texas has enacted a statute based upon the Uniform Act with two significant differences. First,
the "regular course of business" requirement specifically maintains the personal knowledge
requirement for the entrant or one with a duty to transmit to the entrant. This factor goes
to the admissibility and not to the weight of the evidence, as required by the Uniform Act.
Second, the court's discretion is limited because the requirements for admissibility are narrow-
ly defined. For further explanation of the Texas statute see Comment, The Admissibility of
Computer Printouts Under the Business Records Exception in Texas, 12 S. T-x. L.J. 291
(1971). Fourteen states have retained the common law shop book rule: Alaska, Colorado, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia.
552 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 531, at § 289.
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that the computer print-outs are documents created especially for trial and there-
fore not within the statute's protection.
In those states that have adopted the Model Act, 5" no case has been decided
concerning the admissibility of computer print-outs into evidence. There appear
to be two problems presented by the Model Act which do not exist under the
Uniform Act. First, the Model Act clearly states that it is the "writing or re-
cord" sought to be introduced that must be made during the regular course of
business, whereas the reference to "sources of information" in the Uniform Act
is ambiguous enough to mean that if either the record, i.e., the print-out, or
the sources of information, i.e., the input stored within the computer, is made in
the regular course of business, the print-out would be admissible if all other
conditions are met. Thus, the states that have enacted legislation based upon
the Model Act may experience difficulty in admitting the print-outs since they
are merely translations of the writing or record found in the computer's storage
device. As such, they are documents normally prepared for trial and thus not
in the regular course of business. However, this argument has not been accepted
by states under the Uniform Act since it exalts form over substance. It is suffi-
cient that the print-out is a compilation of existing records produced in the
regular course of business.5"
With regard to the second problem, the Model Act omits any mention of
who is to testify as to the identity and the mode of preparation of the evidence.
Although enacted expressly with the intent to make it unnecessary for all partici-
pants to testify, it would be illogical for the courts in Model Act states to infer
that all restrictions were removed. To do so would undermine the aspect of
unusual reliability which is the foundation for the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. Rather it is hoped that the courts in those states will insure
the element of reliability by construing the statute to require either the custodian
or some other qualified witness to testify, as is required by the Uniform Act."5
The business records exception under the common law required the records
to be "produced by one who had personal knowledge of the facts recorded and
whose job it was to know the facts in the regular course of business. As technology
developed and the number of people involved in transactions increased, it be-
came more difficult to prove who actually had, or whose duty it was to have,
knowledge of the facts recorded. One purpose, then, of the adoption of both
the Model Act and the Uniform Act was to remedy the practical inconvenience
that had resulted by providing that all that is necessary is that the one who
testifies establish that the evidence was made in the regular course of business
by persons who had actual knowledge of the event recorded.55 The Model Act
includes a provision specifically stating that lack of personal knowledge by the
entrant or maker will affect the weight but not the admissibility of the evi-
553 See note 551 supra.
554 Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, - , 132 N.W.2d 871, 875(1965). It could also be said that since the real record exists within the computer's storage
area, any print-out is at best a copy of the real record, and thus inadmissible. See text accom-
panying notes 616-26 infra.
555 Note, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records, supra note 545, at 1040.
556 5 J. WIGMosR, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERIaN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRsAS
AT C MMON LAW § 1530, 1530a (3d ed. 1940).
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dence.55 7 At first, this might seem to indicate that personal knowledge by one
whose job it is to know the facts is no longer necessary. It has been held, however,
that this provision means only that the one who testifies, i.e., the entrant or
maker, need not have personal knowledge of the facts. 58 It is still required that
testimony be furnished that someone in the regular course of business had the
duty to know, and in fact did have personal knowledge of the facts. The Uni-
form Act contains no reference whatsoever to the element of personal knowledge.
Instead, it leaves considerable discretion in the court to evaluate the "sources of
information, method and time of preparation." '5 9 Applying this standard, the
courts have held that the sources of information should be based upon the per-
sonal knowledge of the witness testifying (entrant) or of the informant, someone
who has a business duty to observe the facts and report to the entrant.58 0
Upon close inspection, the discretion given the courts by the Uniform Act
would seem to permit a broader admissibility than has previously been recognized.
Records would be admissible even if made without personal knowledge of any-
one in the regular course of business who had the duty to know, as long as other
sources of information establish a reasonable guarantee of trustworthiness. If
true, this further liberalization of the hearsay rule will have important ramifica-
tions upon the EFTS envisioned for the Less-Check Society.
A unique problem arises when a record is produced in a completely auto-
mated system. In such a case, information is received by a computer or some
other monitoring device, which transmits it to another computer, where it is
recorded on tape for storage or use. No one would have obtained personal
knowledge of the record or even the sources of information. Computer print-
outs would appear to be inadmissible in those states which still require that
557 See note 549 supra.
558 The cases indicate that in those states following the Model Act, business records will be
inadmissible if the testimony shows that the record was made by persons who were neither
engaged in the regular course of business nor had any duty to know the facts reported. Cox v.
State of New York, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818, 148 N.E.2d 879 (1958); Geroeami
v. Fancy Fruit and Produce Corp., 249 App. Div. 221, 291, N.Y.S. 837 (1936); Beasley v.
Huntley Estates, 25 Misc. 2d 43, 137 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1954); Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124,
170 N.E. 517 '(1930); C. McCoRMIK, supra note 531, at § 286. If the person who recorded
is the entrant, the record is admissible if the person who supplied that record had the duty to
do so in the regular course of business. Kardas v. State of New York, 44 Misc. 2d 243, 253
N.Y.S.2d 470 (1964); see also Comment, Computer Print-Outs of Business Records and Their
Admissibility in New York, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 61 (1967).
559 UNIFORM BUSINESS RECoRnS AS EVIDENCE ACT § 2.
560 Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 114, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561, 416 P.2d 793
(1966). Furthermore, in Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Company, 328 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959),
it was held that the business record would be admissible even though the entrant was not em-
ployed in the regular course of business at the time of the act, condition or event recorded;
nor did the entrant have personal knowledge of how or when the record was created. In
addition, the court extended the Missouri statute to mean that the testimony of a witness
as to the mode of preparation need not be based upon personal knowledge, as long as other
sources of information are present to justify its admission.
In Fauceglia v. Harry, 409 Pa. 155, 185 A.2d 598 (1962), it was held that under the
Uniform Act, the entrant is not required to have personal knowledge of the event recorded,
as long as someone else in the organization has personally observed the event recorded.
In Fagen v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 188 A.2d 427 '(1963), the court held that where
the entrant had no personal knowledge and where the informant was under no duty to any-
one to make a truthful account of the facts in the regular course of business, the record will
not be admissible as proof of those facts.
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the entrant have personal knowledge of the record, 6' as well as in those states
that have limited this to proof that someone, not necessarily the entrant, had
personal knowledge of the event in the regular course of business. However,
those states that have adopted the Model Act or especially the Uniform Act,
as well as those states that retain the more flexible common law, have an oppor-
tunity to utilize the broad discretion vested in them. Despite the fact that neither
the entrant nor anyone else had any personal knowledge, the reliability of the
completely automated system is even greater than one involving human partici-
pation 61 The absence of any specific reference to the necessity for personal
knowledge could be used to an advantage in this exceptional situation, due to
the high degree of trustworthiness present. However, these same courts would
be wise to judicially interpret those statutes to maintain the personal knowledge
requirement in all other instances not presenting such extraordinary reliability.
In 1936, the federal government followed the example of the Model Act
and enacted the Federal Business Records as Evidence Act.56 This was followed
in 1942 by the promulgation of the American Law Institute's Model Code of
Evidence, 64 Rule 514 of which is noteworthy in a number of respects.
First, it applies not only to acts and events but also to conditions. Second, it
includes as a business, every kind of institution, and makes it clear that
conduct for profit is not essential to a business. Third, it clearly provides
that the person having knowledge of the act, event or condition, either must
make the memorandum or must in the course of the business transmit the
information for inclusion in the memorandum.56 5
Apparently the drafters opposed the broad discretion vested in the courts under
the earlier statutes, even though they had historically been interpreted to include
the personal knowledge requirement. Perhaps this absence of any discretion
which could be exercised to eliminate the personal knowledge requirement in
a situation where it was clearly warranted, such as in an entirely automated sys-
tem, accounts for the fact that no state has adopted this statute.
In 1953, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
561 Such as in Texas and in those states adopting the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (Rule
514). The same result would obtain under the PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (Revised Draft March 1971), 51 F.R.D. 315(Rule 803 (6)) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE].
562 Comment, The Admissibility of Computer Printouts Under the Business Records Ex-
ception in Texas, supra note 551, at 299.
563 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970), originally enacted as Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 640, § 1, 49
Stat. 1561. The same issues are presented in the federal system as in jurisdictions under the
Model Act.
564 Rule 514 reads:
A writing offered as a memorandum or record of an act, event or condition is
admissible as tending to prove the occurrence of the act or event or the existence of
the condition if the judge finds that it was made in the regular course of a business
and that it was the regular course of that business for one with personal knowledge
of such an act, event or condition to make such a memorandum or record or to
transmit information thereof to be included in such a memorandum or record, and
for the memorandum or record to be made at or about the time of the act, event or
condition or within a reasonable time thereafter.
565 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 514, Comment. This requirement has been applied to
pre-dated statutes through judicial interpretation. See text accompanying notes 557-60 supra.
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approved the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 6 ' Rule 63 (13), pertaining to busi-
ness records, was fashioned after the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act. This particular rule departed from the Model Code Rule 514 requirement
that the memorandum be made or have been transmitted by a person having
knowledge of the act, condition or event in the regular course of business. In
lieu thereof, it retained the broad discretionary powers vested in the courts to
examine the sources of information, method and time of preparation in their
determination of admissibility.
The most recent codification is the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
for the United States Courts and Magistrates." 7 Proposed Rule 1001(1) in-
cludes within the definition of "writings" and "recordings" forms of "data
compilations." '568 Computer print-outs would easily qualify as data compilations
and thus come within the rule.5
69
Proposed Rule 803 (6) would, unfortunately, retain the personal knowledge
requirement,"' rendering inadmissible information transmitted from one com-
puter to another. This dilemma could be resolved by tracing the chain of
transmission to a human source with personal knowledge, but this solution
might result in a loss of the desired form of the record. As an alternative argu-
ment, it could be said that all the computers used during the process constitute
a single computer.5 ' For example, in a dispute arising out of a single transaction
in an EFTS, the source of information for the computer print-out would be the
on-line terminal at the retail store. If the Proposed Federal Rule is construed
narrowly, the print-out of the transaction would be inadmissible because no
testifying witness (entrant) would have obtained personal knowledge; nor would
the on-line terminal be able to qualify as an informant since it could not person-
566 To date, only Kansas, New Jersey, the Virgin Islands and the Panama Canal Zone have
adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Rule 63(13) states that:
Writings offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove
the facts stated therein, if the judge finds that they were made in the regular course
of a business at or about the time of the act, condition or event recorded, and that
the sources of information from which made and the method and circumstances of
their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness, are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
567 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 803(6) states that the following is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule:
A memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form, or acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted
activity, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
568 See note 573 infra.
569 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 803(6).
570 Id.
571 This effect has been established by legislation in England. The Civil Evidence Act
1968, c. 64, § 5(3) states:
Where over a period the function of storing or processing information for the
purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in sub-
section (2) (a) above was regularly performed by computers, whether .. .
(a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
'(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that
period; or
(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in
whatever order, of one or more combinations of computers,
all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the
purpose of this Part of this Act as constituting a single computer . ..
[June, 1972]
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ally observe the facts and report them to the entrant. But, if the statute were
construed broadly to include more than just first-cycle print-outs, it could be
argued that the informant was the merchant, who punched in the amount of the
sale. The merchant would become the one with personal knowledge of the
transaction, and the print-out would be admissible, provided that you could
also prove that it was the merchant's duty to know the information in the ordi-
nary course of the card issuer's business.
However, if a dispute arose over a cardholder's account, involving a series
of transactions, it would clearly be impossible, no matter how far the chain is ex-
tended, to ever satisfy the personal knowledge requirement. Under these circum-
stances, the statute would render inadmissible evidence which is extremely reli-
able. For this reason it would be unwise for any state to follow the examples of
the Model Code of Evidence and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence." 2
There appears to be no dispute that a print-out qualifies as a writing or
record.57 There remains one criticism that has been voiced of all the statutes,
i.e., the requirement that the record be made "at or near the time of the act,
condition or event... ."'' With computers, it may not be possible to fix the
date of entry of the transaction into the computer. As a result, it will be more
difficult to prove the difference in time from the date of the transaction to the
date of input into or output from the computer. Given this obstacle, it will be
almost impossible to prove that the date of the print-out was "at or near" the
time of the transaction. The reliability of the traditional record-keeping system
was based upon the verifiability of the memory of the human participant.575
Since it appears that computers are in fact more trustworthy,5 7 it would seem
logical that this vague statutory requirement would be fulfilled if the computer
input, rather than the print-out, occurred at or near the time of the transaction.
However, the statutes specifically state otherwise, and, as mentioned above, at
times it may be difficult to prove when the input occurred.
In Transport Indemnity Ca. v. Seib, 77 it was intimated that print-outs
would be admissible if it could be proved that inputs are made as a part of the
day-by-day operations of the record-making party.5 78 In the context of an
EFTS, problems arising out of the requirement of a timely recordation would be
572 The same result would obtain in Texas, which has not adopted either the Model Code
of Evidence or the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
573 Although there are no cases directly on point, it has been held that no particular mode
or form of record is required by the Uniform Act. Transport Indemnity Company v. Seib,
178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965). In addition, in the Model Act it is made even more
apparent by reference to the phrase "[any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry
in a book or otherwise" (emphasis added). Rule 1001(1) of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence states that:
"Writings" and "recordings" consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their
equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photograph-
ing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation.
The Advisory Committee's Note clearly indicates that this would include computers and other
modern developments.
574 UNIFORm BuSINESS RECORDS AS EvWDNca ACT § 2.
575 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 531, at § 285.
576 Comment, The Admissibility of Computer Printouts Under the Business Records Ex-
ception in Texas, supra note 551, at 299.
577 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 '(1965).
578 Id. at ..-, 132 N.W.2d at 875.
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negligible. It is a well-established accounting procedure for banking and other
credit institutions to balance their accounts daily. When the use of on-line
terminals becomes accepted, input will occur simultaneously with the transaction.
It is only in those instances in which an institution transforms its traditional
record-keeping system to a computerized one that it may be difficult to contend
that the input occurred at or near the time of the transaction. For this reason,
it seems necessary to amend the statutes to "bring the realities of business and
professional practice into the courtroom," '5 79 and to insure that a narrow inter-
pretation of the statute would not "reduce sharply its obvious usefulness.
' 580
By eliminating the requirement of timeliness for a reliable EFTS, it would be
left up to the courts in their discretion to decide whether or not the reliability
of the system justified its admission.5 s ' The elapsed time between the transaction
and input into or print-out from the computer would merely be one factor in
the court's determination. And as the efficiency, accuracy and use of computers
in the payments system become more common, perhaps the need to prove that
input is part of the day-by-day operations of the recording party, as per Seib,
will be obviated through the doctrine of judicial notice." 2
c. Case Law
The leading case on the admissibility of computer print-outs is Transport
Indemnity Co. v. Seib."' In that case the defendant, who operated a fleet of
trucks in various states, was sued by an insurer for premiums claimed due under
an insurance contract. To prove the amount of premiums due, the plaintiff
sought to introduce into evidence an exhibit printed by electronic computing
equipment and prepared by the director of accounting for the plaintiff. The
director's testimony indicated that the figures reported and the computations
made were accurate calculations within his personal knowledge. He gave exten-
sive testimony in laying a proper foundation for admission of the print-outs.
This satisfied the requirements that the custodian or other qualified witness testify
to the identity and mode of preparation of the print-outs, that the print-outs
be made in the usual course of the plaintiff's business, and that the record-
keeping involved be an indispensable part of that business. And as previously
mentioned, the court held that the reliability of the computer was not a factor
to be considered in determining the admissibility of the print-outs. Rather, the
objections to the identity and the mode of preparation were relevant only in
considering the weight and credibility of that evidence.ss
579 United States v. Olivo, 278 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1960).
580 Id.
It has been suggested that an amendment need not delete anything and only add the following
clause:
or, that it was the regular course of that business to cause such memorandum or
record to be made automatically by a reliable automatic information processing sys-
tem and it was so made by such system.
581 Comment, The Admissibility of Computer Printouts Under the Business Records Ex-
ception in Texas, supra note 551, at 302.
582 See King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
583 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
584 Id. at ...... , 132 N.W.2d at 875.
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In admitting the print-outs into evidence, the court construed Nebraska's
Business Records as Evidence Act.585 In holding that the requirements of the
statute had been satisfied, the court, quoting from Higgins v. Loup Riuer Public
Power District,8 said:
The purpose of the act is to permit admission of systematically entered
records without the necessity of identifying, locating, and producing as wit-
nesses the individuals who made entries in the records in the regular course
of the business rather than to make a fundamental change in the established
principles of the shop-book exception to the hearsay rule.5s 7
The computer performed the bookkeeping functions of the plaintiff. Loss
information supplied by the defendant had been fed into the computer where
it had been recorded and stored on tape. At any time the computer could have
calculated the composite total of losses allocated to premiums and printed out
the results. The director's testimony included a verification of the computer's
calculations. Since the print-out involved no calculations other than those made
prior to storage within the computer, it was clear that the print-out merely in-
volved a change in the form of the record. The court was quite explicit in hold-
ing that no particular mode or form of the record was required by the statute.""
In concluding that the "sources of information, method and time of prep-
aration" justified admission, the court said: "The taped record furnished a
cumulative record based on information flowing into the office of the plaintiff
company day by day and fed into the machine in response to a systematic pro-
cedure for processing each insured's account." '589
Then, in response to the defendant's contention that the print-out was in-
admissible because it was made for use at trial and not in the ordinary course
of business, the court stated:
This argument exalts the form over the substance. The retrieval from
the taped record (exhibit 14) was made for the purposes of the trial. But,
the taped record and the information and calculations thereon were made
in the usual course of business and for the purpose of the business alone.
There is no merit to this contention. 5 0
Although this logic appears applicable to credit transactions, one must
wonder if the result would have been the same if calculations independent of
those already on tape had been necessary in order to produce the print-outs or if
the witness called upon to lay a proper foundation was not a "custodian or other
qualified witness." It would seem that as long as it could be proven that the use
of computers was a part of its day-by-day operations, this should satisfy the
element of unusual reliability upon which the business records exception to the
585 NnB. RE v. STAT. § 25-12,109 (1964).
586 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170 (1955).
587 Transport Indemnity Company v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253 ....... 132 N.W.2d 871, 874(1965).
588 Id. at ..... 132 N.W.2d at 875.
589 Id.
590 Id.
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hearsay rule is based. However, without testimony demonstrating the method
and system in use, the internal checks and proofs, and other circumstances in-
dicating trustworthiness, that evidence should be given little, if any, weight, at
least until the scientific reliability of that computer system is judicially noticed.
The Seib rationale was followed in two Arizona decisions. In State v.
Veres,"9 a computerized statement of a bank account was sought to be intro-
duced against a defendant criminally charged with passing NSF checks. The
assistant cashier who testified had not prepared the bank records, nor had any
knowledge of the mode of preparation or operational aspects of the machine. He
identified the records of the account as that of the defendant and testified that
checks are "encoded by machines" '592 as a part of the normal course of business.
The court held the evidence admissible under Arizona's version of the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act,59 finding no abuse of the broad discretion
vested in the trial court by the statute. 94 The court did not confront the issue
whether or not the assistant cashier was, in fact, a "custodian or other qualified
witness." '595 Nor was the mode of preparation ever established. While acknowl-
edging that the cashier's testimony did not conform to the ordinary degree of
care in laying a proper foundation, the court seemed to rely upon other sources
of information to justify its admission. 9 6 Perhaps this is an indication that as
the reliability of computers becomes more apparent, the foundation necessary to
establish the accuracy and reliability of that system will diminish.
In Merrick v. United States Rubber Ca.,597 a suit based upon a verified open
account, the plaintiff sought to introduce electronically reproduced records as
evidence of the account. It was shown that computer print-outs were used in a
record-keeping capacity as part of the regular course of business. The defendant
contended that a proper foundation had not been presented to justify the ad-
missibility of the print-outs. The plaintiff called as a witness an employee of its
credit department who was familiar with the account involved. This witness had
no personal knowledge of the actual physical operation of the computer, but was
generally familiar with this aspect of the plaintiff's accounting records. The court
held that the foundation presented was adequate, again placing special emphasis
upon the portion of the statute calling for the trial court's opinion as to ad-
missibility."9 While analogizing the case to Veres, the court did note that in Seib
a more meticulous foundation had been laid. Nevertheless, the court again
591 7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629 (1968).
592 Id. at ...... 436 P.2d at 637.
593 4 ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2262 (1956); 16 Apaz. REV. STAT. ANN. Civil Rule
44(q) (1956).
594 State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117 ........ 436 P.2d 629, 638 (1968).
595 4 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2262 (1956); 16 Azz. REV. STAT. ANN. Civil Rule
44(q) (1956).
596 The defendant had testified that:
[H]e knew that his bank account was not in good condition, that at the time of
the writing of the checks he had requested that the checks be not negotiated be-
cause the bank had asked defendant to refrain from writing checks until the matter
of his account had been straightened out, and that he had written checks to "cash"
which were not honored.
State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117- ...... , 436 P.2d 629, 638 (1968).
597 7 Ariz. App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968).
598 Id. at ... 440 P.2d at 317.
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broadly applied the statute in approving the employee as a "custodian or other
qualified witness."
The rationale of Veres and Merrick has been carried over into the federal
system. The Fifth Circuit, in Olympic Insurance Co. v. Harrison, Inc.,0 9 found
no merit to the contention that computer print-outs, which had formed the basis
of proof that the defendant had not paid over insurance premiums he had col-
lected, were unreliable. During the trial, the defendant had failed to raise any
specific objections to the accuracy and reliability of the print-outs. On the other
hand, the print-outs were shown to have been produced in the regular course of
business. In the light of these circumstances, the court decided that the discretion
vested in the district court by the Federal Business Records as Evidence Acte"0
established a prima facie aura of reliability, and held that the print-outs were
properly admitted.""
The Ninth Circuit followed this trend in United States v. De Georgia.!°a
There the court admitted into evidence computer print-outs to prove that no
transaction had been recorded, since the transaction was of the type that, if it
had occurred, would have been recorded in the regular course of business. The
defendant did not contest the fact that the records admitted were produced in
a computer system rather than in a traditional record-keeping system. However,
the court did point out:
While... it is immaterial that the business record is maintained in a
computer rather than in company books, this is on the assumption that:
(1) the opposing party is given the same opportunity to inquire into the
accuracy of the computer and the input procedures used, as he would have
to inquire into the accuracy of written business records, and (2) the trial
court, as in the case of challenged business records, requires the party offer-
ing the computer information to provide a foundation therefore sufficient
to warrant a finding that such information is trustworthy.603
The opinion seems to indicate that if the defendant does not raise any
objections to the foundations laid, the evidence would be admissible. However,
since it is the court's duty to determine whether or not the computer performs
with accuracy and reliability, the burden of establishing a proper foundation
should rest upon the one seeking to introduce that evidence, whether or not it is
objected to by an opposing party.
In states adhering to the common law shop-book rule, King v. State ex rel.
Murdock Acceptance Corp. 4 should provide a valuable precedent.60 5 King was
599 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969).
600 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
601 Olympic Ins. Co. v. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir. 1969).
602 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
603 Id. at 893 n.11.
604 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
605 Kentucky has accomplished this without reliance upon King. In Brown v. Common-
wealth, 44 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Ky. 1969), the court, in a cursory fashion, admitted computer
records under the common law shop-book rule. In justification the court said:
The witness was the supervisor of the district in which the records were made in
the normal course of business through an intricate computer process. As noted in
Time Finance Company v. Beckman, Ky., 295 S.W.2d 346, 349, the "shopbook rule"
is well-established in this jurisdiction. The records presented were admissible pursuant
to that rule.
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sued on a false notarial certificate of acknowledgment to a deed of trust. In
order to prove the balance due on certain conditional sales contracts, Murdock
introduced both the original contracts and computer print-outs showing the
complete record of each account. In order to lay a foundation, Murdock's Ac-
counting Manager, who was in charge of the data processing department, testified
that information regarding every transaction was recorded on tape and stored in
the computer daily in the ordinary course of business. He displayed a knowledge
of the computer's operation, including error-detection procedures, and admitted
that although he had no personal knowledge of the particular account here,
employees under his supervision did have such knowledge. The court noted that
the shop-book rule had been extended to include situations where personal
knowledge of the transaction recorded did not lie in the entrant but in those
who had supplied the information to him in the regular course of business." 6
After rejecting an argument that the print-outs did not constitute the best
evidence,0 7 the court concluded that it should adopt the common law rule to
accommodate the changes involved in electronic data processing:
[T]his Court is not dependent upon legislative action to determine the
question before us. The rules of evidence governing the admission of
business records are of common law origin and have evolved case by case,
and the Court should apply these rules consistent with the realities of cur-
rent business methods. 60 8
The court appeared extremely conscious of the progress made in increasing
computer reliability, citing section 609 of Jones on Evidence,' 9 which states that
"[T]he scientific reliability of such machines, in the light of their general use
and the general reliance of the business world on them, can scarcely be
questioned."6 10
In applying the shop-book rule to computer print-outs, the court dispensed
with the necessity of identifying, locating, and producing as witnesses everyone
who participated in the entry in the regular course of business, if proof was
offered:
(1) that the electronic computing equipment is recognized as standard
equipment, (2) the entries are made in the regular course of business at or
reasonably near the time of the happening or event recorded, and (3) the
foundation testimony satisfies the court that the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness
and justify its admission. 611
It is noteworthy that the court referred to "entries" rather than "record" or
"writing" in the second requirement. This choice of terminology can be viewed
606 King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 397 (Miss. 1969),
citing Grenada Compress Co. v. Atkinson, 94 Miss. 93, 47 So. 644 (1908).
607 Id. at 398.
608 Id. at 397.
609 Id. at 398.
610 3 B. JoNEs, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 609 '(Supp. 1971).
611 King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 1969).
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as an implicit refutation of the argument that print-outs are inadmissible because
they are especially prepared for trial.
d. Unresolved Issues and a Suggested Approach
It is not clear from King whether common law jurisdictions will admit
evidence upon the less adequate foundations laid in Veres and Merrick. In addi-
tion, several issues have not been presented in any Of the cases that might merit
future consideration. For example none of the cases have dealt with the
difficulty in laying a proper foundation to demonstrate the reliability of a com-
puter that arrives at a complex, independently contrived conclusion not verifiable
by examination of the input. 12 Cases to date have involved print-outs that only
store input and consolidate items at the time of output. In an EFTS, computers
will be required to make interpretive evaluations in areas such as credit ratings
and investment securities."1 ' The reliability of these value judgments will obvi-
ously be more difficult to establish. No case has specifically eliminated the
personal knowledge requirement in a completely automated system. No case has
judicially noticed the scientific reliability of computers. None have construed
the Model Act to apply to computer print-outs. No criminal case has decided
whether or not the admission of print-outs would violate the confrontation or
due process clauses of the Constitution.614 It is often quite difficult to lay the
proper foundation or to prove that the party testifying is a custodian or other
qualified witness.
A Less-Check context might not provide a forum for raising all of the above
issues, since the use of computers is not unique to the payments system. But it
will probably be in light of the broader scope of computer use contemplated by
the EFTS that the common law and the statutes will be tested. However, for
the present it appears that, in addition to proving literal compliance with the
statutory requirements, the laying of a proper foundation still serves two neces-
sary functions. First, to establish the identity and mode of preparation, computer
reliability must be established in order to gain admissibility. Second, the extent
of the foundation will, after admission, bear upon its weight and credibility.
Florida and Iowa have amended their statutes to include within their ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule a record kept by means of electronic data process-
ing.61 Other states are presented with two viable alternatives. Either their
legislatures can follow the examples of Florida and Iowa by amending their
statutes to conform to the practicalities of computer use or their courts can declare
that since their statutes were enacted to apply only to traditional record-keeping
systems, computer print-outs do not fall within the ambit of the statutes. This
612 Mills, Lincoln & Laughead, Computer Output -Its Admissibility into Evidence, 3 LAw
& COMPUTER TEcH. 14, 16 (1970).
613 See note 470 supra.
614 Mills, Lincoln & Laughead, supra note 612, at 21.
615 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.36 '(Supp. 1971); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.28 (Supp. 1971). In
addition, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that punched cards, magnetic tapes, disks, and
other machine-sensible data media used in the automatic data processing of accounting transac-
tions constitute records within the meanings of section 6001 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 and section 1.6001-1 of the Income Tax Regulations. Rev. Rul. 71-20.
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would allow states to utilize the flexibility afforded them by the common law, as
in King, rather than to stretch statutory language to absurdity by judicial inter-
pretation.
3. Best Evidence Rule
Even if computer print-outs qualify for admission as an exception to the
hearsay rule, an objection may be raised that the print-out does not constitute the
best evidence. The best evidence rule requires that to prove the contents of a
writing, you must produce the original, unless its unavailability can be explained
satisfactorily. 16 Its justification lies in the importance accorded to precision and
the corresponding risk of inaccuracy or misstatement if a copy or oral testimony
is introduced in place of the original.61
Even though a print-out would qualify as a "writing" or "record" under
modem definitions,"'8 there remains the objection that a print-out is merely a
copy of the original record stored within the computer. Historically, the best
evidence rule has generated a number of exceptions which might be applicable
to computer print-outs. One exception would be that if the original writings are
too numerous to produce, or so complicated that their production would only
confuse the jury, a summary or extract, such as a print-out, would be admissible
in its place, within the court's discretion. 19 A second applicable exception
excuses nonproduction when the original records have been lost or destroyed
with no fraudulent intent on the part of the party introducing the evidence."'
This exception could be construed to include the destruction of input by com-
puters in the ordinary course of business.
As improvements to the payments mechanism develop, the use of the sales
slip as a record of the computerized transaction will likely disappear. Neither
case law definitions nor statutory formulations of the best evidence rule seem to
present any appreciable difficulties to admitting print-outs of these transactions.
In Seib, the court seemed unconcerned whether the print-out was an original
record or a copy of the original claim files and reports.62' In King, the court was
more explicit in its acceptance of the print-out as the best evidence:
Records stored on magnetic tape by data processing machines are
unavailable and useless except by means of the print-out sheets such as those
admitted into evidence in this case. In admitting the print-out sheets re-
616 C. MCCORmICK, supra note 531, at § 196.
617 Id. at § 197.
618 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 1(13) states:
"Writing" means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photo-
graphing and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any form of
communication or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols,
or combinations thereof.
See PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 1001(1), supra note 573.
619 Public Operating Corp. v. Weingart, 257 App. Div. 379, 13 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1939). See
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 1006.
620 See UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 70(1) (a); PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
1004(1); Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 195, 228 '(1969).
621 Transport Indemnity Company v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253. ....... , 132 N.W.2d 871, 875
(1965).
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flecting the record stored on tape, the Court is actually following the best
evidence rule. We are not departing from the shop book rule, but only
extending its application to electronic recordkeeping.6 22
A majority of states 23 have enacted the Uniform Photographic Copies of
Business and Public Records Act, which provides for the admissibility of re-
produced records or copies if made during the regular course of business "by any
photographic, photostatic... or other process which actually reproduces or forms
a durable medium for so reproducing the original . . .",2 If interpreted
broadly, this statute would permit print-outs to be introduced under the best
evidence rule whether or not the original still exists, provided that the original
would have been admissible.625
In addition, the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence present the most
comprehensive solution to the problem posed by the best evidence rule. The
definition in Rule 1001 makes it clear that, if a proper foundation is laid to
show that the print-out is made within an accurate and reliable system, the
print-out will be considered an original writing or recording.62 6 Consequently,
under these proposed rules, no difficulty should be encountered in admitting
print-outs over best evidence objections.
622 King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 1969).
623 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico. New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
624 The Act reads:
If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or any department
or agency of government, in the regular course of business or activity has kept or
recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination there-
of, of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, and in the regular course of business
has caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photo-
graphic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or other process
which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the orig-
inal, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless held in a
custodial or fiduciary capacity or unless its preservation is required by law. Such
reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the orig-
inal itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in
existence or not and an enlargement or fascimile of such reproduction is likewise
admissible in evidence if the original is in existence and available for inspection under
direction of the court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or
facsimile, does not preclude admission of the original.
625 Id.
626 Rule 1001(3) states:
An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself or any
counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An
"original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data are
stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight,
shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."
In conjunction, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 1001(3) explains:
In most instances, what is an original will be self-evident and further refinement
will be unnecessary. However, in some instances particularized definition is required.
A carbon copy of a contract executed in duplicate becomes an original, as does a
sales ticket carbon copy given to the customer. While strictly speaking the original
of a photograph might be thought to be only the negative, practicality and common
usage require that any print from the negative be regarded as an original. Similarly,
practicality and usage confer the status of original upon any computer printout.
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
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G. The Right t Privacy
The growth in consumer installment credit in the past two decades has been
accompanied by a corresponding consolidation and organization of information
through the use of highly sophisticated computer devices. The implementation
of credit card plans saw the development of credit reporting agencies whose sole
purpose was to collect data on an individual's financial status and personal life.
Once information was provided there was no assurance that it would be used only
for the purpose for which it was submitted. On the contrary, a system of cooper-
ation developed among the various credit bureaus whereby access to records was
quite easily obtained by subscribers, employees, police and federal investigators,
not always for legitimate business purposes, however. When an individual was
denied credit, usually no reason was supplied for the rejection. Whether or not
the denial was based upon an inaccuracy or an omission in the dossier would
not be known to the individual because ordinarily, even if aware of the existence
of a record, he could not obtain access to it.627 As computers become more
widely used, a number of revolutionary effects will be evidenced. First, the col-
lection, storage and use of detailed information will be much more efficiently
accomplished. 2 Second, the use of computers will result in the collection of
more information at a substantially reduced cost.6"9
The new communications-information technology being developed has
begun to generate arguments about whether the constitutional right of privacy
will be adequately safeguarded. Until now, the information provided by credit
bureaus has not provoked these fears since previous invasions of the right to
privacy have been relatively small in dimension.3 0 Several reasons account for
this:
(1) large quantities of information about individuals have not been col-
lected and therefore have not been available; (2) the available information
generally has been maintained on a decentralized basis; (3) the available
information has been relatively superficial in character and often has been
allowed to atrophy to the point of uselessness; (4) access to the available
information has been difficult to secure; (5) people in a highly mobile
society are difficult to keep track of; and (6) most people are unable to
interpret and infer revealing information from the available data.63 '
As we have seen, the entire consumer credit system seems to be undergoing
a radical change. Financial institutions have begun to replace retailers in the
credit industry." 2 The far-reaching impact of the "money card" will permit a
consumer to handle all credit sales with his bank. Credit investigations need not
be made for each transaction. The bank will have to make an investigation only
when a customer opens an account. As each transaction for credit occurs, the
on-line terminal will be connected through the clearinghouse centers to the
627 Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 '(1968).
628 Campbell & Woods, Computers and Freedom, 2 LAw & COMPUTER TECH. 3 (1969).
629 Karst, supra note 501, at 360.
630 E. WEiss, supra note 310, at 62.
631 Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology
in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MIcH. L. Rlv. 1089, 1108-09 (1969).
632 Karst, supra note 501, at 375.
[June, 1972]
individual bank's computer which, after proper identification, will either author-
ize or reject the extension of credit on the basis of stored financial and personal
information. This record will certainly be more detailed and thorough than is
presently possible. If a consumer changes his account to another bank, the in-
formation will be transmitted to the new bank from the old one. As a result, ac-
cess to information will be more easily controlled; however, problems may still
arise concerning access and accuracy of records-problems that threaten to
destroy an individual's right to keep his business to himself. 3 Before we evolve
into a one-card system decisions must be made concerning how individuals are to
be credit-rated, how far an individual's private finances can be regulated,'
and how abuses of that credit-rating system can be prevented.
To prevent the use of the computer from becoming an instrument suppress-
ing man's individual freedom, precautions will be necessary to eliminate the risk
of the system's misuse. Generally the most significant dangers that must be con-
sidered have been developed under the following four classifications:
(a) Input, storage and delivery of erroneous information, whether
(i) incorrect or misleadingly incomplete factual material, or
(ii) wholly or partly erroneous or misleading opinions, deductions
or classifications, based on such material, or arrived at mistakenly or
misguidedly, or involving some wrong or misleading categorization
or generalization without requisite qualifications.
(b) Misuse of information by persons owning or employed to work
the computer system, e.g., disclosure to unauthorized persons.
(c) Deliberate or accidental extraction or use of information by out-
siders not intended to have or use it.
(d) Invasion of privacy, i.e., collection, collation, dissemination and use
of information which the ordinary person now considers to be
nobody's business but his own, and wide dissemination and use of
information which ought to be disclosed only to a few."35
The most serious problem in the past concerning inaccuracy has been dis-
covering the inaccuracy itself. Even when this was possible, it appeared that an
individual victimized by misinformation had little, if any, remedial action at
his disposal. Mistakes in input, storage, or delivery of information appear to
have been covered by the laws of defamation and negligence. However, the
doctrine of qualified privilege had been applied in libel suits where credit bureaus
provided erroneous information to subscribers who had legitimate business
interests at stake. 66 The privilege was only overcome by a showing of malice637
633 Id. at 375-76.
634 Naws FRONT, May 1968, at 30, 32.
635 Campbell & Woods, suprz note 628, at 5.
636 Wethereby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 201 A.2d 344 (1964); Shore v. Retailers
Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961) ; Barker v. Retail Credit Co.,
8 Wis. 2d 664, 100 N.W.2d 391 (1960). Some states, however, and England, deny the privi-
lege on the ground that credit bureaus are mere business ventures trading for profit in the
characters of other people. Johnson v. The Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 '(1886); Pacific Pack-
ing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 P. 1007 (1914).
637 H. E. Crawford Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1957); Hooper-
Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947).
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or conscious indifference and reckless disregard for an individual's rights." 8 In
addition, the privilege could have been vitiated by a showing that the particular
subscriber did not have a legitimate business interest in the report or if it was
released to the general public." 9
When computerized credit rating procedures are used by banks participating
in an EFTS, the qualified privilege will be extremely difficult to overcome. The
burden of proving malice will be nearly impossible, and any retailer with an
on-line connection with the bank through the clearinghouse would certainly be
an interested subscriber.
In an EFTS, the doctrine of negligent misstatement could impose liability
on banks and other participants in the system if erroneous information was fed
into or printed out of a computer due to the bank's failure to exercise reasonable
care in operating the system. Most jurisdictions, however, have not adopted this
theory as a basis of liability for inaccuracies in credit information.""
In addition to the risk of inaccuracy several other problems would be mag-
nified in an EFTS if only common law remedies were available. For instance, as
computers become more complex and bank services are expanded, computers will
be able to make evaluative judgments based upon stored information as well as
direct feedbacks or compilations. How could the opinion of a computer be
faulted? Even if a consumer tested the computer's judgment in court, it seems
that he would have an inordinate burden placed upon him in order to prove
liability. No action would be likely to succeed unless a presumption that the
computer was misguided in its evaluation is established in favor of the consumer.
That same presumption would also have to be applied when erroneous factual
material was transmitted by a bank operating within an EFTS.
In like manner, access to information has been relatively easy to accomplish
for anyone except the consumer. In an lEFTS computer time and stored informa-
tion could be shared with nonmembers of the system since the need for informa-
tion would put economic pressure on banks to centralize all data in a storage
area accessible to anyone who has access to the computer.6 4 In addition, the
computer could probably be tapped just like a telephone is today.642 In those
cases, the constitutional protection of privacy afforded individuals in wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping cases under the fourth amendment would appear
to be applicable. 43 However, a more difficult problem concerns the invasion of
638 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 345 S.W.2d 34 (1961); MI-Hall
Textile Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Shore v. Retailers
Commercial Agency, 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961).
639 King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 9 A. 705 '(1887); Calvin v. New York, New Haven
& Hartford Ry., 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 263 (1960); Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile
Agency, 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5
(1890); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358 (1893).
If a subscriber with a legitimate business interest obtains the information and transfers it
to disinterested third parties, the credit bureau has not been held liable. Peacock v. Retail
Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
640 Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, GRo. L.J.
509, 517 (1969).
641 Karst, supra note 501, at 360-61.
642 Id. at 361.
643 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
'(1967).
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privacy by unauthorized disclosure of private facts. An action developed in tort
whereby liability has been based upon publication of highly objectionable private
facts. To establish a prima facie case, the disclosure had to be public. Com-
munication of facts to an employer,'" or to an individual or small group of
people would not amount to an invasion of privacy. The facts disclosed had to be
private facts, and the facts published had to be objectionable to a reasonable
man. In an EFTS, stored information would be available to the public at large,
but dissemination of it to lenders would probably not amount to a public dis-
closure. Even if publication was established, investigations of credit would be
protected if they were reasonable. 45
The inadequacy of common law remedies, the development of constitutional
protection of the right to privacy for intrusive invasions, the realization that
computerization in credit reporting offers a vast potential for abuse, and the
mounting public concern for regulation, prompted Congress in 1970 to pass
the Fair Credit Reporting Act." 6 The Act was designed to regulate the con-
sumer reporting industry by requiring consumer reporting agencies to adopt
reasonable procedures to assure the confidentiality, accuracy and the proper use
of information.64 It applies to any information, personal or otherwise, collected
by banks, credit card companies, 4 and other credit reporting agencies. The Act
limits "consumer reports" to communication of information to third parties.
With respect to computer equipment:
Consumer reporting agencies employing automatic data processing
equipment, particularly agencies that transmit information over distance by
any medhanical means, must exercise special care to assure that the data is
accurately converted into a machine-readable format and that it is not
distorted as a result of machine malfunction or transmission failure. Pro-
cedures also must be adopted that will provide security for such systems in
order to reduce the possibility that computerized consumer information will
be stolen or altered, either by authorized or unauthorized users of the infor-
mation system.64 9
Consumer reporting agencies are required to keep their files current.
6 0
Upon request, a consumer must generally be given access to everything in his
file, including the sources of the information.6 51 If facts are disputed, the con-
sumer reporting agency is required to reinvestigate the information, unless the
agency has reasonable grounds for believing the dispute to be frivolous or ir-
relevant. 52 An important provisioni refuses access to governmental agencies of
644 Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (1969).
645 Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966).
646 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
647 Id.
648 It does not apply to any report issued on an individual's credit standing when the
initial issuance of a credit card is involved. Id. § 1681 (a) (d) (3) '(B).
649 Division of Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, at 8.
650 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (c) (1970).
651 Id. § 1681 (g).
652 Id. § 1681 (i).
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all but identifying information except where the government agency seeks the
information for one of the permissible purposes listed under the Act..
The Act requires that whenever an adverse credit report is the basis for a
denial of credit, the consumer must be made aware of the nature and substance
of the information which acts as the basis for denial and the identity of the source
of the information, if it be a credit reporting agency. " In addition, consumer
reporting agencies must inform consumers of the existence of investigative reports,
i.e., those depicting character, mode of living, personal characteristics and reputa-
tion, secured from interviews with friends, neighbors, and relatives and must
inform the consumer of his right and comply with his request that the informa-
tion be disclosed."5
Compliance with the FCRA is to be enforced by the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Criminal sanctions are provided for both obtaining information about
a consumer under false pretenses from a consumer reporting agency 5 6 and for
any disclosure by an employer of a consumer reporting agency to a person un-
authorized to receive the information.6 57 Civil liability is imposed if a consumer
can prove willful 6 8 or negligent659 noncompliance with the provisions of the
statute. Most importantly, the act provides, in substance, that:
A consumer reporting agency, any user of information, or any person
who supplies information will not be subject to a consumer's civil action
for defamation or invasion of privacy based upon information disclosed to a
consumer pursuant to the Act, unless the information is false and furnished
with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer or furnished negli-
gently in noncompliance with the Act. However, if the consumer also obtains
the information independently of the agency disclosures, such actions may
be brought. 60
The FCRA as an attempt to provide viable consumer protection will have
a substantial effect upon the consumer credit industry. However, the Act does
not limit the kind of information that can be gathered or reported. It does not
allow consumers to physically see and possess a copy of their file. It merely
requires the consumer reporting agency to disclose the contents of the file. It
appears that the consumer still bears an inordinate burden of insuring com-
pliance within the industry, as well as proving noncompliance when it occurs.6 '
Despite these problems, there is much to be said for the FCRA in its
attempt to create a uniform standard of protection for consumers. Consumer
credit on a large scale is a creature of our times. If an EFTS is to operate
653 Id. § 1681 (f).
654 Id. § 1681 (m).
655 Id. § 1681 (d).
656 Id. § 1681 (q).
657 Id. § 1681 (r).
658 Id. § 1681 (n).
659 Id. § 1681 *(o).
660 Division of Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission,
Compliance With the Fair Credit Reporting Act, at 28.
661 Note, Consumer Protection: Regulation and Liability of the Credit Reporting Industry,
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functionally and efficiently, banks and other credit lending institutions will have
to assure the consumer that credit reporting can be accomplished with a mini-
mum risk of inaccuracy, a maximum right of access, and a corresponding guar-
antee that irrelevant personal information will not be collected or released. In this
respect the FORA is a step in the right direction. For without these assurances,
banks and other institutions participating in an EFTS might find consumer
approval of the system an imposing, if not insurmountable barrier.
VI. Conclusion
This survey has described the trends leading toward a Less-Check Society
and the problems which will confront that society. It has described the pressures
militating for a change in our present check payments system, traced the evolu-
tion of the credit card industry as a transitional bridge between the two systems,
and, finally, discussed the problems to be resolved before such a system can
become a reality.
The principal pressure militating for change has been cost. As the flood of
paper characteristic of our check payments system has continued to increase, the
incentive has become greater to develop some alternative to that expensive and
inefficient system. For the time being, this pressure has been alleviated somewhat
by the development of MICR encoding which allows faster, less expensive
processing of checks. That is, however, but a short-range solution, providing
breathing space before the growing avalanche of paper.
The credit card revolution, beginning in the 1960's and continuing today,
will provide the bridge spanning the check and the "money card" payments
systems. Its contribution to the concept of electronic funds transfer has been
threefold: (1) it has accustomed the consumer to computer finance; (2) it has
made him conversant with card (as opposed to check) payment; and (3) it has
established some of the legal, economic, and technological groundwork upon
which the Less-Check concept can build.
That concept, technologically feasible today, will probably evolve slowly
because of the various consumer, business, and legal problems which remain to
be solved. The main consumer problem will be one of acceptability. An EFTS
utilizing computers, money cards, and a nationwide clearinghouse is, after all,
a rather extreme departure from the personal check. Congress is preparing for
the transition by proposing and enacting sensible measures designed to remove
some of the burdens of computer finance. These measures have gone a long way
toward making the credit card safe and convenient and should help promote
acceptance of the "money card." The main obstacle to Less-Check acceptability
remains the popularity of the check, a factor which only time and increased use of
the credit card can overcome.
The major business problems are the initial investment which such a change-
over will entail and the high volume of business necessary to support the system.
Technology does not appear to be a problem. Current industry developments
including project SCOPE, preauthorized payment plans, the ITS, touch tone
telephones and others indicate that, when the ultimate change-over becomes
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necessary, the technological groundwork will have been laid. Indeed, most of the
components of the Less-Check Society will be in experimental use in various parts
of the country during the coming year. The cost of the technology is the main
problem. A relatively large fixed cost expenditure requiring a significant volume
to ensure economic feasibility will be required initially. If present trends con-
tinue, however, this cost problem should ultimately solve itself. The banks will
invest in an EFTS when the cost of running the check payments system becomes
too great. As the use of checks continues to grow, the cost of processing them
will continue to increase. Ultimately, the point will be reached when the initial
Less-Check investment will be practical; at that time, the change will be made.
The legal problems are more complex, but it appears that the existing
legal structure is sufficiently flexible to facilitate the change. One of these prob-
lems is evidentiary-the validity of computer print-outs as evidence. Its solution
seems to lie in a simple process of modernization of statutory law, most of which
dates back to before the development of the computer. A highly integrated
electronic funds transfer system will also pose antitrust problems (monopoly,
concerted refusal to deal, and tie-in agreements). The establishment of a policy
of free access and of open competition between banks and nonbanking credit
institutions should provide an adequate solution, however. The system will pose
problems in the area of commercial law, but the Uniform Commercial Code, if
supplemented to include electronic credit transfers, would be sufficiently flexible
to cover whatever problems might arise. And, finally, a national clearinghouse
with a massive accumulation of personal credit information will pose problems
of privacy for the consumer. The law must work toward limiting access to and
preventing leaks of this information.
Any attempt to visualize future events necessarily results in a rather in-
definite outline. Our outline envisions a combination check-electronic payments
system, i.e., both the check and the money card will exist simultaneously in the
Less-Check Society (just as currency continues to exist with the check in our
current payments system). The change will be gradual. As regional systems of
electronic funds transfer develop and eventually link with one another to provide
a national communication system, fewer and fewer payments will be made by
check. The Less-Check Society will be more efficient and less costly, but, like any
revolutionary change, it involves a value judgment. The system will be me-
chanical and impersonal. It will involve a considerable savings to the banking
industry and, perhaps, to the consumer who will receive faster service, but at the
cost of some of his privacy. The benefits will be institutional and the defects
personal. However, if a judgment need be made, it must be in favor of change,
a change made inevitable by the apparent inadequacy of the present check
payments system to meet our future needs. The Less-Check Society presents a
viable alternative to that inadequacy and is, in our opinion, the answer.
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